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This Dissertation lays the groundwork for a private law theory of international investment law 
(IIL). This project intervenes in a polarized debate on the nature of the global investment regime. 
With few exceptions, the scholarship has tended to divide sharply according to stylized visions of 
IIL as either a system of private, commercial law, or a system of public law. The “commercial law 
school” tends to be associated with a thick, capital-centric vision of IIL – one that emphasizes 
insulating private interests from foreign state action. Scholars and practitioners in this vein tend to 
be apologists for the system, or advocates of only minimal structural reforms. By contrast, the 
“public law school,” tends to be associated with a thin vision of IIL, highly deferential to national 
sovereignty, where private interests take a back seat to bona fide national regulatory policy. Its 
adherents tend to style themselves as critics and reformers, decrying how the status quo seems to 
have sacrificed national regulatory autonomy at the altar of global capital. While the commercial 
lawyers have been far too dismissive of the threat posed by IIL to domestic public values, the 
public lawyers risk losing sight of the values states seek to achieve through IIL in the first place – 
the promotion of sorely needed foreign direct investment (FDI) and the protection of FDI 
providers. The debate thus far has proceeded mostly in caricature, and something important has 
been lost: the possibility of a nuanced system of international private law, sensitive to both the 
sovereign state’s public values and the private rights and interests of foreign investors whose 
protection is central to the object and purpose of the regime. These Chapters seek to fill that lacuna.  
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This Dissertation seeks to lay the groundwork for a private law theory of 
international investment law (IIL). This project intervenes in a polarized 
debate on the nature of the global investment regime. With few exceptions, 
the scholarship has tended to divide sharply according to stylized visions of 
IIL as either a system of private, commercial law, or a system of public law. 
The “commercial law school” tends to be associated with a thick, capital-
centric vision of IIL – one that emphasizes insulating private interests from 
foreign state action to whatever extent possible. Scholars and practitioners 
in this vein tend to be apologists for the system, or advocates of only 
minimal structural reforms. By contrast, the “public law school,” tends to be 
associated with a thin vision of IIL, highly deferential to national 
sovereignty, where private interests take a back seat to bona fide national 
regulatory policy. Its adherents tend to style themselves as critics and 
reformers, decrying how the status quo seems to have sacrificed national 
regulatory autonomy at the altar of global capital. While the commercial 
lawyers have been far too dismissive of the threat posed by IIL to domestic 
public values, the public lawyers have tended to lose sight of the ultimate 
value in IIL itself – the promotion of sorely needed foreign direct 
investment (FDI) through the grant of international protections for foreign 
property, state contracts, IP, and assets of all stripes. This project starts from 
the position that the debate thus far has proceeded mostly in caricature, and 
that something important has been lost: the possibility of a nuanced system 
of international private law, sensitive to both the sovereign state’s public 
values and the private rights and interests of foreign investors whose 
protection is central to the object and purpose of the regime. These Chapters 
seek to fill that lacuna.  
 This introductory essay situates the broader Dissertation within the 
intellectual history of international investment law. After briefly introducing 
the regime, I set out the main scholarly debate between the commercial and 
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public law schools. In so doing, I attempt to explain the absence of any 
theoretically satisfying study of the private dimensions of IIL, and explain 
the need for such an endeavor. I then establish the semantics of the broader 
project. I deploy the concepts of private and public law only as ideal types, 
rather than truly exclusive categories. These concepts are here used only as 
analytical devices, whose merit rests on what they can illuminate about IIL. 
The overarching goal of this project is to demonstrate that a private law 
hermeneutic can offer significant insights into the regime which have yet to 
be tapped, both toward diagnosing its pathologies and toward opening up 
promising avenues for reform. Finally, I introduce the Dissertation’s three 
main chapters: (1) The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment 
Law; (2) Corporations as Lawmakers; and (3) The Logic of Contract in a 






The international law of foreign direct investment has become, in recent 
years, a pillar of international economic law. This ever-expanding regime is 
now constituted by thousands of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free 
trade agreements (FTAs), and fleshed out through hundreds of published 
arbitral awards. The twin goals of these treaties seem narrow at first blush: 
to protect foreign investors from certain forms of state action; and thereby 
promote foreign direct investment. But the regime has generated enormous 
interest, among governments, scholars, and private litigants – in large part 
due to its surprising substantive breadth, and its central innovative 
institutional feature – investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
Institutionally, IIL empowers individual investors to directly sue sovereign 
states over violation of their treaty rights. As such, the regime has generated 
a level of activity in practice paralleled only by regional human rights 
litigation. At the same time, ISDS claims have touched all areas of public 
policy, from economic regulation to regulatory efforts concerning public 
health, security, morals, and the environment. This seemingly narrow 
regime of international law has thus already had a substantial bearing on the 
state’s sovereign policy space.  
Over the last decade, initial scholarly excitement about the regime 
has turned increasingly critical – and frequently alarmist. The global 
investment regime is increasingly cast as a bête noire in international law, 
for several of the very reasons grounding its success. From the national 
perspective, IIL has come under increasing fire for undercutting the state’s 
internal sovereign prerogatives, democratic choice and national self-
2
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determination. The regime has empowered private investors to collaterally 
attack sovereign regulatory measures of all stripes, through compulsory, 
binding, and highly enforceable international arbitration. From the 
international point of view, the sheer volume of investment treaties and 
arbitral awards has also generated significant concerns about the 
fragmentation of international law. Ad hoc arbitral tribunals have created 
significant interpretive inconsistencies, without any institutional mechanism 
for appeal, review, or harmonization – not only in the interpretation of 
common investment treaty terms, but also in the interpretation and 
application of general international law. Even in its best light, the regime 
remains troublingly incoherent, and at minimum it poses a real threat to 
national regulatory autonomy. 
IIL is, however, at an inflection point. While few advocate 
eliminating the regime entirely, there are also very few apologists for the 
basic status quo. And there is clear movement in the field, with states of all 
sizes and regions currently pursuing significant projects of reform. In the 
newest BITs and FTAs, states have tended to scale back treaty protections, 
or at least more clearly delineate their limits. Further, States are increasingly 
experimenting with new institutional forms, particularly in the so-called 
“mega-regional” agreements currently under negotiation: including the 
twelve-member Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership between the U.S. and the E.U. (T-TIP); the 
E.U.—Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA); 
and the U.S.–China Bilateral Investment Treaty (U.S.–China BIT). The 
most recent draft of the CETA, for example, would establish a permanent 
international investment court, with judges selected by the states parties, 
and mechanisms for appeal and remand. 1  Other recent models have 
included publicly minded institutional reforms like increased transparency 
and access for amicus curiae submissions, as well as interpretive 
mechanisms to ensure that states (as opposed to arbitrators) maintain 
primary voice in interpretation.2 For all the negative coverage of the regime, 
                                                
1 EU—Canada Comprehensive Economic Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Draft, 
(December 2015) , http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf; 
This court would be open only to investors bringing suit under the CETA, but the treaty 
envisions linking the court to other treaty regimes in the future, evincing more global 
institutional ambitions. See also EU—Vietnam FTA, Trade in Services, Draft (January 
2016), Investment & E-Commerce, Ch. II, Art. 12, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154210.pdf.  
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states clearly continue to see value in the use of investment treaties to 
protect and promote FDI – they have generally opted for reform over exit. 
Yet for all this productivity, and all the attendant legal, political, and 
scholarly interest, IIL remains remarkably poorly understood. Its precise 
doctrinal workings are, of course, expounded in countless treatises, 
monographs and articles. 3  And the consequences of the regime (or 
particular interpretive tendencies) for the state’s regulatory autonomy have 
been more than adequately expounded. We know how the doctrine works, 
more or less, and we know all about the basic tension between the 
protection of private rights and public regulatory values. But for all the 
pages written on BITs and ISDS, there has been very little theoretical 
attention to the core private dimensions of a regime self-consciously 
established for the protection of foreign property. For all its very real and 
significant implications for domestic public law and public values, IIL is at 
heart about regulating investments – which means property and contracts of 
all types, and, to an extent, other assets like, intellectual property (IP), 
sovereign debt, and business organizations. The main thing that investment 
treaties do is establish law and institutions to govern these private rights. It 
is therefore striking that so few studies of IIL even consider its manifold 
private dimensions – much less how analogous national regimes of private 
law are balanced against public values. This Dissertation seeks to fill that 
gap. 
I contend, throughout this study, that investment treaties have subtly 
brought into being robust (though incomplete) international legal regimes of 
contract and property, and are expanding into the realms of IP, corporate 
law, and sovereign debt. Despite the misleadingly sparse and general 
language of their substantive protections, investment treaties can only be 
properly understood and reformed if their private law dimensions are kept 
in view. And it is precisely here that the literature falls short. To fully 
understand this body of law, it must be understood in light of the widely 
varied assets it seeks to govern. In particular, it should no longer be 
assumed that investment treaty norms simply apply to all these different 
types of assets in the same way. Why should rules protecting a foreign 
investor’s expectations against state action play out the same way in the 
context of real property as they might with contracts specifically negotiated 
with the state? Or with IP? Or debt? In domestic law, by contrast, each of 
these assets are created and defined by discrete legal regimes which tend to 
be oriented around widely different values (ranging from autonomy and 
                                                
3 See, e.g., RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (2d ed., 2012); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
INVESTMENT CLAIMS (2005). 
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efficiency to incentivizing innovation). Absent any specificity in the 
treaties, there is no reason to assume that IIL converts such distinct legal 
rights and interests into an undifferentiated class of assets.4 Likewise, any 
project of reform should start from an appreciation of the variegated nature 
of the private rights protected by IIL – bearing in mind the discrete values 
and tradeoffs at stake in the regulation of such different types of assets. For 
example, there may be good reason to defer to states’ regulatory 
determinations regarding patent enforcement which simply do not hold in 
the context of regulatory takings of real property, or regulation which has 
vitiates the value of an investor’s contract with the state.  
This Dissertation intervenes in medias res, and starts from the 
position that reform is necessary. I share the critics’ concerns that IIL poses 
a substantial threat to local and global public values. The problem is that the 
main contemporary projects for reform remain wrongheaded in thrust, 
incomplete, and ultimately inadequate. Critics and reformers have tended to 
focus unduly on only one side of the puzzle: the real and perceived 
pernicious consequences of the regime for the state’s regulatory autonomy 
and public values. But by emphasizing regulatory autonomy over all else, 
these projects pay insufficient attention to the distinct private rights to 
which these treaties apply, and thereby risk losing sight of the regime’s 
central object and purpose – the protection and promotion of foreign direct 
investment. Moreover, they fail to grapple with the possibility that private 
interest and public values might be reasonably reconciled in different ways, 
depending on what kind of assets and measures are at issue. I argue that 
something valuable has been lost within the peculiar ebbs and flows in the 
literature, which this Dissertation seeks to retrieve: the private dimension of 
IIL, and, especially, the possibility of recasting IIL as a variegated body of 
international private law attuned to public regulatory values, democracy, 
and national self determination.  
Together, the articles comprising this Dissertation have two main 
goals. The first is to reveal the weakness in trying to resolve the complex 
tensions of international investment law by appeal to one-size-fits-all public 
law doctrines – a task I take up primarily in Chapter One. The second goal 
is to begin the hard work of constructing a more satisfying approach to 
reform, grounded in private law, with due consideration to the widely 
divergent interests and values implicated by regulating the such diverse 
assets as property and contract – not to mention IP, sovereign debt, and 
corporate entities. I begin this project in general in Chapter Two, and hone 
in specifically on the relationship between treaties and contracts in Chapter 
Three.  
                                                
4 Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229 (2015). 
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Why has there been no serious theoretical attempt to expound the private 
dimensions of international investment law to date? The likeliest 
explanation lies in the peculiar intellectual history of IIL. The regime has 
itself only come into existence within the last thirty or so years, but it 
generated little scholarly attention prior to the explosive public law 
movement in the early 2000’s. 
Within IIL scholarship, it is an old hat that the regime’s early 
evolution was led by commercial lawyers – scholars and practitioners 
steeped in private law, coming from the older field of international 
commercial arbitration.5 These lawyers brought with them a private law 
hermeneutic, which – the story goes – led them to an extremely investor-
friendly interpretive ethic. 6  And true enough, the early arbitral 
interpretations of investment treaties tended to be highly suspicious of any 
host state regulatory policy that undermined the value of an investor’s 
assets. Indeed, in reading BITs and FTAs as robust protections for private 
parties, a number of early awards seemed to seriously undermine the state’s 
sovereign capacity to regulate in the public interest.7  
The backlash against ISDS came in the early 2000’s – particularly 
following a series of arbitral judgments against Argentina, awarding 
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to private investors for losses 
arising out of the state’s efforts to manage its financial crisis in 2001–2002. 
Since then, a steady stream of scholars have excoriated the regime and its 
participants for failing to appreciate IIL’s public dimensions. Adherents of 
the ever-growing “public law school” have called for dramatic doctrinal and 
institutional reforms, to better safeguard public values, through, above all, 
an appreciation of the state’s fundamental right to regulate.  
                                                
5 See, classically, Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity 10 ICSID REV.—FILJ 232 
(1995); Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 3; See also Anthea Roberts, Clash of the 
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 45 (2013). 
6 Roberts, supra note 5; See also Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 
(2012), 32, http://www.wipol.unibonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-
workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12.  
7 See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003), discussed more fully in Corporations as 
Lawmakers, at 264.  
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The public law critique has taken a range of forms, some more 
thoroughgoing than others. But the basic pattern is the same. These scholars 
tend to associate the older commercial law school with private law and the 
interests of capital, as opposed public law with its greater sensitivity to 
public values. On that assumption, the critics have leveled a sustained 
attempt at rebranding IIL as fundamentally a regime of public law, with 
both descriptive and normative valences. They tend to make two basic 
moves. First, descriptively, they tend to highlight the public features of the 
regime. Typically, such arguments emphasize: the sources of IIL in treaties 
and custom (i.e. instruments of public international law); institutional 
arrangements, e.g. the practice in ISDS of issuing published arbitral awards 
smacking of case-law;8 the strong bearing of IIL and ISDS on public values 
like health, morals, and the environment;9 and even its broader impact on 
democracy and self-determination writ-large. 10  For these scholars, 
appreciating what they take to be the public dimensions of IIL reveals its 
paucity as a public law regime. Second, by apparent corollary, these 
scholars have sought inspiration and analogy for reform in other public law 
regimes – both domestic and international. Typically, these include calls for 
                                                
8  Canvassed in Roberts, supra note 5. Most of these descriptive arguments are not 
compelling. There is something particularly unsatisfying about pointing to sources as 
evidence that the regime is really best understood as public law. In domestic legal orders 
large swaths of property, contract, and tort are established by statute. Does that convert 
them into public law in any meaningful sense? Surely not. More relevant is what 
relationships these statutes regulate, between whom, and how they regulate those 
relationships. The mere fact that IIL is established by sources of public international law, 
similarly, should not make any difference in whether the regime is best described as public 
or private. Arguments emphasizing the institutions of IIL are hardly more satisfying – as 
they apply to most domestic private law regimes as well. Clearly there is something more 
“public” about ISDS than confidential commercial arbitration between private parties, but 
whether that hews toward understanding IIL as public law is suspect, given that domestic 
contract, property, and tort disputes are generally resolved in court. The real issue is the 
interplay between IIL and ISDS, on the one hand, and domestic regulatory autonomy on 
the other. To the extent that this international regime puts a damper on the state’s capacity 
to regulate, it certainly has an important public dimension. Whether that is enough to 
describe the entire regime as “public law” is debatable (and, as suggested below, ultimately 
not too important as a semantic matter, so long as such labels are not taken as license to 
ignore the regime’s complex private dimensions.).  
9  Stephan Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the 
Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 579 (2012); William Burke-White 
& Andreas von  Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of 
Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 35 YALE INT’L L.J. 283 (2010). 
10  Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the 
Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, 4 ESIL REFLECTION 3 (2015). 
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importing various doctrines of deference to domestic policy into ISDS,11 
like the margin of appreciation,12 proportionality,13 and subsidiarity.14 Other 
scholars have emphasized the need for new institutions more appropriate to 
stewardship of a public law regime in such a sensitive area – hailing, for 
example, the current proposals for a permanent international investment 
court, other mechanisms for appeal and remand, and transparency reforms.15  
For these critics, IIL is best understood as a regime of public law, and that 
hermeneutic provides the key to identifying appropriate reforms.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the public law school’s vehement scholarly 
backlash has been largely left unanswered. There has been little sustained 
theoretical response by the commercial lawyers – though they have 
remained highly influential in the practice of investment arbitration. 16 
Apologists for the regime have rather tended to ignore the public law 
critique. For example, the latest edition of Dolzer & Schreuer’s Principles 
of International Investment Law – still deservedly the key treatise in the 
field – retains its strong commercial law hermeneutic, as well as an 
uncritical investor-friendly slant – all without engaging the critics on the 
larger theoretical questions about the nature of the regime. Where the 
commercial lawyers have engaged with the public lawyers, it has generally 
been only on the level of debating particular normative prescriptions – for 
example, by rejecting calls for deference as illegitimate attempts to rewrite 
extant treaties.17  
It bears mentioning that a small handful of scholars have begun 
attempting to thread the needle, suggesting that IIL represents a kind of 
hybrid between public and private law.18 But they too have expended little 
                                                
11 Schill, supra note 9. 
12 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 9. 
13 Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 76 (2010). 
14 Kumm. supra note 10. 
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 3. 
17 Thomas W. Walde, Procedural Challenges in Investment Arbitration Under the Shadow 
of the Dual Role of the State: Asymmetries and Tribunals’ Duty to Ensure, Pro-actively, the 
Equality of Arms, 26 ARB. INT’L (2010) p. 3. 
18 See Roberts, supra note 5; José Alvarez, Is Investor-State Arbitration Really Public? 
(manuscript on file with author). The notion of a hybrid regime is, here, ultimately more 
confusing than not. As discussed further below, all regimes of private law touch on 
relationships between individuals and the state – in property, contract, etc. And where they 
8
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intellectual capital theorizing the private dimensions of IIL – expending far 
more energy engaging with the public law critiques. There remains no 
sustained academic counterpoint to the public law critique, nor any fully 
theorized synthesis.19 
Thus, as the makeup of the scholarly changed in the early twenty-
first century, the early capital-friendly interpretations came to be associated 
with the commercial lawyers who then dominated the field, and, 
unfortunately, with private law itself. Today, in IIL circles the idea of 
private law tends to be strongly associated with an interpretive approach 
that is opposed to public law and non-commercial values. By contrast, 
public law is usually cast as the savior of the public interest. The former is 
typically coupled with capital, private interest, and the status quo, while the 
latter is typically linked to public values, self-determination, and reform.  
These linkages have already had pernicious effects for the regime as 
a whole. First, they appear to have given rise to an assumption that 
descriptive characterizations of the regime as either public or private 
authorizes, or even mechanically leads to, specific doctrinal interventions – 
as if, for example, a public law hermeneutic leads inexorably toward 
deference to state action while a private law hermeneutic necessarily entails 
equality of arms between states and foreign investors. Second, relatedly, 
reformers have tended to assume that the theory and doctrine of private law 
has little to offer toward effectively rebalancing the regime. In making these 
assumptions, their efforts for reform risk pushing the needle too far in the 
opposite direction, protecting the state’s discretion to such an extent as to 
undercut the key goals of the regime – to protect, and thereby promote 
foreign direct investment.  
                                                                                                                       
do, special rules frequently apply – typically to the benefit of the governmental party. 
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law, 78 U. Chi. L.R. 879 
(2011). One might thus say that takings law or the law of public contracts are thus similarly 
“hybrids,” but that implies unnecessarily reified concepts of public and private law. It 
would not be especially fruitful to try to precisely determine which aspects of the law of 
takings or public contracts are “really” public or private. These categories are better viewed 
as analytical ideal types, which necessarily overlap at the borders, but are nevertheless 
capable of revealing different facets of the same phenomena. See further supra, at p. 11. 
19  The only real exceptions lie in a handful of articles by domestic private lawyers, 
marveling at how investment law seems to be reshaping their own fields. See, e.g., Vicki 
Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 30, 37 (2003) (on the concept of property in NAFTA jurisprudence); and Rochelle 
Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive, to Commodity, to Asset: How International Law 
is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. (2015) (on the relationship 
between IIL and domestic and international IP law). 
9
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The public law movement has generated important insights, in 
particular through its critique of the too-frequent subordination of public 
values to private interests in the cases – especially the early, formative 
ones.20 But it is not at all clear that public law doctrines offer the best 
solutions toward rebalancing the private rights and public values. What is 
missing is an appreciation of the nuances of private law, and its reformist 
potential – in particular the variegated ways in which discrete regions of 
private law like property, contract, and IP can be highly sensitive to 
domestic public values, as in: the domestic laws of takings; the domestic 
differentiation between public contracts and contracts between merely 
private parties; or in the way national law balances values of innovation and 
public health in patent law.21 This Dissertation seeks to decouple the idea of 
private law from the early capital-friendly excesses of investor-state 
jurisprudence, and to reconstruct some of the fundamental concepts of the 
global investment regime from the perspective of a nuanced theory of 






It is worth pausing, at the outset, to emphasize that the categories of public 
and private law should not be too rigidly segregated. Public law is 
classically understood as the law regulating interactions between the state 
(or other public authority) and individuals; private law, on the other hand, is 
typically understood as regulating relationships between individuals. As has 
long been clear, however, these categories do not really connote entirely 
distinct fields of law. Wide areas of so-called private law wind up 
regulating interactions between individuals and the state, such as takings 
law, the law of public contracts, and the idea of mandatory contract rules, 
etc. Indeed, entire fields of law seem to live in the boundary, such as the 
law of patents. If IIL is a regime of private law, it too lies entirely within the 
border. Far from undermining the value of the distinction between public 
and private law, for present purposes it is precisely this porous boundary 
that makes the distinction most fruitful.  
                                                
20 See Tecmed, supra note 7; Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, supra note 4, at 264. 
21 In other words, I am arguing that private law theory in the international context should 
take a cue from efforts in domestic private law theory to reconcile private law with 
regulation and public values. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES & 
INSTITUTIONS, (2011); Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J., 
1163, 1217–1219 (1999); Serkin, supra note 18. 
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I deploy the concepts of public and private law here as ideal types – 
as analytical categories, the purpose of which is not classification in and of 
itself, but rather achieving a better understanding of the pressures and 
values implicated by regulating commercial interactions between private 
individuals and the state. Public law and private law are just labels – useful 
labels, to be sure, for organizing our thoughts, but labels nonetheless. Each 
of these concepts may have some elective affinity toward certain legal 
doctrines or institutions, but merely affixing one label or the other to a 
borderline case should not lead mechanically to conclusions about how that 
case should be regulated.22 Calling the law of state contracts “public law” 
does not automatically imply that the state should be entitled to deference in 
case of regulatory breach, any more than would labeling it “private law” 
logically imply that the state should be construed as a private commercial 
actor like any other. The labels serve to draw our attention to the different 
facets involved – e.g., the importance of private expectations and reliance, 
on the one hand, and the regulatory responsibilities of the government on 
the other. But determining how to balance these interests and values 
involves difficult tradeoffs, which need to be addressed head on – not 
simply papered over.  
That said, there is value in the ideal types – particularly, here, 
insofar as they open us to new and more satisfying possibilities for reform. 
As a matter of pure semantics, it is not especially important that IIL is 
described as either public law or private law, or as some kind of hybrid. 
What matters is the level nuance with which we evaluate the regime. Given 
its significant impact on domestic public life, it matters how we evaluate 
IIL’s successes and diagnose its pathologies, and it matters how we 
conceive of solutions. And herein lies the value in keeping sight of IIL’s 
private dimension. The core tension of the regime lies in balancing the 
state’s capacity to regulate against providing a level of protection for 
investors sufficient to induce FDI. But there is no reason to assume that this 
tension should be resolved in the same way for all types of assets – not 
when property, contract, IP, and debt implicate such distinct and 
complicated constellations of interests and values in any legal order. The 
failure of the early capital-centric awards was to assume that IIL should 
                                                
22  As Dewey famously noted, in discussing the legal nature of corporations, abstract 
descriptions of what a legal entity is tells us nothing about how it ought to be regulated. 
John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
670-673 (1926). Such leaps in logic simply mask the material tradeoffs involved. Attempts 
to portray such linkages as logical corollaries ultimately amount to normative smuggling. 
See also, Steven Walt & Micah Schwartzman, Morality, Ontology, and Corporate Rights, 
VA. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER, No. 21, (2016) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730333.  
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grant all such assets ironclad protection on the model of the most 
rudimentary Blackstonian property right. But the public law school falls 
into the same kind of trap by assuming that all such questions can be 
resolved by appeal to a single one-sized-fits-all doctrine of deference, like 
proportionality or the margin of appreciation. A more theoretically 
satisfying private law approach will not yield mechanical answers any more 
than the public law approach does. But it opens the way to a much more 
nuanced understanding of the wide range of relationships between 
individual and state regulated by these treaties, and reveals the hard work 
and tradeoffs that reform will involve.  
 While my goal, here, is to lay the groundwork for a private law 
theory of international investment law, I do not seek to replace a reified 
public law theory with an equally doctrinaire private one. The project is 
ultimately synthetic. My goal throughout is to resuscitate the fundamental 
private law dimensions of the regime, without losing sight of the threat it 





The Dissertation is comprised of three discrete articles, each comprising a 
chapter in the broader project. Chapter One, titled The Margin of 
Appreciation in International Investment Law, represents a critique of one 
instantiation of the public law approach. In view of the substantial tension 
between international investment law and domestic regulatory capacities, 
most adherents of the public law school have advocated reading some 
doctrine of deference into BITs and FTAs – to loosen the burden on states 
seeking to implement bona fide regulatory measures. Foremost among such 
efforts, scholars like William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden have 
advocated importing and repurposing the margin of appreciation doctrine, 
famously developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).23 
And a number of Tribunals have in fact invoked the doctrine, seemingly 
giving credence to the view that it presents a viable path toward reform.24    
                                                
23 Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 9. 
24 Continental Casualty. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award 
(Sept. 5, 2008); Frontier Petroleum Services. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (Nov. 12, 2010); Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); 
Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008). 
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I argue, however, that the attempt to import the margin of 
appreciation (and other doctrines like it) into IIL is conceptually misguided. 
Through comparison to the ECtHR, I suggest that certain key doctrinal and 
institutional grounds for affording a doctrine like the margin in its original 
context do not obtain within IIL, calling into question the doctrine’s 
propriety in its new setting – particularly the absence of systematic judicial 
institutions capable of fleshing out such a doctrine of deference in the long 
term with any degree of predictability. Indeed, upon close analysis it turns 
out that every ISDS tribunal that has invoked the doctrine thus far has 
deployed it uncritically in materially different ways – ultimately taking the 
margin to imply totally different standards of review, ranging from rational-
basis, to reasonableness, to least-restrictive-means analysis. And there is no 
control for such divergence in a regime lacking any form of appeal or 
formal precedent.25  
While this public law doctrine may work within the confines of the 
ECtHR to grant states some leeway to regulate according to local values 
and needs, it is a false friend to states in IIL. Under current institutional 
structures, structurally flexible doctrines of deference like the margin of 
appreciation and proportionality review leaves both sovereigns and foreign 
investors in a state of uncertainty about how much regulatory flexibility the 
state will ultimately have. In a regime oriented toward promoting foreign 
direct investment, such unpredictability leaves no party better off.  
 
Chapter Two, titled Corporations as Lawmakers, begins the work 
of reappraising IIL from the perspective of private law. I here make the 
claim that IIL has created rudimentary but broad regimes of international 
law for the protection of contracts and property, as well as certain aspects of 
corporate law. However, these ever-expanding fields of law have as yet 
been poorly thought through, leading to the perverse consequence that 
private corporations are able to unilaterally impose highly enforceable 
norms of international law on sovereign states with whom they contract. 
This consequence flows directly from the confluence of three seemingly 
discrete tendencies in the interpretive practice of ISDS tribunals, concerning 
assumptions about property, contract, and corporate law.  
I first challenge the peculiarly aggressive vision of property that has 
become tacitly entrenched in ISDS. Drawing on domestic and comparative 
property theory, I argue that the maximalist (Blackstonian) conception of 
transnational property entrenched in international arbitral practice assumes a 
                                                
25 Continental Casualty (engaging in least restrictive means review); Frontier Petroleum 
(reviewing for reasonableness and good faith); Electrabel (reviewing for rational basis); 
Micula (reviewing only for convincing evidence of fraud or material error). 
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primacy of property rights over other domestic values unimaginable in most 
modern societies, including both capital-importing and capital-exporting 
states. Property is here insulated from all kinds of domestic regulatory 
initiatives, regardless of the state’s aims. Investors’ assets are protected not 
only from complete regulatory takings, but even from substantial 
depreciation in value incidental to regulation (e.g. via a doctrine protecting 
their legitimate expectations) – along with extensive procedural guarantees.  
Second, I demonstrate how this conception is uncritically extended 
to a surprising range of assets, from the typical categories of real property to 
contracts and a host of other intangible rights, without any differentiation. I 
argue that even where a BIT or FTA applies to contracts, it does not follow 
that contracts and property should be protected in the same way. There are 
crucial differences between the values at stake in the protection of real 
property and the disposition of a public contract (not to mention the 
entitlements associated with a patent right). Solutions, moreover, are not 
easily universalizable. Domestic private law regimes differ in how they 
balance private rights and public interests for legitimate reasons – societies 
differ not only in what they value, but in how much they emphasize 
particular values. Taken together, I suggest that the application of 
exceptionally broad international property protections to state contracts 
paves over all such nuance, ultimately elevating such contracts entirely 
above the domestic legal order of the host state. 
Finally, I demonstrate how Tribunals’ assumptions about the 
corporate form have led them to unduly empower corporations to graft such 
heightened protections onto their contracts with sovereign states unilaterally 
– even when such contracts were not initially negotiated under the aegis of 
an investment treaty. ISDS jurisprudence generally permits corporations to 
easily augment their nationality to secure arbitral jurisdiction, by structuring 
their foreign investments through intermediaries in countries party to BITs 
or FTAs with the target state. Remarkably, the case law recognizes such 
restructuring even after contracts between the state and investor have gone 
into force. This effectively allows corporations to elevate contracts 
negotiated with the state under domestic law to the level of ironclad 
international legal entitlements, without even notifying the host state. 
Taking these three trends together, I contend that ill-considered assumptions 
about the nature of private law in investment treaties and ISDS 
jurisprudence have had the perverse effect of empowering private 
corporations to unilaterally erect norms of international law in their own 
private interest. 
 
If Chapter Two demonstrates the need for reconstructing 
international investment law anew, in a variegated way, sensitive to the 
14
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widely divergent classes of assets IIL covers, Chapter Three represents a 
first pass at one such private law reconstruction – in the area of contracts. 
Titled The Logic of Contract in a World of Treaties, this Chapter probes the 
core contractual notion of the autonomy of the parties – i.e. the capacity of 
the parties to structure their relationships and allocate risk as they see fit. In 
particular, it examines the relationship between the rights enshrined in a 
BIT or FTA, and the agreement reached in a subsequently negotiated public 
contract. To what extent can a contract trump (or waive) substantive and 
procedural treaty rights? This Chapter suggests that the jurisprudence varies 
wildly on this question, creating significant problems of certainty, 
efficiency, and fairness – for states and foreign investors alike. 
This Chapter reappraises the treaty/contract issue from the ex ante 
perspective of contracting states and foreign investors. I make three main 
claims: one conceptual, one descriptive, and one normative. First, I argue 
that investment treaties must be understood as having generated a 
rudimentary, yet broad, law of contracts – governing agreements between 
states and foreign investors on pivotal issues, from substantive rights and 
duties, to damages and forum selection. Second, I argue that this emerging 
international law of contracts has developed sporadically, irregularly, and 
inconsistently, due in part to a tendency among tribunals to confuse the 
logics of contract and property. As a result, it remains undecided whether 
contracting parties should understand background treaty norms as defaults, 
sticky defaults, or mandatory terms – leaving the meaning of their contracts 
under a cloud of doubt. Third, I argue that the best way to resolve this 
problem for both states and investors, ex ante, is generally to privilege their 
contractual arrangements over background treaty rules. Even when these 
parties have different interests and values at stake, the treaty/contract 
problem is not zero-sum. Both sides usually stand to benefit from the 
freedom to negotiate around treaty rules as mere defaults – though I explore 
certain cases where treaty norms might justifiably exert a greater pull. In 
general, prioritizing party choice is not only optimal from the economic 
standpoint – it also provides states with the tools to secure their future 






Taken together, these Chapters underscore the pitfalls of scholarly attempts 
to resolve the tensions of international investment law through quick-fix 
invocations of public law doctrines, as well as the conceptual losses in the 
scholarship’s failure to appreciate the incoherencies of the regime as a 
15
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matter of private law. I seek to shift the focus back toward the private 
dimensions of IIL, and lay the groundwork for reconstructing the regime 
with due sensitivity to both public values and the needs of foreign capital. 
These three Chapters represent only a prelude, laying the groundwork for a 
broader project probing the private law foundations of IIL. The next stage 
of the project is to reorganize, expand, and supplement these pieces, with a 
view toward publishing a systematic monograph – tentatively titled 
INTERNATIONALIZED PRIVATE LAW: RIGHTS, INTERESTS, AND VALUES 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW. I 
envision structuring the book around a series of private law reconstructions, 
on the model of The Logic of Contract in a World of Treaties – examining 
in turn property, contract, IP, sovereign debt, and issues of corporate law. It 
will conclude with an examination of the present and future institutions of 
international investment law, probing the extent to which these private law 
reconstructions can enrich the debate on institutional reform. 
16









Investment treaties tend to say nothing, or only very little, about the appro-
priate standard of  review for arbitrating disputes between sovereign states and 
foreign investors. Most treaties do not address whether states should be afforded 
any deference in their own assessment of  their treaty obligations. Neither do 
they specify the converse, that state action must be strictly reviewed. They are 
simply silent — and their silence has been interpreted in innumerable ways by 
different tribunals. This interpretive chaos has generated calls for a unified ap-
proach — one that would resolve the uncertain and fragmented status quo, 
while being sufficiently flexible as to admit the application of  different stand-
ards of  review in different contexts. To some, the venerable doctrine of  the mar-
gin of  appreciation appears to fit just this bill — a solution finding growing fa-
vor among tribunals and commentators, not to mention advocates for respondent 
states. 
This Article challenges the suitability of  the margin of  appreciation in the 
adjudication of  investment disputes. This judge-made doctrine is famously a 
product of  Strasbourg, manufactured by the European Court of  Human 
                                                          
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks are due to William Burke-White, 
George Bermann, Eirik Bjørge, Martins Paparinskis, Anthea Roberts, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Stephan 
Schill, and Judge Christopher Greenwood for discussion and comments invaluable to the preparation 
of  this piece. Thanks as well to Simon Batifort, Melissa Durkee, J. Benton Heath, Rebecca Ingber, 
Neha Jain, Daniel Peat, and Vijay Padmanabhan for their comments on various drafts. Further thanks 
are due to the participants in the Third ASIL Research Forum, Midyear Meeting, NYU School of  
Law (Nov. 1–2, 2013), as well as Jason Yackee, Elizabeth Trujillo, and the participants in the Inaugu-
ral ASIL IEcLIG Junior Scholars Research Forum, University of  Pennsylvania (Nov. 22, 2013) for 
comments on this piece — and likewise to Bart Szewczyk, Claudia Haupt, and the participants in the 
joint ASIL–ASCL International and Comparative Junior Scholars Workshop, Columbia Law School 
(Mar. 29, 2013). Thanks, finally, to Brian King, Elliot Friedman, Rahim Moloo, Carlos Ramos-
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17
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319559 
546 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 54:3 
Rights. Its halting import into the global investment regime is only a recent phe-
nomenon. Through comparison to the Strasbourg Court, I suggest that certain 
key grounds for affording the margin in its original context do not obtain within 
investment law — calling into question the doctrine’s propriety in its new set-
ting. 
Beyond questioning the suitability of  the margin of  appreciation within ad 
hoc investment disputes, this Article challenges the broader premise that the 
problem of  fragmented approaches to the standard of  review among investment 
tribunals can be best resolved through judicial recourse to a unified a priori 
doctrine of  deference. As evidenced by the adventures of  the margin in several 
recent arbitral awards, such attempts tend to produce only a pernicious illusion 
of  unity. I argue, instead, that the desired certainty can be achieved only gradu-
ally, through judicial practice and dialogue over the medium to long term. 
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I. The Margin in Investment Law ........................................................... 553 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investment treaties tend to say nothing, or only very little, about the ap-
propriate standard of  review for arbitrating disputes between sovereign 
states and foreign investors. Most treaties do not address whether or to 
what extent states should be afforded a degree of  deference in their own 
assessment of  their treaty obligations, or their agencies’ findings of  fact; 
and neither do they specify the converse, that state action must be strictly 
reviewed, or state fact-finding subject to de novo scrutiny. They are simply 
silent, and their silence has been interpreted in innumerable ways by differ-
ent tribunals. This emergent interpretive chaos has, unsurprisingly, gener-
ated calls for a unified approach — one that would resolve the uncertain 
and fragmented status quo, while being sufficiently flexible as to admit the 
application of  different standards of  review in different contexts. To 
some, the venerable doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation appears to fit 
just this bill — a solution finding growing favor among tribunals and 
commentators, not to mention advocates for respondent states. 
This Article questions the propriety of  the margin of  appreciation in 
the context of  the ad hoc resolution of  investment disputes. In so doing, it 
challenges the broader premise that the problem of  fragmented approach-
es to the standard of  review can be best resolved through judicial recourse 
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to a unified a priori doctrine of  deference, no matter how flexible. The 
problem cannot be solved all at once — at least not through judicial action 
under current institutional arrangements. And as evidenced by the adven-
tures of  the margin in investment awards to date, attempts to do so are 
more likely than not to produce only a pernicious illusion of  unity. I sug-
gest, instead, that the desired certainty can be achieved only gradually, 
through judicial dialogue over the medium to long term — among inves-
tor-state tribunals, and extending no less to other international courts and 
tribunals grappling with similar problems. 
The margin of  appreciation is a judge-made doctrine of  deference — 
famously a product of  Strasbourg, manufactured by the European Court 
of  Human Rights (ECtHR); in broad strokes, it reflects a particular ap-
proach to “assigning weight to the respondent state’s reasoning” under 
certain judicially imposed conditions.1 Though developed within the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),2 the doctrine has gained 
purchase in other international judicial settings.3 Some scholars have sug-
gested that the margin ought to become a general feature of  all interna-
tional adjudication.4 Still, its halting import into the global investment re-
gime is only a relatively recent phenomenon.5 Without questioning the 
                                                          
1. ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
3, 17 (2012). While the margin of  appreciation is, for all intents and purposes, a creation of  the 
ECtHR, there is some dispute as to whether its ultimate origins lie in national or even international 
judicial doctrines of  deference. Some scholars suggest that the doctrine stems from doctrines of  
deference applied in European national courts. See, e.g., id. at 3 (calling the doctrine a “judicial crea-
tion” of  the ECtHR, whose “origins have been traced to analogous concepts of  judicial deference in 
the administrative law of  a number of  European countries,” including in particular France and Ger-
many). More recently, Eirik Bjørge has made a strong case that the doctrine is better understood as 
grounded in historical international doctrines of  deference to national authorities, specifically the more 
state-centric international legal doctrine of  the early twentieth century. See Eirik Bjørge, The Margin 
of  Appreciation: Where Does it Come From and Where Is It Headed? (Feb. 10, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting further that the doctrine’s precursors have long been aban-
doned in general international law). But for present purposes the doctrine’s pedigree is not at issue. 
Wherever the doctrine’s deepest roots lie, the key point is that the margin of  appreciation has been 
shaped and developed by the ECtHR for nearly four decades, and has become inextricably associated 
with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. 
2. Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
3. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of  the Constitution of  Costa 
Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶¶ 62–63 (Jan. 19, 1984). 
4. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 907 (2005); see also Jean-Pierre Cot, The Margin of  Appreciation, in 6 THE MAX PLANCK EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1012, 1013 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). But see 
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (Feb. 6, 2007) 
(“[T]he European Convention on Human Rights permits a margin of  appreciation not found in 
customary international law . . . .”). 
5. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
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propriety of  the margin in other supranational judicial contexts, I suggest 
that this form of  deference is problematic in the context of  ad hoc inves-
tor-state arbitration. Through comparative analysis of  the ECHR and the 
international investment regime, I hope to show that certain key grounds 
for affording the margin in its original context do not obtain within inves-
tor-state arbitration — calling into question the propriety of  the doctrine 
in its new setting. 
In the arbitral context, the margin of  appreciation acts as little more 
than a pseudo-standard. While appearing to connote a coherent doctrine 
of  deference, the invocation of  the margin tends to obscure the reasoning 
behind tribunals’ determination of  the appropriate degree of  deference in 
particular disputes, and obstruct dialogue among tribunals across cases. 
Were it to find increased favor, a doctrine of  this kind would only hinder 
the development of  a coherent approach to the standard of  review in in-
ternational investment law. 
This relatively granular question about the propriety of  the margin of  
appreciation falls into a broader discussion about standards of  review in 
international investment arbitration. It is worth pausing at the outset to 
reflect on why the larger issue comes up at all. In broad strokes, the ques-
tion typically arises where tribunals are called upon to review state action 
for compliance with vague and open-ended standards of  treatment — like 
the requirements to provide foreign investors with “fair and equitable 
treatment” (FET) or to refrain from engaging in an indirect expropriation 
of  their property.6 Taking FET as an example, it is uncontroversial that 
                                                                                                                                      
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008). Among scholars the idea has been championed by Wil-
liam Burke-White and Andreas von Staden. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, 
Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of  Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 283 (2010); see also Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s En-
gagement of  the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775 (2008). 
Several scholars have further advocated for applying the doctrine in the investment context as expert 
witnesses in investor-state arbitrations. See El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/15, Witness Statement of  Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White (Mar. 4, 
2007) (arguing for a margin of  appreciation in circumstances of  public order or national security). 
On the other hand, other tribunals have strongly resisted the import of  the margin of  appreciation 
into the investor-state dispute settlement. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (finding 
no support for the margin of  appreciation doctrine under the Germany—Argentina BIT at issue, or 
under customary international law); see also Quasar de Valores SICAV S.A. v. Russian Federation, 
Arbitration Inst. of  the Stockholm Chamber of  Commerce, Award (July 20, 2012); Chemtura Corp. 
v. Government of  Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 123 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
6. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT LAW 141, 148–49 (2d ed. 2013); Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-
conceptualizing the Standard of  Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 579 (2012) (highlighting other 
kinds of  situations in which deferential review may be appropriate in investor-state arbitration, as 
when faced by the superior scientific expertise of  national authorities, or agency fact-finding ground-
ing their regulatory measures); see also Rahim Moloo & Justin M. Jacinto, Standards of  Review and Re-
viewing Standards: Public Interest Regulation in International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2011–2012 539 (Karl P. Sauvant ed. 2013). 
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state action cannot be considered unfair and inequitable solely because it 
negatively affects a foreign investor’s bottom line. States retain significant 
authority to regulate in the public interest, even if  such authority is cur-
tailed by their treaty obligations, and it will often happen that legitimate 
regulatory measures will reduce the value of  an investment without entail-
ing any violation of  the foreign investor’s rights.7 But the question then 
arises: how should state action be reviewed where a violation of  FET is 
alleged? In the absence of  any specific guidance from the underlying in-
vestment treaties, tribunals have appealed to a wide variety of  standards of  
review in different contexts, ranging from the very deferential (e.g., good 
faith review)8 to the more probing (e.g., proportionality).9 The question of  
the appropriate standard of  review similarly arises where the tribunal is 
called upon to review national authorities’ interpretation of  their own do-
mestic law, or to review the state’s factual determinations — ranging from 
the scientific fact-finding underlying an environmental measure10 to the 
determination of  the existence (and requirements) of  a national emergen-
cy.11 
The margin of  appreciation arises in this context as one very particular 
approach to determining the standard of  review in disputes against states. 
As indicated above, the margin is most famously a doctrine of  deference 
employed by the ECtHR for resolving a state’s compliance with its obliga-
tions under the ECHR. The basic idea is that the state is entitled to a cer-
                                                          
7. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 141. Similarly, in the context of  indirect expropria-
tion, see Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of  Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID 
REV. 1, 6 (2005) (arguing that “cases of  regulatory expropriation involve conflicting policies and 
interests which are not easily, if  at all, reconcilable,” and that tribunals and international lawyers 
should “explore in a more systematic way: (i) the policy rationales for providing compensation for 
expropriation; and (ii) the contextual factors that weigh in favor of  and against compensation.”); L. 
Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of  International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV. 293, 297 (2004); see also, e.g., Saluka Investments BV 
(The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶¶ 261–62 (Mar. 17, 2006) (“[T]he 
principle that a State does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to pay compensation to 
a dispossessed alien investor when it adopts general regulations that are ‘commonly accepted as with-
in the police power of  States’ forms part of  customary international law today.” Interpreting the 
relevant BIT’s provisions on expropriation in light of  customary international law, the Tribunal held 
that even under the Treaty the results of  regulatory actions falling within the state’s police powers 
non-compensable). 
8. See Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94. 
9. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 312–13 (July 
14, 2006); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). 
10. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States of  America, UNCITRAL, Final Award on Jurisdic-
tion and Merits, ¶ 41 (Aug. 3, 2005) (assessing, inter alia, the claimant’s submission that U.S. regulatory 
measures “constitute a ‘sham environmental protection in order to cater to local political interests or 
in order to protect a domestic industry.’”); see also Julianne J. Marley, Note, The Environmental Endan-
germent Finding in International Investment Disputes, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1003 (2014).  
11. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award, ¶ 339 (May 12, 2005). 
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tain “space for maneuver,” within which its conduct is exempt from full-
fledged review.12 In other words, so long as the state’s action does not vio-
late a certain minimum threshold of  protection, the Court will respect the 
state’s determination that its action complies with the Convention — even 
if  the Court might have come to a different conclusion itself, faced with 
the issue de novo.13 Crucially, however, the relevant minimum threshold 
varies from right to right in the ECtHR’s case law, and is subject to change 
over time under certain conditions — conditions defined by the Court.14 
Parallels between the global investment regime and the ECHR make ju-
dicial borrowing tempting: both regimes, after all, empower individuals to 
bring suit against states directly, before a supranational judicial forum, over 
alleged violations of  their treaty rights.15 Given this core structural similari-
ty, it may seem natural to import processual doctrines worked out through 
the ECtHR’s robust case law to flesh out the relatively young system of  
investor-state arbitration.16 But despite the similarities between the re-
gimes, certain key differences account for both the margin’s success in the 
ECHR and its counter-productivity in international investment law.  
Above all, the coherence of  the margin in its original setting must be 
understood in light of  the fact that the ECHR entails a standing court, 
charged with the adjudication of  claims against a consistent set of  parties 
to a single overarching treaty. The ECtHR is effectively the steward of  the 
human rights system in Europe. By contrast, the investor-state system is 
fragmented in all the ways the ECHR is not. Arbitral tribunals are consti-
tuted on a one-off basis — for the resolution of  particular disputes arising 
out of  myriad bilateral and multilateral treaties, covering an infinitely com-
plex constellation of  states parties. The legal regime depends, for its con-
sistency and development, upon a rich dialogue among investor-state tri-
bunals, litigants, and scholars. The ideas get worked out through the inter-
                                                          
12. Schill, supra note 6, at 582; see also Eirik Bjørge, A Theory of  National Application of  The Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights 164 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) 
(calling the doctrine “a form of  legal discretion which recognizes that the respondent state can be 
presumed to be best qualified to appreciate the necessities of  a particular situation affecting its juris-
diction”). 
13. LEGG, supra note 1, at 3; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 666 (8th ed. 2012); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (2007); Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of  Appreciation, 
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 843–44 (1999). 
14. See Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in Interna-
tional Organizations, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 289, 332 (2013) (examining how the ECtHR augments the 
breadth of  the margin over time, in view of  the subsequent practice of  the parties evidencing what it 
takes to be a new or emerging European Consensus about the scope of  a particular Convention 
right, or in view of  certain kinds of  changes in international factual or legal circumstances). 
15. It should be stressed that this feature, the grant to individuals and private corporations of  the 
right to bring direct suit against sovereign states, is extremely rare in general international law. See 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 257 (6th ed. 2008). 
16. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 333. 
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play of  theory and practice over time. As I hope to show, the basic prob-
lem with forcing the margin of  appreciation into this setting is that it un-
dermines this critical process of  dialogue and risks throwing this relatively 
fragile legal ecosystem into disarray. 
The problem can be illustrated by appeal to the five investor-state 
awards to date in which the tribunal invoked the margin of  appreciation: in 
particular the Award in Continental Casualty v. Argentina (2008); the Award in 
Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic (2010); and most recently the Decision on 
Liability in Electrabel v. Hungary (2012); as well as the Partial Award in 
Saluka v. Czech Republic (2006) and the Decision on Jurisdiction in Micula v. 
Romania (2008).17 At a glance, each case seems to have done the same 
thing, albeit in different contexts. In each instance, the tribunal found that 
the respondent state was entitled to a margin of  appreciation, requiring the 
arbitrators to treat certain decisions by the national authorities with a de-
gree of  deference.18 However, upon closer scrutiny (and as examined in 
greater depth below), it appears that despite the consistent invocation of  
the margin as a rubric, each of  the tribunals ultimately subjected the re-
spondent states’ actions to very different standards of  review.19 In order of  
greatest to least scrutiny: Continental Casualty engaged in a relatively search-
ing least restrictive means analysis;20 Frontier Petroleum adopted a more leni-
ent review for reasonableness and good faith;21 and Electrabel subjected the 
state’s action to review for mere rational basis and good faith.22 Saluka and 
Micula, the most deferential and also the most similar, looked for only 
“clear and compelling evidence” of  error or other improper regulatory 
                                                          
17. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008); 
Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010); 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006) (invoking the respondent’s “mar-
gin of  discretion”); and Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008) (invoking the margin of  appreciation in reviewing the validity of  a 
non-disputing party’s conferral of  nationality on the claimant). 
18. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35; Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL, ¶ 527; 
Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94; Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181; Saluka, 
UNCITRAL, ¶ 272. 
19. See discussion infra Part I.B.  
20. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9. 
21. Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL. 
22. Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19. As discussed further below, Electrabel is unique 
among the five investor-state cases in (at least seemingly) suggesting that the margin might apply 
differently in different instances. The Tribunal there applied the margin at two separate points in its 
analysis, qualifying it as a “modest” margin of  appreciation in one instance, id. ¶ 6.92, and a merely 
“reasonable” margin in the other, id. ¶ 8.35. The Tribunal explained that a reasonable margin of  
appreciation would entail review for rational basis and good faith, but spent no words on what stand-
ard of  review a modest margin might entail — or to what extent it might differ from the former. See 
id. ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35; infra Part I.B.  
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action and convincing evidence of  fraud or material error (respectively).23 I 
do not want to suggest that any of  these tribunals misapplied the doctrine. 
The problem is rather that the concept of  the margin does no work in any 
of  these awards. It creates only an illusion of  consistency, at the heavy cost 
of  masking serious differences in approach. In other words, the doctrine 
acts as an empty proxy for any real analysis of  how to approach the truly 
sensitive issue: how to determine the appropriate level of  deference due to 
a sovereign, if  any, in a particular case. 
To be clear at the outset, I do not want to argue against judicial borrow-
ing in all contexts. Especially within investment law, borrowing and analo-
gy represent critical tools for refining and developing the law.24 Nor do I 
want to collaterally attack the margin of  appreciation as such — indeed the 
doctrine has played a very important role in the ECtHR, and to a lesser 
extent within the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights.25 Most im-
portantly, I do not want to argue against any and all judicial deference in 
the adjudication of  investor-state disputes. What I do very much doubt is 
the propriety of  this particular doctrine in the particular context of  the ad 
hoc settlement of  disputes through investor-state arbitration. Here, this ca-
pacious doctrine merely papers over the problem of  fragmented ap-
proaches to the standard of  review, with the effect of  producing more un-
certainty — not less. 
The following Part will first situate the debate on the propriety of  the 
margin of  appreciation within the broader issue of  deference and stand-
ards of  review in investor-state arbitration. Part II will then turn to the 
case law to demonstrate the principal problem missed by the debate thus 
far — that the margin produces only an illusion of  coherence, while ob-
scuring important divergences in these tribunals’ approaches to working 
out the appropriate standard of  review in particular cases. Part III will ex-
amine the margin of  appreciation in its original context, in order to illumi-
nate the source of  its poor fit within the international investment regime. 
Within the ECtHR, I suggest, the margin of  appreciation is contentless by 
design — allowing the Court to adopt a flexible and evolutionary approach 
to the adjudication of  human rights disputes over time in the face of  wide-
spread cultural diversity. As I hope to show, the doctrine is only given 
meaning through this standing court’s rich jurisprudence. Returning to the 
global investment regime in Part IV, I argue that the purposefully vague 
and variable facets of  the doctrine make it uniquely unsuitable in the con-
                                                          
23. Saluka, UNCITRAL, ¶ 272, 273; Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 95. 
24. See discussion infra Part III; Anthea Roberts, Clash of  Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the 
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 50 (2013). 
25. See generally LEGG, supra note 1, at 3. But see Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 843 (suggesting that 
the doctrine has had perhaps an overly important role, overly prioritizing moral relativism at the 
expense of  universal principles in the adjudication of  human rights disputes). 
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text of  ad hoc dispute resolution arising out of  a fragmented multitude of  
diverse investment treaties. The margin’s inherent open texture helps ex-
plain why it has thus far produced dramatically inconsistent results in every 
such case in which it has been applied. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I sug-
gest that the broader problem of  legal certainty arising out of  fragmented 
approaches to the standard of  review in international investment arbitra-
tion will not likely be resolved by appeal to a unified a priori standard of  
review, as a one-size-fits-all solution.26 The right answers will take time to 
work out and will only coalesce gradually, through well-reasoned arbitral 
practice, knitted together over time through rich judicial dialogue. 
I. THE MARGIN IN INVESTMENT LAW 
Over the last few years, the margin of  appreciation has found growing 
favor within investor-state arbitration. Respondent states, in particular, are 
increasingly invoking the margin in defending claims impugning the ac-
cordance of  their conduct with applicable bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), often by direct reference to the case law of  the ECtHR.27 Similar 
claims have arisen under more nuanced multilateral investment treaties, 
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)28 and the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).29 The margin appeals to respondent states 
because it assumes a priori that the state is entitled to a degree of  defer-
ence — a “space of  maneuver” — in complying with its treaty obliga-
tions.30 Because respondents can rarely find explicit authority for deferen-
tial review in their treaties, they have increasingly turned to the ECtHR’s 
                                                          
26. This argument assumes current institutional arrangements as a given. The picture may of  
course look very different under a more centralized judicial regime for the resolution of  international 
investment disputes — as, for example, an appellate mechanism within the ICSID system, or an 
entirely new standing international investment court. See, e.g., UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note No. 2: Reform 
of  Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of  a Roadmap, at 8–9, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (June 2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/web 
diaepcb2013d4_en.pdf  (exploring both institutional mechanisms as possible avenues of  reform). The 
problem, for present purposes, is to grapple with the contemporary absence of  any formal institu-
tional centrality in the global investment regime; the possibility of  future centralization lies beyond 
this Article’s scope. 
27. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff  (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of  Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 434–36 (July 24, 2008) (recounting the respondent’s argument that, as a sov-
ereign state, Tanzania was acting well within its margin of  appreciation under international law). The 
respondent relied exclusively on ECtHR cases in supporting this position. Id. ¶ 434 (citing Ireland v. 
United Kingdom, 18 Jan. 1978, §§ 214, 229, Ser. A no. 25; Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 Nov. 1984, 
§ 40, Ser. A no. 87; Lithgow & Others v. United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, Ser. A no. 102; and Smith & 
Grady v. United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96, 33986/96, § 77, ECHR 1999-VI). 
28. See Chemtura Corp. v. Government of  Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 123 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
29. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Juris-
diction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012). 
30. See Schill, supra note 6, at 584. 
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well-established jurisprudence for support in the hopes of  establishing that 
they are at least entitled to some degree of  deference in principle. 
Invocations of  the margin have thus far yielded only a mixed track rec-
ord for respondents. Some tribunals have expressly rejected the doc-
trine. For example, the Tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina held that as regards 
the right to property, “the European Convention on Human Rights per-
mits a margin of  appreciation not found in customary international law or 
the [Germany-Argentina BIT].”31 And other tribunals have simply ignored 
the respondent’s invocation of  the doctrine.32 But a handful of  arbitral 
tribunals have expressly employed the margin in reviewing states’ conduct 
under investment treaties — both at the respondent’s urging, as in Conti-
nental Casualty v. Argentina, and apparently sua sponte as in Frontier Petroleum v. 
Czech Republic and Electrabel v. Hungary.33 Suffice it to say that from a high-
altitude review of  the cases, the long-term acceptance of  the doctrine in 
the context of  investor-state arbitration remains to be seen. 
Still, the mere notion that the margin of  appreciation has a role to play 
within investor-state arbitration has sparked a polarized scholarly debate. 
As I hope to show, recourse to the doctrine thus far has also already pro-
duced significant jurisprudential problems. By way of  background, this 
Part will first situate the debate about the margin in the broader discussion 
of  the appropriate role and contours of  judicial deference in investor-state 
arbitration. I will then turn to the cases where the doctrine has found fa-
vor, in hopes of  illustrating its poor fit within the investment regime. 
A. Deference and the Standard of  Review 
The problem of  standards of  review in investment law starts with si-
lence. As noted above, investment treaties tend to say nothing about the 
standards of  review applicable to disputes between sovereign states and 
foreign investors over the meaning or application of  their provisions. 
However the fact of  their silence on this issue should not be surprising, 
                                                          
31. Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 354 (Feb. 6, 
2007); see also Chemtura, UNCITRAL, ¶ 123 (holding that “the assessment of  the facts is an integral 
part of  its review under Article 1105 of  NAFTA. In assessing whether the treatment afforded to the 
Claimant’s investment was in accordance with the international minimum standard, the Tribunal must 
take into account all the circumstances, including the fact that certain agencies manage highly special-
ized domains involving scientific and public policy determinations. This is not an abstract assessment 
circumscribed by a legal doctrine about the margin of  appreciation of  specialized regulatory agencies. 
It is an assessment that must be conducted in concreto. The Tribunal will proceed to such assessment in 
concreto when reviewing the specific measures challenged by the Claimant.”). 
32. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, ¶¶ 434–36 (recounting Tanzania’s invoca-
tion of  the margin of  appreciation at length in summarizing the respondent’s position, but complete-
ly ignoring the argument in its own analysis of  the case). 
33. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181 & n.270 
(Sept. 5, 2008); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 527 
(Nov. 12, 2010); Electrabel, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, ¶ 6.92. 
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and would not be necessarily problematic by itself. It is indeed unusual to 
find express guidance on appropriate standards of  review in the constitu-
ent instruments of  international courts and tribunals, or even in national 
constitutions.34 The silence of  investment treaties becomes problematic 
only in view of  the fragmented nature of  the investment regime. 
As a preliminary matter, it should be understood that the very idea that 
any deference should be afforded to host states is controversial, though 
increasingly less so. Investment arbitration was, for a long time, considered 
merely a sub-species of  international commercial arbitration or, in other 
words, a purely private dispute between the investor and the State-qua-
private party. As Stephan Schill explains, any notion of  deference in that 
setting was considered “anathema” as a violation of  a fundamental princi-
ple of  international arbitration: the parties’ equality of  arms.35 However, as 
Burke-White and von Staden have amply shown, it is increasingly clear that 
the investment arbitration regime has moved from its purely private origins 
into a form of  thoroughgoing public law litigation, in which foreign inves-
tors regularly challenge host states’ fundamental regulatory policy.36 
Tribunals have increasingly come to appreciate this evolution, and have 
turned to the idea of  deferential standards of  review as a tool for balanc-
                                                          
34. In the United States, the idea of  differentiating among various standards of  review appropri-
ate to different cases (i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review) is complete-
ly judge-made. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Similarly, the 
famous German doctrine of  proportionality review is found nowhere in the Basic Law; it too is 
judge-made. See, e.g., Apotheken-Urteil [Pharmacy Case], Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS 
[BVERFGE] 377, 1958 (Ger.); see also Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Every-
where but Here?, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291 (2012). Similarly, in the ECtHR, the margin of  
appreciation is a wholly judge-made doctrine, and has remained un-codified for sixty years, although 
it will likely be incorporated into the preamble to the ECHR soon. See Protocol No. 15 Amending the 
Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature June 
24, 2013, art. 1, C.E.T.S. No. 213, https://wcd. 
coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2012)166&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackCo
lorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 (appending the 
following recital to the end of  the preamble: “Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accord-
ance with the principle of  subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and free-
doms defined in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin 
of  appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of  the European Court of  Human Rights 
established by this Convention[.]”). Article 1 of  Protocol 15 will only come into force upon ratifica-
tion by all the parties; although universal ratification appears likely, at the time of  writing, Protocol 15 
has been signed by only twenty-one out of  forty-seven, and ratified by just one (Ireland). Up-to-date 
figures on signatures and ratifications are available at Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Pro-
tection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUR. TREATY OFFICE (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=213&CM=8& 
DF=27/06/2013&CL=ENG. 
35. Schill, supra note 6, at 587. 
36. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 287; see also William W. Burke-White & Andre-
as von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of  Non-
Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 316 (2008); Roberts, 
supra note 24, at 46–49; Schill, supra note 6, at 579. 
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ing the regulatory authority of  the state against foreign investors’ rights 
and legitimate expectations under investment treaties.37 Different arbitral 
panels have identified and relied on a dizzying set of  standards of  review 
in different cases, drawn from international and national orders, and both 
civil and common law jurisdictions. These standards generally involve 
some particular linguistic formulation connoting a test. They range from 
the simple to the nuanced, and from the extremely deferential to the rela-
tively strict. 
Some standards entail only minimal review, limited, for example, to the 
assessment of  good faith, rational basis, or reasonableness (in order of  
greatest to least deference). Other standards involve more sophisticated 
tests, and will tend to involve a more searching (i.e., less deferential) analy-
sis of  impugned governmental action. For example, in applying the least 
restrictive means (LRM) analysis favored in WTO jurisprudence, a court 
will uphold a measure so long as it was (1) necessary to a legitimate state 
aim, and (2) the least restrictive means reasonably available toward achiev-
ing that end.38 Proportionality review is even more strict (if  more subjec-
tive), adding to the LRM analysis a third prong whereby even if  a measure 
satisfies LRM the court will balance the value of  achieving that legitimate 
aim against its interference with the claimant’s right.39 Finally, U.S.-style 
“strict scrutiny” represents a maximally searching (or minimally deferen-
tial) standard of  review, requiring that to survive scrutiny a measure must 
be both “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest” and also 
the least restrictive means toward achieving its aim.40 
Arbitral tribunals have turned to each of  these widely varied approaches 
in grappling with the silence of  their underlying treaties. The effect is a 
state of  general uncertainty as to what the standard of  review might be 
from one case to the next — whether the state will be entitled to signifi-
cant deference in comporting with its treaty obligations, or whether it will 
be subject to more exacting review. The tribunal’s choice of  standard thus 
has serious consequences, and can easily prove decisive in a particular arbi-
                                                          
37. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Mer-
its (Aug. 3, 2005); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 141. 
38. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of  
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 308, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). Within investment law, see 
Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 196; Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO 
Law: In Comparative Perspective, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 371, 378 (2007). 
39. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Government of  Israel [2004] (Isr.); AHARON 
BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (2012). In the 
context of  investor-state arbitration, see Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). Among scholars, Alec Stone 
Sweet has been a forceful advocate for reliance on proportionality review in the context of  investor-
state arbitration. See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 76 (2010). 
40. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of  Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990). 
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tration. As the significance of  these choices becomes increasingly appar-
ent, the problem of  uncertainty is moving rapidly to the forefront.41 Faced 
with this state of  confusion, a growing number of  scholars have sought 
out a more unified approach to the standard of  review, applicable across a 
wide variety of  cases.42 
The debate about the margin of  appreciation in international invest-
ment law arises out of  this broader problem of  identifying an appropriate 
standard of  review in the context of  ad hoc arbitrations based on thou-
sands of  disparate legal instruments.43 On the one side, advocates have 
been spurred by a perceived need to expand judicial deference in investor-
state arbitration where tribunals are faced with disputes that implicate pub-
lic law, including, for example, disputes over the effects of  fundamental 
state regulatory policy in areas like the environment, health, or public mor-
als, as well as state action in the context of  emergencies.44 Supporters of  
the margin in the investor-state context question whether non-national 
arbitrators ought to pass judgment on the state’s domestic regulatory poli-
cy. At least in the context of  some such “public law” disputes, they argue 
that a degree of  deference is necessary, and that the margin of  apprecia-
tion represents an appropriate mechanism for achieving the correct bal-
ance.45 Most importantly, they emphasize that the margin approach is suit-
able across all kinds of  cases.46 Burke-White and von Staden stress that the 
doctrine envisions different degrees of  deference in different contexts.47 
According to them, where an investment dispute has a public character, 
the margin of  appreciation allows the arbitrator the flexibility to determine 
whether a wide or limited degree of  deference would be appropriate; and 
where an arbitration between a state and a foreign investor entails a purely 
private dispute, no margin should be afforded to the respondent state at all 
(i.e., the latter is entitled to no deference).48 On this view, the margin fits 
better than other standards within investment law because of  its character-
istic elasticity. 
On the other side, several critics reject the margin as inappropriate in 
the investor-state context — but they have tended to focus on what they 
                                                          
41. In Anthea Roberts’s phrase, the issue of  the standard of  review is likely to prove the next bat-
tleground in the theory and practice of  international investment arbitration. Anthea Roberts, The 
Next Battleground: Standards of  Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 16 INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB. 
CONGRESS SERIES 170, 172 (2011). 
42. See, e.g., Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 286, 333. 
43. These instruments include thousands of  bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as contracts 
and national investment laws. 
44. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 292; Choudhury, supra note 5, at 827. 
45. See Andreas von Staden, Deference or No Deference, That is the Question: Legitimacy and Standards of  
Review in Investor-State Arbitration, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, July 19, 2012, at 3, 3–4. 
46. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 5, at 286, 323, 333. 
47. Id. at 305–06. 
48. Id. at 288. 
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take to be problems with the notion of  deference as such.49 They reject the 
margin as affording too much deference to respondent states, emphasizing 
that the purpose of  the investor-state arbitral regime is to protect foreign 
investors from undue interference by host states. These critics portray the 
margin as a means of  giving respondent states a free pass to accomplish 
indirectly what they cannot do directly.50 In other words, it enables states 
to cheat — to take advantage of  deference by dressing up mere interfer-
ence in the clothes of  public law (e.g., by engaging in indirect expropria-
tion through dubious environmental measures).51 Indeed they tend to go 
further and reject all deference in the investor-state context, advocating 
instead U.S.-style “strict scrutiny.”52 The criticisms are generally quantita-
tive; the arguments tend to reduce into either the old contention that any 
deference is inappropriate in the context of  investor-state arbitration, or 
that, at any rate, this particular doctrine affords the state too much leeway. 
In my view, the debate has missed the conceptual core of  the problem 
with importing a doctrine like the margin of  appreciation into the ad hoc 
adjudicatory setting. The problem is not that the doctrine affords defer-
ence to respondent states as such, or that it necessarily entails too much 
deference. Advocates for the margin raise compelling arguments about the 
need for deferential standards of  review in investment law, at least in some 
contexts. The deeper problem with the margin is that it entails no particu-
lar standard of  review. As regards the scope and degree of  deference due 
to national decision-makers, the margin of  appreciation is essentially 
contentless. And indeed, as constructed by the ECtHR, the doctrine is 
contentless by design. 
By contrast to the varied standards of  review considered above, the 
margin of  appreciation does not entail any concrete linguistic standard or 
specific test. Unlike review for good faith, reasonableness, LRM, and pro-
portionality, the margin does not inherently imply any particular level of  
deference to the decisions of  national authorities. While it recognizes in 
principle that some deference is due to respondent states, the doctrine is 
contentless as to the scope and degree of  that deference in the abstract.53 
                                                          
49. See Kassi D. Tallent, The Tractor in the Jungle: Why Investment Arbitration Tribunals Should Reject a 
Margin of  Appreciation Doctrine, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION & INTERNATIONAL LAW 
111 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010); Sarah Vasani, Bowing to the Queen: Rejecting the Margin of  
Appreciation Doctrine in International Investment Arbitration, in 3 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION & 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 162–63 (Ian A. Laird & Todd J. Weiler eds., 2010). 
50. See Tallent, supra note 49, at 113; Vasani, supra note 49, at 149. 
51. See, for an oft-cited example, Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) (wherein Mexican authorities declared the region around the 
claimant’s waste disposal facility a protected area for a rare form of  cactus on apparently dubious 
grounds, thereby precluding Metalclad from operating its facilities). 
52. See Tallent, supra note 49, at 113, 134; see also Vasani, supra note 49, at 149, 162–65 (acknowl-
edging that at least emergency situations “warrant increased scrutiny”).  
53. At most the Court has pointed to certain factors that it considers relevant to the scope of  the 
30
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B. Recourse to the Margin of  Appreciation 
The best way to draw out the indeterminacy inherent in the margin as 
applied in the context of  ad hoc arbitration is by comparing the cases — 
specifically the five awards where the tribunal relied on the doctrine to 
date: Continental Casualty v. Argentina, Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, 
Electrabel v. Hungary, Saluka v. Czech Republic, and Micula v. Romania.54 
Continental Casualty was one of  several arbitrations arising out of  the Ar-
gentine financial crisis of  2001.55 Continental, an American company, 
claimed that Argentina’s emergency fiscal measures had interfered with its 
investment in Argentina (an insurance company named CNA 
Aseguradora), thereby substantially diminishing its value in violation of  
several provisions of  the U.S.—Argentina BIT (to the tune of  roughly $70 
million). Argentina argued that its measures were not wrongful because 
they constituted lawful derogations from the BIT under the “non-
precluded measures” clause at Article XI, exempting, inter alia, measures 
“necessary for the maintenance of  public order,” or the protection of  the 
state’s own “essential security interests” from constituting violations of  the 
treaty. For present purposes, the relevant question of  the appropriate 
standard of  review arose out of  the question of  who gets to decide 
whether or not Article XI applied in the present circumstance — the Tri-
bunal or the respondent state itself  (meaning that the clause would be 
“self-judging” on the question of  applicability)? And if  the Tribunal, then 
how much, if  any, deference should be afforded to the respondent state? 
The Tribunal held that the clause was not self-judging, and that it thus 
had to determine whether the financial crisis triggered Article XI. In de-
termining the applicability of  this derogation clause, however, the Tribunal 
held that the respondent state should be entitled to a margin of  apprecia-
tion, citing to the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR.56 In the words of  the Tri-
                                                                                                                                      
margin in particular cases. In Buckley v. United Kingdom, 25 Sept. 1996, § 74, Reports of  Judgments and 
Decisions, 1996-IV, the Court held that “[t]he scope of  this margin of  appreciation is not identical in 
each case but will vary according to the context . . . . Relevant factors include the nature of  the Con-
vention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of  the activities concerned.” 
See also Schalk & Kopf  v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 98, ECHR 2010 (observing that “[t]he scope of  
the margin of  appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its back-
ground.”). However, it provides no doctrinal explanation for how it weighs these factors in particular 
cases. 
54.  Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008); 
Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010); 
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008). 
55. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 53.  
56. Id. ¶ 181 (citing Jahn & Others v. Germany, nos. 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01, ECHR 
2005-VI) (further citing Shany, supra note 4). The Tribunal notes, in the footnote, that “A certain 
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bunal, “this objective assessment must contain a significant margin of  ap-
preciation for the State applying the particular measure: a time of  grave 
crisis is not the time for nice judgments, particularly when examined by 
others with the disadvantage of  hindsight.”57 
Rather than impose a strict review, the Tribunal determined that, given 
the state’s margin of  appreciation, it would only be appropriate to engage 
in a relatively deferential LRM analysis, asking only (1) whether the im-
pugned measures were necessary to a legitimate end, and (2) whether these 
means were the least restrictive measures reasonably available to achieving 
that purpose.58 With respect to all but one relatively minor claim, the Tri-
bunal found that Argentina’s measures satisfied the LRM test and thus 
constituted non-precluded measures under Article XI — thereby immun-
izing the respondent state from liability under the BIT.59 
Frontier Petroleum involved a much less dramatic kind of  dispute. It be-
longs to a line of  cases interrogating the liability of  a respondent state for 
the actions of  its judiciary in refusing to enforce a commercial arbitral 
award between two private parties.60 Frontier, a Canadian company, 
claimed that it had made a significant investment in the Czech Republic 
through a joint venture to manufacture aircrafts with a private Czech com-
pany (Moravan).61 After disputes arose between the two companies, the 
claimant commenced and won a private commercial arbitration in Stock-
holm, and sought to enforce the award in the Czech Republic under the 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  For-
eign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention).62 The Czech courts refused 
                                                                                                                                      
deference to such a discretion [of  the respondent state] when the application of  general standards in 
a specific factual situation is at issue, such as reasonable, necessary, fair and equitable, may well be by 
now a general feature of  international law also in respect of  the protection of  foreign investors un-
der BITs.” Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181 n.270. 
57. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 181. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 193–95; see also Sweet, supra note 39, at 73–74. 
59. Cont’l Cas., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, ¶ 320 (the one exception entailed a comparatively 
small sum of  U.S. $2.8 million, relative to the U.S. $70 million originally claimed).  
60. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of  Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, 
Award (June 30, 2009); ATA Constr., Indus. & Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (May 18, 2000); White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of  India, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (Nov. 30, 2011). But see GEA Grp. Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/16, Award (Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that a commercial arbitral award does not 
constitute an investment, and thus that State authority’s refusal to enforce any such award is not, on 
its own, actionable before an ICSID tribunal). See generally D. Brian King & Rahim Moloo, Enforcement 
After the Arbitration: From National Courts to Public International Law Fora, in FORUM SHOPPING IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONTEXT 393, 412–26 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2013). 
61. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 26 (Nov. 12, 
2010). 
62. The New York Convention provides only very limited grounds for a State to refuse to en-
force an arbitral award, one of  which is a relatively narrow category of  public policy. United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Recognition and enforcement of  an arbitral award may also be 
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enforcement as a matter of  public policy (one of  the few permissible 
grounds for refusing enforcement under the New York Convention (Arti-
cle V(2)(b))), citing Moravan’s intervening bankruptcy, the need to main-
tain the equality of  creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, and the equitable 
and orderly distribution of  assets.63 As a measure of  last resort, Frontier 
brought a direct claim against the Czech Republic as an investor under the 
Canada—Czech BIT, alleging that the Czech authorities’ refusal to enforce 
its commercial award constituted, inter alia, a breach of  the BIT obligation 
to afford foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. 
The crucial issue implicating the standard of  review was how to deter-
mine whether the respondent state had actually breached its obligation 
under the New York Convention, given that it claimed to have refused en-
forcement pursuant to the valid public policy exception under Article 
V(2)(b). In the Tribunal’s view, this task amounted to determining whether 
the Czech courts’ interpretation of  the public policy exception in Article 
V(2)(b) was “made in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner,” or otherwise 
amounted to a breach of  FET.64 According to the Tribunal in Frontier Petro-
leum, it would not be necessary to determine for itself  whether the findings 
of  the Czech courts met the standard of  public policy under Article 
V(2)(b), nor would it be appropriate for it to determine the precise con-
tents of  that standard.65 Instead, it held that “States enjoy a certain margin 
of  appreciation in determining what their own conception of  international 
public policy is.”66 The Tribunal thus limited itself  to a highly deferential 
form of  review, asking only whether the Czech courts’ interpretation of  
public policy under the New York Convention was “reasonably tenable and 
made in good faith.”67 The Tribunal found no reason to doubt the Czech 
courts’ good faith, and was satisfied with the reasonableness of  the courts’ 
interpretation of  public policy by evidence that this view was corroborated 
in French and German national jurisprudence, as well as in academic 
commentary.68 The Tribunal thus found no violation of  the BIT. 
The third case, Electrabel v. Hungary, concerned a dispute arising out of  
Hungary’s accession to the European Union (EU), and its subsequent ef-
forts to harmonize its laws with binding EU regulations.69 In 1995, Hun-
                                                                                                                                      
refused if  the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that: . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of  the award would be contrary to the public policy of  
that country.”).  
63. Frontier Petroleum, UNCITRAL, ¶ 29. 
64. Id. ¶ 525. 
65. Id. ¶ 527. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (emphasis in original). 
68. Id. ¶¶ 528–30. 
69. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012). 
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gary caused a then-state-owned power plant operator (Dunamenti) to enter 
into a power-purchase agreement (PPA) with a separate state-owned ener-
gy supply company, guaranteeing the latter’s purchase of  a large, fixed 
quantity of  electricity from the former. The goal was to make Dunamenti 
attractive to private, and especially foreign, investment; the PPA would act, 
in effect, as a lucrative government subsidy. Between 1995 and 2001, the 
claimant, a Belgian corporation, invested heavily into Dunamenti, presum-
ably to take advantage of  the attractive PPA. The most significant dispute 
arose in connection with Hungary’s accession to the EU, in 2004, due to a 
perceived inconsistency between Dunamenti’s preferential PPA and EU 
regulations prohibiting such subsidies. Hungary ultimately terminated the 
PPA in 2008 in compliance with a binding order to do so by the European 
Commission in the form of  a “Final Decision.”70 Notably, Hungary de-
clined to challenge the Commission’s decision before the EU courts.71 
Electrabel thus brought an ICSID claim against Hungary under the Ener-
gy Charter Treaty, contending that the state’s termination of  the PPA con-
stituted an indirect expropriation and a violation of  FET. Though less sig-
nificant to the overall arbitration, Electrabel further complained of  Hun-
gary’s reintroduction of  regulated electricity pricing in 2006, which the 
claimant contended violated its legitimate expectations and forced 
Dunamenti to lower its prices by 40 percent.72 
The Electrabel Tribunal invoked the margin of  appreciation at two dif-
ferent points in its analysis. It resolved the bulk of  the dispute by deter-
mining that Hungary was under an obligation to comply with EU regula-
tions and could not bear international responsibility for complying with 
any binding orders by the Union under the terms of  the ECT.73 However, 
the issue of  deference arose in relation to two remaining issues: whether 
Hungary should have challenged the European Commission’s Final Deci-
sion before the EU courts; and, separately, whether Hungary’s reintroduc-
tion of  regulated pricing in 2006 violated Electrabel’s legitimate expecta-
tions (and thus FET). First, in resolving whether Hungary should have 
challenged the European Commission’s Final Decision, the Tribunal held 
that “Hungary was entitled to a modest margin of  appreciation in arriving at 
its own discretionary decision in regard to such proceedings, without 
thereby committing a breach of  the ECT’s FET standard.”74 The Tribunal 
went no further in explaining what level of  review any such “modest” 
margin would entail, simply finding Hungary not liable for failing to chal-
lenge the Commission’s decision. 
                                                          
70. Id. ¶ 2.24. 
71. Id. ¶ 6.92. 
72. Id. ¶ 2.12. 
73. Id. ¶ 4.40 (finding that ECT itself  envisions compliance with EU regulations). 
74. Id. ¶ 6.92 (emphasis added). 
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The Tribunal was somewhat more specific in invoking the margin a se-
cond time, later in the case. In assessing Hungary’s regulation of  electricity 
prices, the Tribunal held that, at least as regards that particular sector of  
the economy, “[r]egulatory pricing (by operation of  law) was and remains 
an important measure available to State regulators.”75 As a result, the Tri-
bunal determined that the state enjoyed a “reasonable margin of  apprecia-
tion in taking such measures before being held to account under the ECT’s 
standards of  protection.”76 The Tribunal added that its “task is not here to 
sit retrospectively in judgment upon Hungary’s discretionary exercise of  a 
sovereign power, not made irrationally and not exercised in bad faith to-
wards Dunamenti at the relevant time.”77 Notably, the Tribunal’s language 
gives pause as to whether it applied the doctrine in the same way in each 
instance — whether, in other words, a “reasonable” margin of  apprecia-
tion is the same as a “modest” one. At least in the former case, it seems as 
though the Tribunal considered the doctrine to call for a review for ration-
al basis and good faith; as for the “modest” version of  the doctrine, the 
reader is simply left wondering. 
Two further cases merit brief  mention. The first is Saluka v. Czech Repub-
lic, wherein the Tribunal afforded the respondent state a “margin of  discre-
tion” in assessing the compliance of  its regulatory action with the Czech—
Netherlands BIT provision on expropriation.78 In relevant part, the claim-
ant complained that the respondent had expropriated its investment in a 
Czech bank by placing the ailing institution under state administration. 
Despite the slightly different linguistic formulation, the Tribunal engaged 
in a similar kind of  analysis to the above cases. The Tribunal held that, in 
view of  the bank’s financial state, the Czech State “had the responsibility 
to take a decision,” and that it “enjoyed a margin of  discretion in the exer-
cise of  that responsibility.”79 Given that margin, the Tribunal reviewed on-
ly for “clear and compelling evidence that the [Czech banking regulator] 
erred or acted otherwise improperly in reaching its decision” to put the 
bank under forced administration.80 In the absence of  any such evidence, 
the Tribunal considered itself  bound to accept the justification given by 
the Czech authorities.81 
Finally, in Micula v. Romania, the Tribunal invoked the margin of  appre-
ciation in assessing the validity of  the claimant’s acquisition of  Swedish 
nationality. Though born a Romanian national, Micula claimed the right to 
                                                          
75. Id. ¶ 8.35. 
76. Id. (emphasis added). 
77. Id. 
78. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 273. 
81. Id. 
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sue Romania under the Sweden—Romania BIT on the grounds that he 
had both renounced his Romanian nationality and acquired Swedish na-
tionality. Romania challenged his claim to foreign nationality, alleging that 
the claimant had acquired Swedish nationality through fraud or material 
mistake of  fact.82 Noting that Sweden was not a party to the dispute, the 
Tribunal invoked the margin to ground an extremely deferential standard 
of  review. It considered that the “State conferring nationality must be giv-
en a ‘margin of  appreciation’ in deciding upon the factors that it considers 
necessary for the granting of  nationality,”83 and determined under that 
rubric that it could only disregard the Swedish authorities’ decision if  there 
was “convincing and decisive evidence” that the “acquisition of  Swedish 
nationality was fraudulent or at least resulted from a material error.”84 
Taking stock, none of  these cases, on their own, seem glaringly prob-
lematic. In each instance the Tribunal determined that the state was due a 
margin of  appreciation in a particular context, and accordingly scrutinized 
its impugned measures under a more or less lenient standard. But viewing 
the awards side by side, it appears that each of  these tribunals adopted 
very different standards of  review under the seemingly consistent rubric 
of  the margin: a somewhat deferential LRM analysis in Continental Casual-
ty;85 a more deferential review for reasonableness and good faith in Frontier 
Petroleum;86 still lighter review for a mere rational basis and good faith in 
Electrabel;87 and even more deferential approaches in Saluka and Micula, 
with the former reviewing for clear and compelling evidence of  regulatory 
error or other impropriety,88 and the latter reviewing only for clear and 
convincing evidence of  fraud or material error.89 The problem is not that 
any of  these tribunals misapplied the margin — but rather that the doctrine 
                                                          
82. Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
¶ 94 (Sept. 24, 2008). (Sweden was not a party to the dispute). 
83. Id., citing Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of  the Political Constitution 
of  Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶¶ 62–63 (Jan. 19, 
1984). 
84. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 95. 
85. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181 (Sept. 5, 
2008). 
86. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 527 (Nov. 12, 
2010). 
87. See Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Juris-
diction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 8.35 (Nov. 30, 2012) (finding the State entitled to a “reasona-
ble” margin of  appreciation, which seemed to require only that the state’s determination was “not 
made irrationally and not exercised in bad faith” — i.e., rational basis review). The Electrabel Tribunal 
indicated in a separate instance that the State was entitled to a differently qualified “modest” margin 
of  appreciation, but left unsaid whether this entailed a weaker standard of  review, and if  so, what 
kind of  analysis it might have entailed. Id. ¶ 6.92. 
88. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶ 272 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
89. Micula, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, ¶ 94. 
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itself  provides no guidance one way or another as to the appropriate 
standard of  review. While indicating merely that some deference is appro-
priate, these invocations of  the margin obscure the deeper issue of  how 
much. 
Of  course these cases did not necessarily all call for the same standard 
of  review. Cases like Electrabel and Saluka seem to call for the same kind of  
standard insofar as each tribunal weighed the respondent’s justification of  
its regulatory action as coming under its police power — and it stands out 
that the one engaged in rational basis review, while the other reviewed only 
for clear and compelling evidence of  error or impropriety. But on the oth-
er hand, it seems fairly reasonable that the determination of  an absent 
third state as to nationality would be entitled to substantially more defer-
ence than the assessment of  a respondent state’s invocation of  a public 
policy exception to its treaty obligation to enforce foreign arbitral awards. 
To be sure, different standards of  review may be appropriate in different 
circumstances. The point is rather that the doctrine of  the margin does no 
work in actually determining what the right standard should be. At least in 
the context of  ad hoc investment arbitration, the problem is that the doc-
trine appears to be doing work, but in reality amounts to a mere pseudo-
standard — a substitute for real reasoning. In other words, the invocation 
of  the margin of  appreciation as a rubric creates a false impression of  
consistency across cases like Continental Casualty, Frontier Petroleum, Electrabel, 
Saluka, and Micula, while obscuring significant differences in the type and 
degree of  deference afforded therein. 
The problem comes down to institutions. As indicated above, the mar-
gin of  appreciation is by no means a useless doctrine in all judicial con-
texts, even in light of  its apparent hollowness. Indeed, in the practice of  
the ECtHR the doctrine appears to be contentless by design; its flexibility is 
a feature there, not a flaw. The following Part will thus turn to an examina-
tion of  the margin in Strasbourg, in hopes that a comparison to the opera-
tion of  the doctrine in its original setting will be instructive as to its poor 
fit in the context of  international investment law. 
II. STRASBOURGEOIS DEFERENCE 
In comparison to the fragmented international investment regime, the 
ECHR represents the exemplar of  a systematized supranational judicial 
order. At its pinnacle sits the ECtHR, a standing court charged with the 
adjudication of  human rights disputes between individuals and the 47 par-
ties to the Convention. The ECHR permits individuals to bring direct 
claims against the states parties — and they do so frequently. Today the 
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Court’s backlog is well over 100,000 cases, and ever growing.90 All this 
means that the Strasbourg Court enjoys ample opportunities to interpret 
(and reinterpret) the rights of  the Convention — and it has developed a 
formidable case law over its sixty-plus years in operation.91 
While the margin of  appreciation is, today, a fixture of  the ECtHR’s ju-
risprudence, the Court developed the doctrine only gradually, over the last 
forty years.92 The ECtHR first deployed the concept in the 1976 case 
Handyside v. United Kingdom — a case implicating the freedom of  expression 
at Article 10 of  the Convention, which expressly admits limitations by the 
state for purposes of  regulating public morals.93 The question, then, was 
how much weight to give to the state’s own determination that it was act-
ing within the scope of  that exception. The case involved the state’s sei-
zure, on grounds of  obscenity, of  several thousand copies of  The Little Red 
School Book — a book which encouraged young people to experiment with 
sex and drugs and otherwise challenge the authority of  adult “paper ti-
gers.”94 The Court famously refused to scrutinize the United Kingdom’s 
decision to confiscate the books, declaring the state entitled to a “margin 
of  appreciation” in determining the appropriate contours of  the public 
morals exception in Article 10(2).95 The Court pointed out that: 
[T]he machinery of  protection established by the Convention is sub-
sidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights . . . . The 
Convention leaves to each Contracting State, in the first place, the 
task of  securing the rights and liberties it enshrines . . . . By reason 
of  their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of  their 
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of  [the] 
                                                          
90. As a snapshot, in 2009 alone the Court received 57,200 applications, and the Court’s backlog 
reached 119,300. Council of  Europe Press Division, Fact Sheet: Protocol 14, The Reform of  the 
European Court of  Human Rights (May 25, 2010), available at https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet. 
IstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1566940&SecMode=1&DocI
d=1583116&Usage=2. 
91. See Arato, supra note 14, at 333. 
92. Only in the last few years have the parties begun the process of  formally codifying the judge-
made doctrine, culminated in Protocol 15, opened for signature on April 29, 2013, which provides, 
inter alia, for incorporating a reference to the margin of  appreciation in the preamble to the Conven-
tion. See Protocol No. 15, supra note 34. 
93. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 Dec. 1976, Ser. A no. 24. The exception clause at art. 10(2) 
states that: “The exercise of  these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are nec-
essary in a democratic society,” including, inter alia, “for the prevention of  disorder or crime, for the 
protection of  health or morals.” ECHR, supra note 2, art. 10(2). 
94. Handyside, §§ 20, 32. 
95. Id. § 48. 
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requirements [of  public morals] as well as on the “necessity” of  a 
“restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them.96 
The key justification for affording deference to the state was thus, at 
this stage, based on the doctrine of  subsidiarity. The idea was that, in those 
cases where the state was in a better position to determine the line be-
tween a qualified right and its exception in light of  the “vital forces” of  its 
own country, the Court would defer to the state’s interpretation of  its ob-
ligations under the Convention. 
Shortly after Handyside, the Court extended the doctrine to states’ dero-
gations in the context of  national emergencies in the case of  Ireland v. Unit-
ed Kingdom.97 The issue here was to assess the state’s judgment that it was 
acting within the meaning of  the Convention’s general provisions on dero-
gation, permitting states to derogate from the ECHR “in time of  war or 
other public emergency threatening the life of  the nation.”98 And here too 
the Court grounded its answer in the principle of  subsidiarity, holding that: 
[b]y reason of  their direct and continuous contact with the pressing 
needs of  the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a 
better position than the international judge to decide both on the 
presence of  such an emergency and on the nature and the scope of  
derogations necessary to avert it.99 
Such deference would not be limitless, but the Court would afford the 
state a wide berth.100 
Over the years the Court has dramatically extended and fleshed out the 
doctrine to encompass its review of  state compliance with a wide array of  
substantive rights of  the Convention — not only as a matter of  subsidiari-
ty, but increasingly as a means of  fostering the rich cultural, political, and 
legal diversity across the parties to the Convention. In other words, as 
Benvenisti notes, the doctrine is today largely “based on the notion that 
each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving the inherent conflicts 
between individual rights and national interests or among different moral 
convictions.”101 As the modern doctrine stands, the Court will afford 
states a margin of  appreciation as regards their compliance with (most) of  
                                                          
96. Id. §§ 48–49 (emphasis added). 
97. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 48, Ser. A no. 25. 
98. ECHR, supra note 2, art. 15. It is worth bearing in mind the parallel between this situation and 
Argentina’s invocation of  the non-precluded measure clause in the Argentina—United States BIT in 
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008). 
99. Ireland v. United Kingdom, § 207. 
100. Id. (“Article 15 § 1 leaves [national] authorities a wide margin of  appreciation. Nevertheless, 
the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect.”). 
101. Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 843–44. No supporter of  the doctrine, Benvenisti goes on to 
state that the “Margin of  appreciation, with its principled recognition of  moral relativism, is at odds 
with the concept of  the universality of  human rights” and that its use should be curtailed within the 
ECtHR. Id. at 844. 
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the Convention rights,102 reviewing their laws, regulations, and measures 
for conformity to a certain minimum threshold, beyond which the Court 
will respect the decisions of  each state to determine how best to effectuate 
the right within its borders. 
As noted above, the core idea is that the Court will respect the state’s 
determination of  its obligations under the Convention — based on sub-
sidiarity or cultural diversity — even if  the Court would have itself  come 
to a different decision if  presented with the matter de novo. However, it is 
easier to frame the margin as an abstract principle than to pin down its full 
doctrinal contours. In practice, the margin represents something of  a mov-
ing target: unlike typical standards of  review, within the ECHR the margin 
affords national authorities a variable level of  deference, shifting from right 
to right, and over time. 
In the first place, the Court gives states a wider or narrower space of  
deference depending on the Convention provision in question — taking 
into consideration the context and importance of  the interests at issue. 
Speaking in general terms, in Buckley v. United Kingdom the Court offered 
the vague explanation that “[r]elevant factors include the nature of  the 
Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature 
of  the activities concerned.”103 While such a broad factor-based test tells 
us relatively little, a closer look at the cases reveals some clear trends. For 
example, in the context of  assessing state measures regarding public emer-
gencies,104 national security,105 the protection of  public morals,106 and in-
terference with private property,107 the Court tends to afford states a 
                                                          
102. The exception being a handful of  “absolute rights,” for example the prohibition of  torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment at Article 3 or the prohibition of  slavery at Article 4, which 
entails no qualification and affords no derogation under Article 15. See ECHR, supra note 2, art. 3 
(“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”), art. 
15(2) (“No derogation . . . from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provi-
sion.”). 
103. Buckley v. United Kingdom, 25 Sept. 1996, § 74, Reports of  Judgments and Decisions, 1996-IV; 
see also Schalk & Kopf  v. Austria, no. 30141/04, § 98, ECHR 2010 (observing that “[t]he scope of  the 
margin of  appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its back-
ground.”). However, it provides no doctrinal explanation for how it weighs these factors in particular 
cases. 
104. Ireland v. United Kingdom, § 48; Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, § 40, 
§§ 41–43, Ser. A no. 258-B (both cases affording a wide margin to the State’s decision to derogate 
from the Convention “[i]n time of  war or other public emergency threatening the life of  the na-
tion.”). 
105. Klass & Others v. Germany, 6 Sept. 1978, Ser. A no. 28 (1978) (concerning a secret surveil-
lance system aimed at combating terrorism). 
106. Handyside v. United Kingdom, §§ 48–49, 7 Dec. 1976, Ser. A no. 24. 
107. Perhaps of  greatest relevance to international investment law, the Court takes a highly defer-
ential approach to the right to property, affording a “wide” margin in cases alleging either a depriva-
tion of, or interference with, private property by the State in violation of  ECHR Article 1, Protocol 1 
(A1-P1). See James & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Feb. 1986, § 46, Ser. A no. 98 (holding that 
States enjoy a “wide margin of  appreciation” in determining the “public interest” in relation to ex-
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“wide” (more deferential) margin. By contrast, the Court has afforded only 
a “narrow” margin in cases implicating an intimate aspect of  an individu-
al’s private life.108 
Moreover, the margin varies over time. The Court augments the size of  
the member states’ margin of  appreciation under certain conditions. Most 
famously, the Court will readjust the breadth of  the margin as regards a 
particular right in view of  a new consensus among the member states as to 
the meaning or scope of  the right in question.109 The Court takes a very 
broad view of  the term “consensus” — meaning really “almost-
consensus,” or even “emerging consensus,” which need not actually in-
clude the respondent state in the case at hand.110 
Similarly, the Court has proven willing to revisit the scope of  the margin 
in view of  the convalescence of  external rules of  international law relating 
to the particular issue — a respect the Court has extended not only to oth-
er rules of  international law binding on the parties to the Convention, but 
also to norms binding on only some of  them, unratified treaties, treaties 
signed by only some of  the parties, and even intrinsically nonbinding “soft 
law” instruments like declarations issued by the International Labor Or-
                                                                                                                                      
propriation under A1-P1). 
108. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 22 Oct. 1981, § 52, Ser. A no. 45 (noting in the context of  
Northern Ireland’s criminalization of  forms of  sexual conduct between consenting adult males, the 
State is indeed entitled to some margin of  appreciation as regards public morals, but that “[t]he pre-
sent case concerns a most intimate aspect of  private life” and that “[a]ccordingly, there must exist 
particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of  the public authorities can be legiti-
mate . . . .”). 
109. See Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 Nov. 1984, § 40, Ser. A no. 87 (“The scope of  the margin of  
appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and its background; in this 
respect, one of  the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of  common ground be-
tween the laws of  the Contracting States . . . .”). 
110. In Christine Goodwin, for example, the Court recognized that Article 8 (respect for a private 
life) may generally entail a wide margin of  appreciation, but found that margin defeated in this case 
on the basis of  changing international trends, despite the manifest lack of  any clear consensus within 
Europe. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 85, ECHR 2002-VI (“The 
Court accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of  evidence of  a common European approach 
to the resolution of  the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear and uncontested evi-
dence of  a continuing international trend in favour not only of  increased social acceptance of  trans-
sexuals but of  legal recognition of  the new sexual identity of  post-operative transsexuals.”); see Arato, 
supra note 14, at 336–37 (examining the Court’s expansive approach to the doctrine of  European 
consensus); see also Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence Under Special Regimes Relating to Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice: Second Report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over Time, in TREATIES AND SUBSE-
QUENT PRACTICE 210, 255–59 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013). But see A, B, & C v. Ireland [GC], no. 
25579/05, §§ 233–37, ECHR 2010 (affording Ireland a wide margin of  appreciation in its decision to 
prohibit abortion in the vast majority of  cases despite acknowledging the existence of  a clear Euro-
pean consensus to the effect that the right to a private life (Article 8) requires less interference with 
the right to terminate a pregnancy. The Court emphasized, in particular, “the acute sensitivity of  the 
moral and ethical issues raised by the question of  abortion,” and the lack of  consensus as to the 
specific question of  when life begins). Evidently, the application of  the margin is not just variable but 
largely discretionary, and entails, as Benvenisti notes, no small measure of  “judicial politics.” See 
Benvenisti, supra note 13, at 846. 
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ganization.111 As with identifying consensus, the Court leaves itself  signifi-
cant leeway. 
Thus the margin of  appreciation cannot be properly understood in the 
abstract. It is not a static doctrine, but an inherently dynamic device that 
twists and turns through the case law over time. It allows the Court to en-
sure that the Convention remains responsive to material changes in the 
legal, political, and social circumstances of  greater Europe and beyond. 
The margin of  appreciation must thus be understood in light of  the cen-
tral fact that the ECtHR views itself  as the steward of  human rights in 
Europe — charged with overseeing 47 countries, widely diverse in social, 
economic, legal, and political character.  
In sum, as a doctrine of  deference, the margin reflects a commitment to 
subsidiarity. That is, an understanding that the states are the primary guar-
antors of  human rights in Europe, and that the Court should defer to na-
tional authorities in areas where they will be more competent (e.g., as re-
gards societal mores or the determination of  appropriate responses to a 
public emergency). The doctrine further reflects a respect for cultural di-
versity, acknowledging that such different societies as comprise the ECHR 
membership may legitimately structure and balance their rights protection 
in different ways;112 it represents an acknowledgement that there are not 
always right answers, though of  course some answers will always be wrong. 
But at the same time, the doctrine is dynamic and responsive — reflecting 
the idea that things change over time, and the minimum threshold of  
rights protection (or, conversely, the appropriate width of  the margin) may 
adapt and evolve in response. 
Viewed on a case-by-case basis, the margin may seem just as arbitrary in 
the ECtHR as it does in the investment regime.113 But the doctrine’s suc-
cess lies precisely in the fact that the Court is charged with the adjudication 
of  complaints under the Convention on a standing basis. Although the 
                                                          
111. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, no. 34503/97, ECHR 2008 (narrowing the margin with respect 
to labor rights under Article 11 on the basis of  changing external norms of  international law under 
the auspices of  the ILO); see Julian Arato, Constitutional Transformation in the ECtHR: Strasbourg’s Expan-
sive Recourse to External Rules of  International Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349, 371 (2012) (examining the 
Court’s willingness to expand rights protection in light of  a broad array of  external norms, ranging 
from international law norms binding on the parties to the ECHR to explicitly non-binding soft law). 
112. As Benvenisti notes, this doctrine thus entails a principled moral relativism that is difficult to 
square with the universalism inherent in the very idea of  human rights. See Benvenisti, supra note 13, 
at 844. Benvenisti rightly suggests that it is difficult to explain the Court’s recourse to the margin 
without at least in part recognizing the driving force of  “judicial politics.” Id. at 846. This Article 
takes no position as to whether the margin is ultimately desirable in the context of  international 
human rights adjudication. The point here is only to demonstrate why it works in the context of  the 
ECHR — i.e., why it produces (relatively) coherent and sensible jurisprudence, whatever we may 
think of  the outcomes, by contrast to the present (and likely future) arising out of  its import into 
international investment arbitration. 
113. See Tallent, supra note 49; Vasani, supra note 49. 
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margin contains no particular degree of  deference in the abstract, the de-
gree of  deference entailed gets fleshed out over the long term, through the 
case law of  the Court. And while the degree can change, it tends to shift 
through coordinated and relatively well-known ways. Even at home, the 
margin of  appreciation certainly has its critics;114 but at least there these 
three words reflect a coherent doctrine. 
III. DEFERENCE AND DIALOGUE 
Variable deference may be appropriate in the context of  the ECtHR, 
where the rationales of  subsidiarity, inter-cultural sensitivity, and inter-
temporal flexibility make sense and can actually be vindicated. But all this 
works because the regime entails a single court, charged with the adjudica-
tion of  disputes against a stable set of  parties under a single treaty. Cer-
tainty and coherence arise out of  case law, and the case law is explicitly 
responsive to changes of  view among the parties. This kind of  doctrine 
works less well in the context of  ad hoc dispute resolution. 
International investment law lacks any centralized system for ensuring 
jurisprudential consistency, any notion of  formal precedent, or even con-
sistent adjudicators. The system — such as it is — is even fragmented at its 
roots, arising out of  myriad discrete treaties, with an infinite diversity of  
parties. Interpretation of  these treaties occurs ad hoc, each time on a one-
off  basis. In this setting, the idea of  a flexible margin of  appreciation con-
notes little more than a pseudo-standard. It does no analytical work be-
yond merely acknowledging that some degree of  deference is due. The 
structure of  the regime makes it difficult, if  not impossible, for a purpose-
fully variable standard to develop a rich and dynamic structure through 
case law. 
The comparison between these regimes helps to illuminate the deep 
structural problem with importing the margin of  appreciation into invest-
ment arbitration. A review of  the investment cases already gives rise to an 
intuition that something is wrong. It seems strange and potentially mislead-
ing that applications of  the supposedly same doctrine can give rise to such 
varied standards of  review in different, but not altogether dissimilar cases: 
requiring an LRM analysis here, a reasonableness review there, or a mere 
rational basis test in a third case.115 But the problem is not just the fact of  
                                                          
114. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 13. 
115. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008) 
(engaging in LRM review); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (Nov. 12, 2010) (reviewing for reasonableness and good faith); Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability (Nov. 
30, 2012) (reviewing the relevant measure for a rational basis (and good faith)); see also Micula v. Ro-
mania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008) 
(reviewing only for convincing evidence of  fraud or material error); Saluka Investments BV (The 
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difference. As we have seen, even within the ECtHR, the margin leads to 
the application of  widely varied standards of  review in different cases. In-
deed such flexibility is a central feature of  the doctrine, and the character-
istic most strongly emphasized by those advocating its import into the in-
vestment regime. The real problem is that the fragmented investment re-
gime lacks the institutional capacity to coordinate the application of  this 
elastic doctrine over time; here the margin of  appreciation tends to pro-
duce difference without reason. 
The problem of  interpretive cacophony on the question of  the standard 
of  review is significant. There is no doubt that the growing uncertainty in 
this important area, and the increased awareness of  such uncertainty, un-
dermines the credibility of  the system. But the invocation of  the margin 
by scholars and tribunals reflects the wrong approach to resolving this per-
ennial problem in the diffuse investment regime. The attempt to solve the 
problem a priori, through judicial recourse to an open-textured doctrine 
sufficiently flexible as to accommodate all kinds of  different situations, is 
set up to fail in a system lacking any unified judicial body capable of  
streamlining its meaning and contours over time. Absent such institutional 
unity, the margin of  appreciation and other doctrines like it will create 
more uncertainty than they resolve. 
In this decentralized regime, the better path to interpretive coherence is 
the slow road of  judicial dialogue across tribunals over the long term. Dia-
logue among ad hoc tribunals is central to the coherence, certainty, and de-
velopment of  international investment law over time — and this centrality 
is due precisely to the structural fragmentation of  the regime belabored 
above. Absent a unified, hierarchical judicial system, and absent any gener-
ally accepted notion of  formal precedent (in the sense of  stare decisis), the 
vague and varied standards of  treatment in investment treaties get worked 
out only gradually, as tribunals rely on or distinguish one another’s inter-
pretations. This path is equally open to attaining greater coherence in ap-
proaches to the standard of  review, even if  the process promises only 
gradual results. 
Most standards are indeterminate in international investment law. In-
vestment treaties contain myriad formulations of  broad standards of  
treatment like FET, or the obligation to refrain from indirect expropria-
tion. Despite marked differences in their phrasings, and even in view of  
widely varied interpretations by different tribunals, few believe that these 
standards are today impossibly uncertain.116 At least at their cores, these 
                                                                                                                                      
Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Mar. 17, 2006). 
116. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 134–39 (recounting the long debate among tribu-
nals as to the scope of  FET provisions, broadly over whether they merely incorporate the supposedly 
restrictive international minimum standard of  treatment under customary international law, or 
whether FET clauses entailed a more robust standard autonomous from customary international 
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standards are relatively stable. But they were not built in a day; rather, these 
standards have convalesced over time through arbitral practice informed 
by prior case law. To be sure, there are conflicting lines of  jurisprudence, 
often — but not always — relating to the outer boundaries of  these con-
cepts.117 But conflict and disagreement are essential motors in the process, 
so long as they are well reasoned rather than papered over. Distinguishing 
past cases is as valuable a mechanism of  judicial dialogue as relying on 
them. And where the law appears truly in flux, as with standards of  review, 
the best answer is often to wait and see — to wait for tribunals to come to 
conclusions, test approaches, and compare their views with whatever dis-
parate authorities are available.118 
Thus the fact that tribunals employ different standards of  review in dif-
ferent cases is not necessarily a problem at all. There may have been per-
fectly good reasons to apply a more searching LRM test in reviewing the 
state’s emergency measures in Continental Casualty and a mere rational basis 
test in determining whether the state was within its rights to reintroduce 
administrative pricing in Electrabel. But even in more similar cases the fact 
of  differences in result is not necessarily a bad thing. It is not necessarily 
problematic that the tribunals in Electrabel and Saluka resorted to different 
standards of  review in assessing whether their respective respondents’ reg-
ulatory actions were non-compensable exercises of  the states’ police pow-
ers; if  adequately explained, the fact that one engaged in rational basis re-
view while the other considered a more deferential approach appropriate 
could help illuminate methodological possibilities as well as the relevant 
stakes for future disputes, and thereby prompt greater critical reflection 
going forward. But everything turns on reasoning. Difference can only be 
                                                                                                                                      
law). Dolzer and Schreuer note that over time extreme divergence among tribunals on this issue has 
given way to “growing doubts about the relevance of  the whole debate.” Id. at 138. Most scholars 
now tend to acknowledge that FET provisions must at least be interpreted in light of  customary 
international law, but at the same time, that the law on the protection of  aliens under customary 
international law has evolved into something more robust than the international minimum standard 
of  the early twentieth century. See MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STAND-
ARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013). 
117. For example, tribunals have come to opposite conclusions in interpreting whether the most 
favored nation clause of  the same treaty, the Germany—Argentina BIT, applies only to substantive 
protections or also allows importation of  more favorable procedural protections found in other BITs. 
Compare Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
¶¶ 102–03, 120–21 (Aug. 3, 2004) (allowing importation of  the more favorable procedural structure 
of  the Argentina—Chile BIT, to avoid having to comply with a requirement under the Germany—
Argentina BIT to litigate in domestic court for eighteen months before going to arbitration) with 
Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22, 
2012) (holding, on exactly the same issue, that the most favored nation provision of  the treaty does 
not allow recourse to more favorable procedural provisions in external treaties, and thus disclaiming 
jurisdiction). 
118. Admittedly this answer may not satisfy litigants in particular cases, but it will likely not sur-
prise anyone either — at least not those with experience within the investor-state arbitral system. 
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productive where reasons are given. As things stand, the tribunals in 
Electrabel and Saluka grounded their choices about the standard of  review 
in only abstract invocations of  the margin of  appreciation in lieu of  any 
real reasoning — as a consequence, their differences in result appear more 
or less random. 
This concept of  dialogue should thus not be equated with the separate 
idea of  de facto precedent in international investment law. Some have em-
phasized the fact that tribunals do (and should) rely on one another’s opin-
ions, not just as a matter of  practical reasoning but on the further theory 
that such opinions should be entitled to some presumptive weight. This 
view is especially associated with the prolific arbitrator and publicist Ga-
brielle Kaufmann-Kohler; as arbitrator, she has ensured the inclusion of  a 
paragraph formalizing the idea in several awards. As framed in Saipem v. 
Bangladesh: 
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. 
At the same time, it is of  the opinion that it must pay due consider-
ation to earlier decisions of  international tribunals. It believes that, 
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solu-
tions established in a series of  consistent cases. It also believes that, 
subject to the specifics of  a given treaty and of  the circumstances 
of  the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmo-
nious development of  investment law and thereby to meet the legit-
imate expectations of  the community of  States and investors to-
wards certainty of  the rule of  law.119 
By contrast, I do not mean to suggest that prior awards need necessarily 
be afforded any precedential weight. The point is rather that tribunals ought 
to draw from previous awards in working out their answers where doing so 
is helpful. Whether or not tribunals grant authoritative weight to past deci-
sions because they are past decisions is distinct from, and arguably less im-
portant than, the idea that they should rely on prior awards on the basis of  
strength of  reasoning. 
My negative claim is thus that we should avoid turning to broad all-
encompassing approaches in seeking to attain greater coherence as regards 
                                                          
119. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of  Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 90 
(June 30, 2009). This paragraph has become a hallmark of  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and appears 
often among the many disputes chaired or decided by this prolific arbitrator. See, e.g., Quiborax S.A. v. 
Plurinational State of  Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 46 (Sept. 27, 
2012) (repeating practically verbatim the above paragraph from Saipem S.p.A.); see also Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 378 (2007); J. P. 
Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Empirical Backing, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., 
Sept. 2007, at 6, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key= 
1064. But see Brigitte Stern’s separate statement in Quiborax, indicating that she “does not analyze the 
arbitrator’s role in the same manner, as she considers it her duty to decide each case on its own mer-
its, independently of  any apparent jurisprudential trend.” Quiborax, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, ¶ 46. 
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the standard of  review. Recourse to malleable a priori doctrines not found 
in the treaties runs the risk of  undermining dialogue over time, by substi-
tuting abstract recitations for real reasoning, and thereby obscuring differ-
ence and disagreement. My positive claim is that we can and should count 
on the process of  dialogue to work out the answers in the long term. This 
means that tribunals ought to simply do their best to determine the right 
standards in particular cases, in light of  (but not necessarily in reliance on) 
other cases. Of  course they need not shy away from deviating from past 
cases or case lines, even on similar issues, where there appears good reason 
to do so. But they should above all be very clear in explaining their choices. 
The system privileges, and indeed necessitates, clarity. In international in-
vestment law, an award should be only as persuasive as its reasoning. 
A final point bears noting. None of  this is to say that the jurisprudence 
of  other international courts and tribunals like the ECtHR bears no rele-
vance to judicial reasoning in international investment arbitration. Dia-
logue need not be confined among investor-state tribunals. As Schill force-
fully argues, the judgments of  other international courts and tribunals pro-
vide a valuable repertoire of  practice from which arbitrators can draw in-
sight and inspiration — including the rich case law of  the ECtHR.120 The 
same arguably applies to drawing from the reasoning of  national courts as 
they grapple with similar questions in various contexts.121 Although, as I 
have argued above, it may be imprudent to try to resolve the problem of  
standards of  review in investment law by lifting a complex, overarching 
doctrine from a very different standing court, there may be good reason to 
rely on more precise elements of  such a court’s reasoning in particular cas-
es.122 
Even as regards the specific issue of  determining the appropriate stand-
ard of  review, several investor-state tribunals have drawn important in-
sights from the jurisprudence of  the ECtHR without having recourse to 
                                                          
120. Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law — An Introduction, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 3 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 
2010). 
121. Id.; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 392 (2012). But see PAPARINSKIS, supra note 116, at 19–20, 172–74, 255–56 (voicing healthy 
skepticism of  analogies to domestic public law in the interpretation of  standards of  treatment in 
international investment treaties). 
122. As Jeremy Waldron forcefully notes, arguing mutatis mutandis for the invocation of  foreign 
law by U.S. courts, there is a deep value in examining how others have worked out similar problems 
in similar contexts — as a matter of  practical reasoning, falling short of  any kind of  doctrine of  stare 
decisis. JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 76 (2012) (pursuing two main lines of  arguments: first “that we can learn from 
what other courts are doing when they address questions which are the same or similar to those we 
are addressing”; and second “the more challenging idea that there may be some virtue in sheer con-
sistency across the decisions of  different courts, even for courts belonging to different jurisdic-
tions.”). 
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the doctrine of  the margin of  appreciation per se. For example, in deter-
mining how much deference to afford the respondent in Tecmed v. Mexico, 
the Tribunal famously determined that the appropriate standard would be 
review for proportionality.123 However, the Tribunal drew important inspi-
ration from the ECtHR in tailoring its proportionality test. The Tribunal 
noted with approval the European Court’s finding in James v. United Kingdom 
that a state should be entitled to a less lenient version of  proportionality 
review where, as in Tecmed (and all investor-state arbitration), the state in-
terferes with the property rights of  a non-national.124 The Tribunal empha-
sized the ECtHR’s reasoning that: 
[N]on-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or 
designation of  its authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. 
Secondly, although a taking of  property must always be effected in 
the public interest, different considerations may apply to nationals 
and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for re-
quiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than 
non-nationals.125 
Whether or not we approve of  the ECtHR’s argument in James, the 
Tecmed Tribunal’s use of  that argument reflects the right kind of  approach 
to judicial borrowing — based on reasoning rather than abstract doctrines. 
The Tecmed Tribunal drew from James because it provided guidance on the 
specific question of  what kind of  deference should be afforded a sover-
eign state in its treatment of  foreigners — not because it embodied a con-
venient and generalizable abstract principle of  deference. And indeed, the-
se ideas have since found favor with subsequent investor-state tribunals.126 
Thus the case law of  the ECtHR may have an important role to play as 
tribunals work out how state action ought to be reviewed in different kinds 
of  investment cases. Advocates of  the margin of  appreciation approach 
                                                          
123. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). 
124. Id. 
125. James & Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Feb. 1986, § 63, Ser. A no 98, quoted in Tecmed, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122. 
126. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 312–
13 (July 14, 2006) (citing Tecmed and James and finding that “these additional elements provide useful 
guidance for purposes of  determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory”). Indeed 
we see this kind of  borrowing from the ECtHR frequently, as for example in Saipem S.p.A., where the 
Tribunal relied on ECtHR jurisprudence in establishing the principle, discussed above, that the set-
ting-aside of  or refusal to enforce a commercial arbitral award by a host state’s national courts can 
qualify as a judicial expropriation in violation of  an investor’s BIT rights. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s 
Republic of  Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, ¶ 130 (June 30, 2009) (relying heavily 
on the Court’s reasoning that a commercial award can count as a “possession” within the meaning of  
the right to property under the ECHR, so long as the award is final and binding) (quoting and dis-
cussing Stran Greek Refineries & Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, 9 Dec. 1994, Ser. A no. 301-B). 
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are absolutely right, at least, in highlighting the value of  that court’s exten-
sive jurisprudence toward working out the answers across a wide variety of  
different circumstances. While adopting the margin of  appreciation doc-
trine wholesale is the wrong way to go, there is still much to be gained 
from looking at how the ECtHR applies the margin in specific cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In the absence of  a system of  appeal or formal precedent, the holdings 
of  an arbitral award are only as persuasive as their underlying reasoning. 
But as I hope to have shown, this is just where the margin of  appreciation 
falls short as a doctrine. In investment arbitration, the margin tends to be 
invoked to justify determinations of  the standard of  review without any 
substantive explanation of  why a particular standard reflects the appropri-
ate degree of  deference in a particular context. In each of  the cases ana-
lyzed, the margin has appeared to yield completely different standards of  
review; yet we, and future tribunals, are left with little impression as to why. 
From a reading of  Continental Casualty v. Argentina and Frontier Petroleum v. 
Czech Republic, it seems as if  LRM or reasonableness review simply follow 
inexorably from the notion of  the margin.127 The same can be said of  
Saluka v. Czech Republic and its review for clear and compelling evidence of  
error or improper conduct or the review for convincing evidence of  fraud 
or material error in Micula v. Romania; and Electrabel v. Hungary is even more 
opaque.128 Nothing about the margin of  appreciation as a doctrine illumi-
nates these variations, nor is any other reasoning presented. The doctrine 
is, in other words, employed more or less as a cheap substitute for any 
analysis of  the deepest questions: in the face of  treaty silence, what stand-
ard or standards of  review are appropriate in investor-state arbitration? 
Under what conditions? And for what reasons? 
At the same time, the false impression of  consistency across cases like 
Continental Casualty, Frontier Petroleum, Electrabel, Saluka, and Micula, runs the 
risk of  compounding itself  in the future. If  such cases are viewed as un-
problematic instantiations of  tribunals’ application of  a single doctrine, 
                                                          
127. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008) 
(applying a searching LRM analysis); Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (Nov. 12, 2010) (reviewing for reasonableness and good faith). 
128. Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 
¶ 273 (Mar. 17, 2006); Micula v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Sept. 24, 2008). Electrabel applies the margin of  appreciation in two instances and in 
seemingly different ways. Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of  Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶¶ 6.92, 8.35 (Nov. 30, 2012). The Tribunal 
afforded Hungary a “reasonable margin of  appreciation,” again without articulating any particular 
test under such rubric, or differentiating between a “reasonable” and “modest” margin. Id. ¶ 8.35. 
And it also granted the State a “modest margin of  appreciation,” without explaining whether and 
how that might differ from a “reasonable” margin. Id. ¶ 6.92. 
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they risk muddying the analysis in future disputes. The cases we have thus 
far have come out differently on the key questions, with no explanation as 
to why. If  we pretend that these are all simply applications of  a single doc-
trine, the capacity for confusion and uncertainty will prove staggering. 
Thus the import of  the margin of  appreciation into international in-
vestment law does active harm. Absent institutional centralization, the in-
vocation of  this open-ended doctrine tends to obstruct that process of  
dialogue essential to working out a more consistent approach to the stand-
ard of  review over time. This is not necessarily a problem unique to the 
margin, but one that the margin produces in an especially severe way. As I 
hope to have shown, the problem of  interpretive fragmentation concern-
ing the standard of  review in international investment law will not be read-
ily resolved through an abstract, a priori doctrine, no matter how flexible. 
The better road is, here, the harder road — unity through well-reasoned 
arbitral practice and judicial dialogue. If  this approach abstains from trying 
to resolve the problem of  fragmented approaches to the standard of  re-
view in the short run, the reward will be a more coherent, certain, and le-
gitimate approach in the medium to long term. 
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Corporations as Lawmakers
Julian Arato*
This Article argues that multinational corporations have acquired the power to create primary rules of
international law, at stark cost to the state’s regulatory autonomy. It is widely recognized that states have
granted private business corporations significant capacities to act on the international stage, including the
capacity to bear international legal rights and even to directly enforce their rights through compulsory
international adjudication. But what has gone relatively unnoticed is the corporation’s emergent capacity
to directly and formally author its international legal rights, by agreement with sovereign states, via an
“internationalized” power of contract. This Article explains how this power of contract amounts to some-
thing more than a mere commercial power to engage foreign sovereigns in private legal agreements. It
represents no less than the capacity to author meaningful and enforceable international legal norms, with
priority over the domestic law of the state party—facially limited to the economic sphere, but with dra-
matic ripples throughout all domains of public life. I argue that this power arises out of the confluence of
three seemingly disparate doctrinal shifts in international investment law and human rights jurispru-
dence, concerning: the legal status of state contracts; the theory of transnational property; and the law of
corporate nationality. Finally, I turn a critical eye to these developments, drawing theoretical insights
from domestic private law and public international law. I conclude that international legal doctrine has
gone too far in empowering multinationals against the state, while remaining too hesitant to demand any
form of corporate accountability.
Introduction
It is widely recognized that states have granted private business corpora-
tions significant capacities to act on the international stage.1 Sovereigns have
constituted corporations as direct bearers of international legal rights
through a manifold of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), free trade
agreements with investment chapters (“FTAs”),2 and even certain regional
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank Katharina Pistor, Michael
Heller, Hanoch Dagan, Tsilly Dagan, Henry Monaghan, David Pozen, Gráinne de Búrca, Alex Ras-
kolnikov, Bob Scott, Anthea Roberts, Zohar Goshen, Avi Bell, George Bermann, Ingo Venzke, Martins
Paparinskis, Guy Sinclair, Jure Vidmar, Turkuler Isiksel, Kish Parella, Sarah Dadush, Pam Saunders,
Tim Meyer, Melissa Durkee, James Nelson, Tejas Narenchania, Joanna Langille, Mihailis Diamantis,
Rich Chen, J. Benton Heath, and Arie Rosen for discussions, guidance, and comments on this Article at
various stages. Further thanks are due to Joseph Weiler, Anne Orford, Dino Kritsiotis and the partici-
pants in the Third Annual Junior Faculty Forum for International Law at the University of Melbourne in
2014, and in particular to Fleur Johns for her invaluable comments in that setting; and similarly to
Robin Effron, Roberta Karmel, and the participants in the 2014 International Business Law Scholars’
Roundtable hosted by the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn
Law School. Thanks as well to Elizabeth Bramon, Taihei Fukumoto, and the Harvard International Law
Journal staff for innumerable excellent editorial suggestions. And thanks as always to Julianne Marley, for
her invaluable comments, limitless support, and too many conversations about this piece.
1. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties, 56 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353 (2015); José Alvarez, Are
Corporations Subjects of International Law?, 9 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 1 (2011); Roland Portmann,
Legal Personality in International Law (2010).
2. Including certain major multilateral instruments like the trilateral North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”), the broad-based Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), as well as numerous bilateral
51
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI203.txt unknown Seq: 2  4-SEP-15 10:56
230 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
human rights treaties.3 More radically, a great many of these treaties have
endowed corporations with the capacity to directly enforce their rights
through compulsory international adjudication—through investor–state ar-
bitration or direct action before the European Court of Human Rights. But
what has gone relatively unnoticed, and remains undertheorized, is the
emergent capacity of the multinational corporation to create the law—to
directly and formally author its international legal rights by agreement with
sovereign states. This Article argues that over the last few decades the mul-
tinational firm has become a powerful and increasingly autonomous interna-
tional lawmaker—an author of its own rights and obligations under public
international law. This transformation has come at stark cost to the state’s
capacity to regulate in the public interest, with only tenuous grounding in
state consent.
More specifically, this Article examines the multinational’s capacity to
make international law via a modern “internationalized” power of contract.4
I am not here concerned with either indirect lawmaking through influence,5
instruments like the U.S.–Peru Trade Protection Agreement [hereinafter U.S.–Peru TPA]. See North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); United States–Peru Free Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.–Peru, Apr. 12, 2006; Energy Charter Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 17,
1994, http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf.
3. For example, as legal persons, corporations are considered direct bearers of a wide range of general
human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly the right to property.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 34 (permitting corporations to bring suit before the court); protocol 1, art. 1
(enshrining the right to property for both natural and legal persons).
4. The term “internationalized contract” captures the idea that a contract between a natural or legal
person and a state can become a source of international law, binding upon the state like any other
international legal obligation. The modern form of internationalization, at issue in this Article, involves
the elevation, or conversion, of a contract negotiated under the domestic law of some country—often the
state party—into an instrument of international law through the operation of an overarching investment
treaty. In other words, the idea is that certain protections in BITs or FTAs act to elevate domestic public
contracts to the status of international legal instruments that bind the state party in much the same way
as an international treaty. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award
(Oct. 12, 2005). The idea is distinct, though not entirely dissimilar from an older theory of the interna-
tionalized contract enshrined in the oil nationalization arbitrations of the nineteen seventies. See, e.g.,
Awards on the Merits in Dispute between Texaco Overseas Petrol. Co./California Asiatic Oil Co. and the
Gov’t of the Libyan Arab Republic (Compensation for Nationalized Property), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978) [here-
inafter Texaco v. Libya]; infra Part III.A. The crucial difference is that under the old theory a contract
could be internationalized only if the parties agreed to adopt international law as the law of the contract
at issue—explicitly or implicitly. In the modern era, all contracts covered by an overarching BIT or FTA
are presumed internationalized. Where such treaties apply, internationalization has become the new de-
fault rule—and arguably even a mandatory rule, given the difficulty of waiving BIT protection in invest-
ment contracts. See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 176 (Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter SGS v. Paraguay] (finding that
the exclusive forum selection clause in a contract between SGS and Paraguay, opting for resolving all
disputes in Paraguayan courts, did not suffice to opt out of international arbitral jurisdiction under the
overarching BIT). In any case, the results of internationalization through choice of law, or by default
through the background operation of an investment treaty are the same: the contract will subsequently
impose obligations on the state as a matter of international law, the full consequences of which will be
explored further below. See infra Part I.A.
5. See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 5 (noting the significant influence corporations have had on the making
of rules “governing trade, investment, antitrust, intellectual property, and telecommunications”);
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or with what is sometimes called soft or informal lawmaking (e.g., standard-
setting by industry groups).6 I rather focus on direct and formal lawmaking,
by agreement with sovereign states.
Through creative treaty shopping, corporations can attain international
legal protection for their contracts with foreign sovereigns (state contracts).
Under this aegis, their contracts become international legal instruments
with priority over later-in-time conflicting national law, including public
law and regulation. At the same time, counterintuitively, the scope of this
protection is implicitly determined by an extraordinarily robust theory of
property, which tends to privilege such contractual entitlements over all
other domestic values. As a result, what may appear as merely private legal
agreements between corporations and states turn out to have major conse-
quences for domestic public law—significantly hindering the regulatory au-
tonomy of the contracting state party. This internationalized power of
contract represents no less than the capacity to author meaningful and en-
forceable international legal norms—facially limited to the economic sphere,
but with potentially dramatic ripples throughout all walks of public life.
To be clear, I am arguing that corporations have developed the capacity to
negotiate with states to create norms of international law—norms that bear a
particular kind of relationship of priority to the state party’s domestic legal
order. Like all international legal rules, they trump domestic law as a matter
of international law. This does not necessarily mean that internationalized
contracts automatically invalidate conflicting domestic statutes or regula-
tions as a matter of the state’s internal law.7 What it does mean is that
nothing in the state’s internal law can excuse a breach of the international-
ized contract. In other words the internationalized contract bears the same
relationship to domestic law as an international treaty: for internal purposes,
the state may enact laws in breach of its international obligations; but so
long as it keeps the conflicting laws on the books, its international responsi-
bility will be engaged. What’s more, modern internationalized contracts are
Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Law Actors and Law-Makers, 14 Ital. Ybk. Int’l L., 23,
23–26 (2004) (identifying corporate influence on the development of treaties and customary interna-
tional through participation in adversarial litigation in international arbitration—arguing that by suc-
cessfully advancing sustained litigation positions that shape public arbitral awards, corporations play an
important role in the identification and elaboration of the usual sources of international law).
6. See Lowe, supra note 5, at 24–25 (noting corporate involvement in setting standards for industry
best-practices and valuation techniques, which become critically important in the context of interna-
tional litigation); Alvarez, supra note 1, at 5–6 (pointing to corporate codes of conduct); see also Benedict
Kingsbury, Richard Stewart & Nico Krisch, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & Con-
temp. Problems 15, 16 (2005).
7. The status of any conflicting national laws will depend on the openness of the constitutional order
to international law—in other words, whether it has a pluralist or monist approach to the incorporation
of public international law into domestic law. See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Inter-
national Law 88 (8th ed., 2012).
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highly enforceable against delinquent states—indeed more so than many
typical treaties.8
The new reality of corporate international lawmaking can be illustrated
through a handful of examples. Azurix v. Argentina provides the basic
model.9 The dispute arose out of a thirty-year concession contract to provide
water services in Buenos Aires, operated by a local subsidiary of the U.S.-
based Azurix Corporation.10 The project unraveled early on, due in part to
public health concerns relating to water quality, water pressure, and a severe
algae outbreak in a certain facility.11 The government engaged in a series of
formal and informal regulatory measures, eventually terminating the conces-
sion, and Azurix compelled arbitration under the Argentina–U.S. BIT.12
The Tribunal considered that, under the auspices of the treaty, the contract
generated international legal rights that took priority over the state’s regula-
tory efforts and were thus fully compensable.13
In CMS Gas v. Argentina, another American investor brought a claim
under the Argentina–U.S. BIT, claiming that the host state had destroyed
the value of a gas transportation concession operated by its local subsidiary.
The claim impugned a series of general regulatory measures implemented by
Argentine authorities to manage the national fiscal crisis of 2001–2002. The
Tribunal found that the measures did not completely vitiate the value of
CMS’s investment, and thus did not amount to a regulatory expropriation
(that is, a taking). However, it held the state to a higher standard of prop-
erty protection, ruling that even the partial diminution of the contract’s
value was a compensable violation of the company’s rights.14 Here too, the
Tribunal found that the contract generated international legal rights that
took priority over the state’s efforts to regulate in the public interest—even
though the state’s measures stopped well short of fully depleting the value of
the investment, and even given the context of a national emergency.
8. Indeed state contracts are far easier to enforce against states than most treaties through their con-
nection to the powerful mechanisms for the enforcement of international arbitral awards. Infra Part I.A.
9. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July 14, 2006).
10. Id. ¶ 41.
11. Id. ¶¶ 124, 148. The importance of the public health issue was hotly contested, and in any event
the government was far from blameless in the collapse of the project.
12. Id. ¶ 244.
13. Id. ¶¶ 374–77. It should be noted that the Tribunal awarded Azurix the fair market value of its
investment, totaling over $165 million plus interest. Id. ¶ 420.
14. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 281
(May 12, 2005). The Tribunal awarded CMS the fair market value of the entire concession, including
$133 million in losses (calculated through discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis), plus interest, and
ordered the sale of its remaining shares in the concessionaire to Argentina for an additional $2 million.
Id. ¶¶ 468–69. Argentina initially refused to satisfy both the awards in Azurix and CMS Gas; however it
recently relented when the World Bank conditioned consideration of a major loan package on payment of
its outstanding debts under several arbitral awards (though at a substantial discount to both the principal
and accrued interest, totaling around 25%). See Daniel Cancel, Argentina Settles $677 Million Arbitration
Cases with Bonds, Bloomberg Business, Oct. 18, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-10-18/argentina-settles-677-million-of-arbitration-cases-paying-bonds.html.
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Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia adds a crucial wrinkle, demonstrating the cor-
poration’s agency as a lawmaker. Like Azurix, the case involved a water con-
cession—here held by a wholly-owned subsidiary of the U.S.-based Bechtel
Corporation. Unlike the previous cases, however, there was no BIT in force
between the U.S. and Bolivia, and neither Bechtel nor any of its downstream
subsidiaries would have had access to arbitral jurisdiction at the time the
contract was executed. Later, however, in the face of mounting social unrest
against the project, Bechtel restructured its investment through a Dutch
holding company in order to secure access to international arbitration under
the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT (should the need arise). Bolivia ultimately ter-
minated the concession in response to the growing social upheaval over the
project, and Bechtel successfully sued the state on the basis of its newfound
Dutch nationality.15 Bechtel was thus able to internationalize the contract
unilaterally, by augmenting its nationality after the concession entered into
force.
What should stand out in each of these cases are two key assumptions
about the relevant state contracts: first, that they created international legal
obligations; and second that these obligations trumped the states’ prospective
attempts to regulate in the public interest. Though each of the contracts was
explicitly governed by the law of the host state, on their own terms, the
tribunals considered them to have been effectively internationalized, or
transformed into international legal instruments, by operation of an applica-
ble BIT. As a result, the tribunals considered these private instruments to
have priority over the state’s domestic regulatory efforts in situations impli-
cating pressing public interests. In other words, in these cases the state con-
tract appears as a source of international law—establishing legal norms that
the state could not unilaterally vitiate, or even undermine, without engag-
ing its responsibility.
In the first instance, this Article seeks to show that these remarkable
assumptions are surprisingly well grounded in current doctrine, if not al-
ways well understood. Tribunals have given internationalized state contracts
priority over domestic regulatory efforts at all levels, from executive mea-
sures to legislation, and across the full range of regulatory contexts—from
the purely economic16 to regulatory action in the face of risks to public
health,17 human rights,18 and the environment,19 and even to management
15. The Tribunal asserted jurisdiction, however the case was settled before going to the merits.
16. Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005) (involving the privatization of a Polish
insurance company).
17. For example, several water works cases implicated important issues of sanitation. See, e.g., Azurix
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July 14, 2006); Compañı́a de Aguas
del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Aug. 20,
2007).
18. See, for example, two further water works cases implicating not just sanitation, but more funda-
mentally, the basic human right of access to water: Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
22, Award (July 24, 2008); and Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/
3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005).
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of national emergencies.20 I argue that the multinational’s capacity to create
such far-reaching and indelible agreements can only be properly understood
as the power to author international law.
This startling image—the multinational corporation as international
lawmaker—arises out of the confluence of three seemingly disparate devel-
opments in international legal doctrine: (1) the mainstream recognition that
state contracts are entitled to treaty protection; (2) the entrenchment of an
extraordinary level of property protection in international investment law,
along with the ascription of that property-style protection to investment
contracts; and (3) the recognition that multinational corporations can alter
or supplement their nationality in order to shop for protective treaties other-
wise unavailable to nationals of their original home state.
While each of these trends has entailed remarkable doctrinal shifts—up-
ending several classical principles of public international law—none, on its
own, implies the radical idea that corporations actually author the law in
any meaningful sense.21 But taken together these developments produce a
recognizable picture of robust international lawmaking. The first two devel-
opments, in contract and property, respectively comprise the form and sub-
stance of state contracts as law; the third, in the law of corporate nationality,
accounts for the multinational’s autonomy as a lawmaker. In this light, at
least within the ambit of the pre-existing web of international investment
and human rights treaties, the corporation appears as a basically autonomous
actor empowered to directly make and enforce international law, with major
effects for the domestic regulatory freedom of its contracting partners.
The link between the corporation’s international legal metamorphosis and
state consent is thin. The material developments have often not occurred
through clear provision in treaty text or other clear agreement by the par-
ties, but through the interpretation of broad and malleable terms in treaties
on investment and human rights.22 The corporation’s ascent is as much a
judicial innovation as a product of legislation. It has taken place through a
19. See, e.g., Chevron v. Ecuador, UNITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Partial Award on Track I
(Sept. 27, 2013) (arising out of an $18 billion domestic court judgment against Texaco (acquired by
Chevron) over the massive pollution in the Lago Agrio region through oil spills and toxic water dumping
over twenty-five years).
20. See, most famously, the cases arising out of the Argentine financial crisis of 2001–2002: CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 281 (May 12, 2005);
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007).
21. The first principle jettisoned by this development is the assumption that all contracts belong to
the municipal law of some country. See Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, 1 Oppenheim’s Inter-
national Law 927 (9th ed. 1996) (hereinafter Oppenheim’s International Law); Rudolf Dolzer &
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law 168 (2d ed., 2012). The
second is that corporations are all creatures of some municipal law, and are further best regulated by
domestic law. Oppenheim’s International Law at 859–60.
22. See Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional Transformation: Informal Change in Interna-
tional Organizations, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 289, 290 (2013) (observing, mutatis mutandis, a similar dynamic
in the context of international organizations).
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rich jurisprudence, arising out of ad hoc investor-state arbitration under BITs
and FTAs, and, to an extent, regional human rights jurisprudence. The cases
are occasionally contradictory, and remain in a perpetual degree of flux.
Conclusions can only be drawn cautiously, and indeed each line of cases
discussed herein has proven controversial at the margins. But what is most
important for present purposes is the remarkable extent to which they agree
on the basics. The doctrine is sufficiently clear in the most important aspects
to warrant reimagining the role of corporations in international legal
space—not only as rights bearers and enforcers, but also as lawmakers.
The picture is not an altogether happy one. The rise of the multinational
corporation has taken a great many steps, some of which have advanced
important global values. But the corporation’s newfound lawmaking capac-
ity comes at high cost to the nation state’s domestic capacity to regulate in
the public interest. Given the threat to domestic public values, it is not at
all clear that this level of empowerment in the interest of private rights
protection reflects the right trade-off. Moreover, the firm’s lawmaking ca-
pacity comes basically unchecked at the international level—without much
in the way of commensurate safeguards against corporate misfeasance, let
alone a capacity for corporations to bear international legal responsibility for
their own wrongful actions.23
On the one hand, as a matter of private law, there is much to criticize
about each of the broad doctrinal developments central to the corporation’s
ascent. In the first place, we should challenge the aggressive vision of prop-
erty implicit in investment arbitration. It is unclear why transnational prop-
erty protection should be far more thoroughgoing than anything accepted in
any municipal legal order24—and indeed such a robust vision of property
seems especially destructive in the transnational context. Second, there is
further reason to question the easy conflation of such robust transnational
property protection with the protection of state contracts.25 This fusion of
contract and property leads to significant problems pertaining to the scope
of protection associated with investment contracts, and the appropriate rem-
edies. And third, we should adopt a more healthy skepticism of the corpora-
23. I do not mean only responsibility for violations of general international law, like human rights or
international criminal law; the lack of corporate responsibility extends even to breach of contract. By way
of exception, respondent states are increasingly bringing counterclaims against corporate claimants in
investor-state arbitration. See, e.g., Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 93 (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Burlington v. Ecuador]. This possi-
bility obviously only arises once the investor has actually brought an action against the state, but the
mere possibility underscores the need to develop rules for comprehending and categorizing corporate
behavior in legal terms. For example, international law today offers no guidance regarding the attribution
of acts by employees and officers to the corporation, or between parents and subsidiaries, etc.
24. See generally Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30,
37 (2003) (“NAFTA tribunal decisions and dicta significantly exceed U.S. takings protections (already
among the most protective in the world)”); Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions
(2011); Christopher Pierson, Just Property: A History in the Latin West (2013).
25. See James Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 277, 284 (2013).
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tion’s capacity to shop for treaty protection through selective investment
structuring.26 We should be especially suspicious in cases involving state
contracts, where allowing the corporation to unilaterally acquire treaty pro-
tection by restructuring after contracting undermines the very notion of a
bargain, producing stark problems of fairness.27
At the same time, however, it is important to keep sight of the bigger
picture. Particular reforms to the international law of contracts, property,
and corporate nationality are certainly desirable, but it may be that the over-
all emergence of the corporation as an international lawmaker is something
of a fait accompli. The time may be drawing near where we will have to
reassess how we grapple with the corporation’s growing public role from the
traditionally hesitant perspective of public international law. Given the
multinational firm’s capacity to directly make and enforce international law,
without mediation by its state of nationality, we ought to challenge the
laissez-faire attitude of international law to the corporate form, by compari-
son to the more robust formal understanding of its traditional subjects:
states and international organizations.28
This Article seeks to provide the groundwork for a critical reassessment of
the multinational corporation’s privileged position in the international legal
order, by exposing the full extent of the corporation’s heretofore under-stud-
ied lawmaking potential. In Part I, I expound the idea of the state contract
26. The current outer limit is usually only extreme cases of abuse of the corporate form. See Phoenix
Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93 (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.italaw.com/documents/PhoenixAward.pdf; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits ¶¶ 267, 268, 273,
279 (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw1569.pdf; Tania Voon et al., Legal Responses to Corporate Manoeuvering in International Investment
Arbitration, 5 J. Int’l Disp. Settlement 41 (2014); George Kahale III, The New Dutch Sandwich: The
Issue of Treaty Abuse, 48 Colum. FDI Perspectives (2011).
27. A few cases have begun to recognize the problem. See, e.g., Burlington v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5, ¶ 132; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Deci-
sion on Annulment, ¶¶ 94–95 (Sept. 27, 2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 152 (2009). But see Continental Casualty
v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 297 (5 Sept. 2008), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf; Burlington v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5 Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Orrego Vicuña (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1095_0.pdf. See also Dolzer & Schreuer,
supra note 21, at 175–77.
28. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN GA
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (hereinafter ARSIWA); Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of Inter-
national Organizations, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n 61st Sess., May 4–June 5, July 6–Aug. 7, 2009,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 2 (hereinafter DARIO); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-
tional Organizations or between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/
15 (on lawmaking through treaty). I accept the view that we ought to be cautious about “upgrading” the
status of corporations by dubbing them subjects of international law. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 1. It is
certainly not the intention of the present study to advocate empowering corporations any further on the
level of international law. The point is rather to unmask how much the law already empowers multina-
tional firms. The venerable concept of subjecthood may produce more problems than it would solve, but
we must still find a way to bring corporations into the system—to render them formal, knowable crea-
tures of international law, and render them commensurately accountable.
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as a form of international lawmaking by agreement. I explain why there are
strong theoretical grounds for understanding state contracts as sources of
international law and corporations as lawmakers—and why invoking the
concepts of law and lawmaking adds value. Thereafter, in Part II, I turn to
the three broad doctrinal developments that have driven the multinational’s
rise as an author of international law. I examine, first, the internationaliza-
tion of state contracts under a variety of investment treaty provisions, focus-
ing on the umbrella clause and the standard of fair and equitable treatment.
Second, I turn to the question of the expansive notion of property at work in
investor-state arbitration, and its graft onto contract protection. And third, I
explore the viability of corporate treaty shopping through investment
(re)structuring. Finally, in Part III, I turn a critical eye to these develop-
ments—drawing doctrinal and theoretical insight from domestic private
law, as well as the structure and grammar of public international law.
I. Making Law Through Contract
This Part provides the theoretical justification for recasting corporations
as international lawmakers. I assume, by hypothesis, the relevant doctrinal
particulars that I will more firmly establish in Part II. My purpose here is to
show how, in the abstract, an internationalized power of contract can be-
come a power to make international law writ large, and why it matters. I
aim to show, in other words, how a seemingly private exchange of in per-
sonam rights between a multinational corporation and a foreign sovereign
can become, for the citizenry of the state party, a meaningful source of gen-
eral law—a package of legal norms more akin to the public international
treaty than the merely domestic contract.
I argue, first, that there are both formal and material reasons for recon-
ceiving state contracts as sources of international law—under certain condi-
tions. Second, I suggest that the multinational corporation should be
understood as a more or less autonomous international lawmaker—whose
capacity to make law cannot be dismissed as merely delegated by, or deriva-
tive of, the prerogatives of its original state of nationality.
A. State Contracts as International Law
Why call state contracts law at all? The issue goes deeper than differences
between national legal cultures over the proper classification of contracts
more generally. Though seemingly only an agreement between the state and
a foreign private party, the internationally protected contract has signifi-
cantly greater normative force, wider reach, and more indelible effects than
its domestic analogue. These long-term agreements severely affect the state’s
regulatory autonomy, and thereby constrict the capacity of its citizens for
democratic self-government. To continue viewing such agreements as sim-
59
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\56-2\HLI203.txt unknown Seq: 10  4-SEP-15 10:56
238 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 56
ple instruments of commerce would seriously obscure their public scope.
The force and depth of the internationalized state contract are only properly
understood by analogy to the inter-state treaty—as a source of public inter-
national law.
It is not necessary to insist that all contracts, or even domestic public
contracts, are sources of law per se. Domestic legal orders vary widely on the
semantic question of whether contracts are to be understood as law, or rather
as bundles of certain kinds of rights protected by law (i.e., the law of con-
tracts). In civil law systems it is only natural to view the contract itself as a
private source of law, obligatory only for the parties in their mutual rela-
tions.29 Framed in this way, private persons share a limited degree of author-
ity to make law, backed by the sanction of the state.30 By contrast, in
common law jurisdictions it is more uncommon and uncomfortable to refer
to contracts as laws—despite some authority in positivist legal theory.31 The
term “law” is usually reserved for normative enactments of general applica-
tion—including, for example, legislative statutes, generalizable judicial en-
actments (i.e., common law proper), and regulation by administrative
agencies. Common lawyers tend to treat contracts as exchanges of certain
kinds of rights between natural or legal persons that the law renders enforce-
able. They are thus classified in a way closer to property rights than law writ
large, with the classical distinction being that contracts create in personam
rights (rights held against the other party) as opposed to property rights,
which are in rem (held against the world).32 Neither is itself law, but rather a
set of rights recognized by the law, and about which the law will have much
to say.33
29. See, e.g., Code Civil [C. civ.], bk. 3, tit. III, art. 1134 (Fr.) (“Les conventions légalement formées
tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites” [Agreements lawfully entered into have the force of law for
those who have made them]), translation available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-En-
glish/Legifrance-translations.
30. 2 Max Weber, Economy and Society 683 (G. Roth & C. Wittich, eds. 1978) (“Today it is
fundamentally established that any content whatsoever of a contract, in so far as it is not excluded by
limitations on the freedom of contract, creates law among the parties.”); Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory
of Law 257 (2d. ed., trans. Max Knight, 1960) (“The legal order, by instituting the legal transaction as
a law-creating fact, authorizes the individuals subject to the law to regulate their mutual relations within
the framework of general legal norms created by legislation . . . by norms created by way of legal
transactions.”).
31. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012) (going even further by referring to
wills as a form of unilateral law). Classical legal realism comes close to this view as well, with its empha-
sis on power and authority. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 451, 452 (1920) (In contracts,
“particular legal rights and duties are created at the initiative of private individuals. But they are created
(or modified or extinguished) by virtue of the power of mutual coercion (in the form of pre-existing
rights) vested in the ordinary law in the two contracting parties.”).
32. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 25, at 298.
33. Property and contract differ in one crucially relevant respect. The law of property is a realm of
structure. Property categories tend to be rigidly fixed, and attach rights to assets in very specific ways. By
contrast, the law of contract represents the realm of choice—of authorship. The law of contracts typically
allows parties to negotiate and distribute rights and obligations as they see fit, and to allocate risk
however they want. Of course where the parties don’t actually negotiate terms the law will often fill gaps
according to a wide array of default rules. Admittedly, the law will occasionally displace negotiated
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But for all the variation across domestic laws of contract, this issue of
classification is not especially consequential. The difference in how civil and
common law jurisdictions approach the classification of contracts does not
seem to go much further than semantics. It implies no significant distinc-
tion about how contracts interact with the national legal order. The very
same contract would be called “law” in one jurisdiction, and viewed as
merely a private agreement enforceable by law in another—and the classifi-
cation would imply no effect on the contract’s disposition. I take no position
on whether either semantic approach more accurately captures the normative
significance of an enforceable agreement between two private parties, or
even between a private party and the state.
The rationale for viewing the internationalized state contract as a source
of law is more meaningful. While such contracts share a great deal with
their purely domestic cousins, they are closer to instruments of public inter-
national law in two key respects: (1) their formal hierarchical relationship to
domestic legal norms; and (2) their material impact on the citizenry of the
state party. In other words, it matters that they are instruments of interna-
tional law as opposed to national law, and that they have wide-ranging and
indelible effects for domestic regulatory space. Moreover, (3) the conception
of the internationalized state contract as a source of international law easily
stands up to the critique of enforceability perennially leveled against the
idea of law beyond the state. As against the domestic contract, the interna-
tionalized state contract presents a formidable and highly enforceable pack-
age of legal norms with priority over national regulatory initiatives—better
understood as international law than a merely private exchange of rights and
duties.
For purposes of this Part it will be useful to contrast two kinds of contrac-
tual instruments in the abstract, as ideal types. On the international side,
the type is a long-term diagonal contract between a state and a foreign cor-
poration, for example a concession to explore and extract oil and gas in a
part of the state’s territory conditioned on certain profit-sharing obligations.
The contract comes under the protection of a standard BIT between that
state and the corporate investor’s state of nationality, containing the basic
guarantees—concerning expropriation, fair and equitable treatment (FET),
etc. This type represents the contracts at issue throughout this Article. I will
refer to this type as “international state contracts.” Contrast this to the clos-
est domestic analogue, an identical concession contract between the state
and a locally incorporated firm—what I will call the “domestic public con-
tract.” This type is the same as the state contract in all particulars except the
nationality of the parties, whose relationship is here vertical rather than di-
contract terms according to mandatory rules—to different degrees in different legal orders. But, for the
most part, in the law of contracts parties are free to author their respective rights and obligations for
themselves—and the bargain they strike will have the force of law.
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agonal. As a result, it is not entitled to treaty protection—and this is the
crucial distinction.
The first consequence of the difference between these two types—the in-
ternational state contract and the purely domestic public contract—concerns
their formal position in the hierarchy of norms vis-à-vis the state party’s
municipal law. To put the point bluntly, the domestic public contract will
generally occupy a low position within the national legal hierarchy, whereas
the international state contract occupies a position outside and above the
entire domestic legal order.
Say, for example, that the state enacts comprehensive environmental regu-
lations that have the effect of depreciating our hypothetical investor’s oil and
gas contract. If the agreement at issue is a domestic public contract, the
regulation will generally enjoy clear priority—it will simply trump the do-
mestic investor’s contractual rights.34 The disposition of the contract is,
here, purely a matter of domestic law, which will usually not insulate con-
tracts from bona fide prospective regulation—at least not by default.35 By
contrast, the obligations imposed by the international state contract would
not be vitiated by the state’s environmental regulation, and may well require
redress. This is because, under the auspices of a protective treaty, the state
contract creates international legal obligations.
The point has been put in different ways. It is sometimes said that the
protective treaty “internationalizes” the contract,36 or that it “raises” or “el-
evates” the contract to the status of international law.37 Another formulation
is simply that a violation of the contract becomes a violation of the treaty.38
But the general effect is the same: under the treaty’s aegis, the state contract
gives rise to international legal rights and obligations, violation of which
34. See Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885 (2000); Stern,
supra note 25. As Serkin shows, things become more complicated where the parties negotiate robust
protections against prospective regulation into the contract, as in certain domestic public-private part-
nerships. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78
U. Chi. L. Rev. 879, 895 (2011). The same situation arises in international contracts that incorporate
stabilization clauses—i.e., clauses requiring that the state freeze aspects of its regulatory regime vis-à-vis
the private party, or at least compensate the latter fully for any detrimental changes. See Alvarez, supra
note 1, at 22; Paul Kuruk, Renegotiating Transnational Investment Agreements: Lessons for Developing Countries
from the Ghana-Valco Experience, 13 Mich. J. Int’l L. 43 (1991–92). I bracket discussion of both situa-
tions here, focusing primarily on contracts where the parties did not agree to incorporate such broad
protections against prospective regulation.
35. Merrill, supra note 34; Serkin, supra note 34; see also Lise Johnson, The Impact of Investment Treaties
on Governance of Private Investment in Infrastructure (EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2014/32,2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411575.
36. See, e.g., Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 5 (Oct. 12, 2005) 16
ICSID Rep. 216 (2012); Alvarez, supra note 1, at 12; see also infra Part II.A.
37. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 76 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at https://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC657_
En&caseId=C6.
38. See, e.g., SGS v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 142 (Feb. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1526.pdf.
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will engage the state’s international responsibility.39 Crucially, such interna-
tionalization triggers the core principle that domestic law cannot excuse a
state’s violation of its international obligations nor its duty to compensate.40
In the now-classical formulation of the Articles on State Responsibility,
“[t]he characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is
governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the
characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”41 So while na-
tional legislation or regulation will often trump a domestic public con-
tract,42 the same state action cannot excuse the violation of an otherwise
identical internationalized state contract without engaging the state’s inter-
national responsibility—at least as a matter of international law.
Put another way, in the case of domestic public contracts the state retains
basic authority over the contract’s disposition, and can rescind the agree-
ment unilaterally or depreciate its value through subsequent regulation.43
To the extent that its capacity to do so is limited, it would only be by
national law—which can itself be altered by subsequent national law
(though perhaps only with prospective effect).44 Internationalized state con-
tracts are more like treaties in that the state and the private party share
authority over the contract’s disposition, and the state cannot unilaterally
terminate or vitiate the agreement without committing an internationally
wrongful act.
Note that a state contract does not by any means invalidate contradictory
internal law any more than a treaty does. As is usually the case with interna-
tional legal obligations, breach simply triggers the twin duties of cessation
and reparation (for which compensation and termination of the agreement
will often suffice). The point is that a state contract entails a compensable
international legal obligation that can be violated by national regulatory
action—where the same action would have simply vitiated an analogous
domestic public contract without being compensable.
Thus far I’ve presented the formal argument in functional terms, focusing
on the relationship between internationalized state contracts and the domes-
39. There are important nuances in the doctrine relating to exactly what “internationalization” en-
tails, described more fully below in Part II.A. But no differences seem to be implied by the choice
between terms like “internationalization” or “elevation” of contracts, and I treat them as functional
equivalents for the purposes of this Article.
40. ARISWA, arts. 3, 32.
41. Id. at art. 3; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27 (“A party may not invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
42. Merrill, supra note 34. Even in cases where the municipal law of public contracts affords some
protection to private parties from breach by the state, the available remedies are often significantly
weaker than those available for the enforcement of private contracts. For example, Serkin notes that in the
United States, “with only few exceptions, public contracts are enforced against governments with a
liability rule instead of a property rule, and damages are typically limited to reliance instead of expecta-
tion damages.” Serkin, supra note 34, at 916 (“[A] government can often avoid its contractual precom-
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tic legal order. In my view this relationship is what’s crucial. But the formal
argument can be usefully recast from a positivist perspective on interna-
tional law—in terms of the doctrine of sources. Under classical international
law, the three plenary sources of law are, of course, treaties, custom, and
general principles.45 From a maximally formalistic, positivist stance, any ar-
gument for a new or additional source of law would have to trace its pedi-
gree back to one of the plenary sources. In the case of modern
internationalized state contracts the argument is an easy one. Putting aside
custom and general principles, there is no difficulty at all tracing these con-
tracts’ pedigree back to treaties. Indeed it is through the direct operation of
treaty provisions—in BITs and FTAs—that such contracts attain the force
of international law. The overarching treaty is the plenary source of interna-
tional law; the contract it internationalizes is simply a derivative legal
source.
Examples of derivative sources of law abound in both international and
domestic law. The clearest example, internationally, is the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC)’s capacity to issue binding resolutions—often
viewed as a quasi-legislative power.46 The UNSC’s legislative capacity is not
a plenary source of international law, but is rather derived from a major
multilateral treaty—it flows from Chapter Seven of the United Nations
Charter. Similarly, in domestic law we typically view the legislature as the
plenary lawmaker (though in constitutional democracies that honor is by
rights only properly bestowed upon the constituent (or amending) power).
Yet, in modern administrative states across the world, legislatures create
subsidiary agencies, authorizing them by statute to issue binding regula-
tions of all kinds. Administrative regulation is similarly a derivative source
of law, whose pedigree traces back to the legislature (and ultimately, as case
may be, the constitution). Cast in rigidly positivistic terms, the formal side
of my argument is thus that the internationalized state contract has become
a derivative source of international law—analogous to UNSC legislation, or, in
domestic law, the administrative regulation authorized by statute.
There is a second, material reason why the internationalized state contract
should be conceived as a source of international law, which goes to the inva-
sive reach of these instruments within the domestic state’s regulatory space.
Beyond only raising the formal status of the state contract to the level of
international law, these treaties afford such contracts startlingly broad sub-
45. Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 49 (7th ed., 2014); Crawford, supra note 7, at 20;
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a–c), Apr. 18, 1946 (I leave to the side the
supplemental sources of international law listed at Art. 38(1)(d), including international judicial opinions
and the writings of learned commentators, because these are generally taken to refer to finding out the
content of the other principal sources).
46. Julian Arato, Constitutionality and Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Two Perspectives on the Material
Constitution of the United Nations, 10 Int’l J. Const. L. 627 (2012) (examining the quasi-legislative
capacities of the UN Security Council); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires
or Ultra Innovative?, 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 542 (2004).
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stantive protection—through even the most commonplace standards like
FET and guarantees against expropriation. As already noted, such contracts
have formal priority over conflicting domestic law at all levels, from admin-
istrative regulation and legislation to constitutional amendment. But at the
same time, the substantive scope of what counts as a material conflict is
extraordinarily expansive. Internationalized state contracts are insulated
from domestic public law in all spheres, from the regulation of the environ-
ment and public health, to public morals, and even to the management of
national emergencies.
Moreover, liability is not merely limited to complete (or nearly complete)
takings. Insofar as the national regulation runs afoul of the treaty’s expansive
standards by abrogating the contract, materially breaching it, or even signif-
icantly depreciating its value, the state will breach an international obliga-
tion. The ambit of such forceful and pervasive contracts is not adequately
captured by the notion of a simple exchange of mere rights in personam; by
imposing an enormous hindrance on the capacity of the state party to gov-
ern, they affect the rights and capacities of the citizenry as a whole.47
Speaking in terms of our ideal types, at least, the state contract is in
critical respects closer to the inter-state treaty than to its municipal ana-
logue, the domestic public contract. While it may be something of a seman-
tic issue whether or not domestic contracts are best understood as law writ
large, there are strong formal and material reasons for viewing the state
contract as a veritable instrument of international law. In view of its formal
priority over domestic legal norms of any kind, from regulation and legisla-
tion to even constitutional amendment, the state contract relates to national
law in the same way as the classical sources of international law. And in
light of the extraordinary breadth of protection these contracts receive, and
their constriction of the state party’s capacity to regulate in all domains of
public life, they appear materially closer to public law than any simple com-
mercial exchange of rights and duties.48
Finally, third, it should be noted that internationalized state contracts are
eminently enforceable. This is not the place to challenge the spurious
(though perennial) argument that international law is “not really law” be-
cause it is not enforceable against delinquent states.49 That fight has had
more than enough air-time as it is. But it is still worth pointing out that
47. See infra Part II.B. For Schill, the study of public contracts in the interaction between national and
international law reveals that “the theory of administrative law must recognize that in important areas
the state does not govern anymore in an entirely unilateral manner by command and control, but increas-
ingly cooperatively.” Stephan Schill, Transnational Legal Approaches to Administrative Law: Conceptualizing
Public Contracts in Globalization, 30 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 05/2013), available at http://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/13/documents/Schill.pdf.
48. See Schill, supra note 47, at 5–6.
49. The skeptical argument usually derives from an archaic conception of law, overly oriented toward
enforcement, or an unwillingness to appreciate the myriad mechanisms for enforcement available under
international law—prime among them being self-help.
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internationalized state contracts are actually far more enforceable than most
other sources of international law. They can be enforced against the state
more easily and more regularly than typical international legal obligations
for two principal reasons. First, the BITs and FTAs from which state con-
tracts derive their international legal status also bestow upon private actors
the direct capacity to sue states—to compel host states into international
arbitration to resolve their contractual disputes. Aggrieved private parties
need not petition their home state to press their claims, as would be neces-
sary in trade disputes before the WTO.50 Second, BITs and FTAs key into
extremely powerful multilateral treaties for the enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards, like the ICSID Convention51 and the New York Convention.52
Upon winning their case at arbitration, investors can rely on these treaties to
effectively pursue a delinquent state’s assets to the ends of the earth. So not
only are there strong formal and material reasons to view the international-
ized state contract as an authentic (if not plenary) source of international
law; it is moreover a source of law that can be readily redeemed through a
vast specialized architecture for investor-state arbitration and the enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards.
B. The Corporation as International Lawmaker
Once we see state contracts as a source of international law, it is relatively
easy to see how the corporation is an international lawmaker. But two objec-
tions may still be posed, to the effect that the capacity of corporations to
make law is ultimately dependent on sovereign states. One objection might
be that corporations are not really lawmakers in a full sense because they can
only enact state contracts by agreement with states. It may thus seem that
the real locus of lawmaking power comes from the host state. Second, and
more significantly, it might seem as though whatever lawmaking capacities
the corporation does have for itself are merely delegated or derivative of the
sovereign prerogatives of its own original state of nationality, completely
dependent on engaging the latter’s treaty network. Both objections would
miss the mark, but engaging with them helps reveal the corporation’s sur-
prising freedom of action on the international stage.
The first objection can be easily dismissed. As opposed to national law,
which is usually promulgated unilaterally by particular institutions, interna-
tional law is typically made by agreement between sovereign states—
whether explicitly, via treaty, or tacitly via customary international law. We
50. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2006).
But see Crawford, supra note 7, at 12; Shaw, supra note 45, at 3; Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law
Really ‘Law’?, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1293 (1984).
51. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (ICSID Convention).
52. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
July 6, 1988, 1252 U.N.T.S. 4739 (New York Convention).
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have no difficulty viewing each of the parties to a bilateral treaty as
lawmakers—on the contrary, the treaty is usually understood as the arche-
typal expression of the parties’ sovereign power to enact international law.
The power to make law does not come from either party, but rather derives
from the background principle of pacta sunt servanda and the secondary rules
of the law of treaties more generally.53
As with the treaty parties, both parties to an internationalized state con-
tract are equal participants in making the law. The private party’s capacity
to enact international legal instruments is not simply derived from the sov-
ereign prerogatives of the state party. It is rather derived from the back-
ground norms established in the overarching BIT, FTA, or other protective
treaty through which the contract is internationalized. The legal character of
the state contract is thus dependent on a pre-existing web of norms over and
above either contracting party, and cannot be reduced to the state party’s
will alone. Moreover, as explained further below, corporations can even ac-
cess treaty protection unilaterally, elevating a pre-existing domestic contract
to the status of international law after the contract is already in force.
However, a more serious criticism remains open: is the corporation’s law-
making capacity nevertheless ultimately derivative of the lawmaking capac-
ity of its own state of nationality? After all, BITs and FTAs only protect the
investments of nationals of the states parties. It might thus be pointed out
that an investor can only secure treaty protection by operation of treaties
signed by its home state. It might therefore seem to follow that, to whatever
extent it has the capacity to make law by agreement with a foreign host
state, this capacity is no more than an expression of its home state’s preroga-
tives. Indeed, this situation accurately characterizes the relatively circum-
scribed lawmaking capacity of individuals (i.e., natural persons). But
multinational firms have much greater leeway, which grounds a far more
significant lawmaking potential.
The secret lies in the multinational corporation’s flexible form. A corpora-
tion can access BITs and FTAs between the target state and third states with
relative ease, even though they would not be accessible to nationals of its
original home state.54 At least for purposes of acquiring investment treaty
protection, corporations can readily change or augment their nationality.
Firms can alter their nationality by reincorporating through complicated
strategies familiar to tax planners, like corporate inversion or migration; but
they can attain any number of new nationalities far more easily by creating
or acquiring foreign subsidiaries through which to structure their invest-
ments. Indeed, international legal doctrine even recognizes that a corpora-
tion can restructure to take advantage of the host state’s BITs and FTAs
53. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT)
(“pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith”).
54. See infra Part II.C.
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with third states after initially contracting with the state, as occurred in the
Bechtel case,55 so long as it does so before a dispute arises.56
It remains true that the corporation’s lawmaking capacity is contingent
on the action of states in a very general sense. It depends, after all, on a
complex web of pre-existing treaties enacted by states to govern the flow of
foreign direct investment.57 And it is of course ultimately dependent on the
firm’s ability to incorporate in the first place, or to structure its investment
through third states—all of which depends upon the national laws of partic-
ular sovereign states. It would certainly be wrong to say that the multina-
tional corporation is not in any way dependent on the state for its capacity to
make international law. But on balance the level of dependence is relatively
low, and the corporation’s lawmaking autonomy is relatively robust. Of
course corporations lack the plenary capacity of the sovereign state to author
international law on any topic. Yet the multinational firm’s lawmaking po-
tential is far greater than that of the individual investor, whose capacity to
engage foreign sovereigns in internationalized state contracts is merely dele-
gated or derivative of the sovereign prerogatives of her state of nationality.
The better analogy for the corporation’s rise to the international stage lies
in the story of public international organizations. Originally constituted by
the states party to their constituent instruments, international organizations
have proven capable of expanding their capacity to author the law beyond
their enumerated powers—whether through judicial interpretation, or di-
verse forms of organizational action.58 Their capacity to make law, such as it
is, ultimately derives from their creators—but many organizations have sub-
sequently grown more autonomous.59
Like the international organization before it, the multinational corpora-
tion was originally empowered on the international plane by states—but it
55. See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005); see infra Part II.C.
56. See Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93 (Apr. 15, 2009);
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction and the Merits ¶¶ 267, 268, 273, 279 (Sep. 3, 2013); see also infra Part II.C.
57. Appreciating, of course, that there are certain major holdouts to the BIT regime, e.g., Brazil; and
indeed partly in response to the recent Philip Morris arbitration implicating its public health regime,
Australia has indicated that it will no longer sign BITs with dispute resolution provisions.
58. José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2006); Arato, supra note
22 (arguing that judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights have transformed the scope and powers of their respective organizations through progressively
interpreting their constituent instruments); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: Inter-
national Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 Germ. L.J. 979 (2011); Arato, supra note 46 (examining the
quasi-legislative capacities of the UN Security Council).
59. The most dramatic example is that of the European Union, famously captured by Joseph Weiler,
The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991). The UN and Council of Europe are also particu-
larly clear examples. See Arato, supra note 22, at 290 (on judicial transformation in those two bodies);
Arato, supra note 46, at 644 (on transformation through quasi-legislative practice). See also Jan Klab-
bers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2d ed., 2009); J. Benton Heath,
Managing the Republic of NGOs, 47 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 239 (2014); J. Benton Heath, Global
Emergency Power in the Age of Ebola, 57 Harv. Int’l L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
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has relied on its flexible form to attain a significant degree of autonomy to
make international law, by agreement with foreign sovereigns. It has been
helped along, to be sure, by a great many favorable interpretations of the
broad and malleable provisions incorporated in BITs and FTAs—a process
which the next Part will address. But assuming the doctrinal particulars, for
the moment, there is good reason to reimagine corporations as international
lawmakers. They enjoy significant autonomy to navigate the global web of
BITs and FTAs to secure treaty protection for their contracts with foreign
sovereigns; and where they do so, such contracts have formal priority over
conflicting national law of any type, across all areas of public policy. The
multinational corporation thus possesses the power to make law by agree-
ment with sovereign states—to establish private legal norms with major
effects for domestic public law.
II. The Doctrinal Constellation
This Part considers sequentially the three developments central to the
multinational corporation’s emergent lawmaking potential, relating to state
contracts, transnational property, and corporate nationality. Each of these
developments entails surprising expansions of corporate power vis-à-vis host
states and their citizens. None have been sufficiently studied in their own
right, or subjected to adequate criticism. But the radical extent to which the
doctrine empowers private corporations against the state only becomes ap-
parent when they are drawn together.
Here I ground and illustrate the hypothetical analysis attempted above,
by demonstrating that international legal doctrine supports extending in-
vestment treaty protection to state contracts, that such protection insulates
them from state action that depreciates their value as iron-clad property
entitlements, and that corporations may avail themselves of the full panoply
of such protective treaties by changing or augmenting their nationality in
the process of structuring particular investments. I consider in turn: (A) the
emergence of the formal idea of the internationalized contract under modern
international investment law; (B) the material extension of this legal source
of law above and beyond national regulatory policy across all kinds of values;
and (C) the widespread arbitral acceptance of creative corporate treaty shop-
ping, which generates a sphere of autonomy where corporations become
lawmakers.
A. The Modern Internationalized Contract
The first development central to the corporation’s rise as an author of
international law concerns the formal idea of the internationalized con-
tract—the elevation of the state contract to the hierarchy of international
legal norms, as an instrument of international law with priority over con-
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flicting domestic law of any kind. The roots of this development extend
back to the oil nationalization arbitrations of the nineteen-seventies.60 How-
ever, it has come into full fruition in the modern era of international invest-
ment treaties, coalescing only through arbitral practice in the new
millennium.
The very idea of “internationalized contracts” jettisons a classical maxim
of international law: that contracts between states and private parties are
fundamentally instruments of some national legal order, but not interna-
tional law. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) set out the
traditional presumption in 1929, in the Serbian Loans case. The League of
Nations Court held that “[a]ny contract which is not a contract between
States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the mu-
nicipal law of some country.”61 The most recent edition of Oppenheim’s Inter-
national Law confirms the PCIJ view in principle, noting that under classical
international law “[i]t is doubtful whether a breach by a state of its contrac-
tual obligations with aliens constitutes per se a breach of an international
obligation.”62 In other words, a contract belongs to the legal order under
whose law it was executed—i.e., the law of the contract—which is almost
always explicitly or implicitly the law of some national order.
Even before the BIT era, there was some limited and controversial author-
ity supporting the notion that certain state contracts could become instru-
ments of international law, and not (or not merely) agreements under
municipal law.63 The idea was that the parties were free to adopt interna-
tional law as the law of the contract, and evidence of this choice could be
sought in an explicit choice of law clause or, in case of ambiguity, on the
basis of other features of the agreement including the selection of interna-
tional arbitration as a forum.64 The parties’ choice would thereby “interna-
tionalize” the contract—the theory goes—converting it into an
international legal instrument whose conditions of breach, defenses, and
remedies would be derived, in whole or in part, from public international
60. Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
61. Serbian Loans, Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 14 at 41 (July 12).
62. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 21, at 927 (noting, however, that the situation may be
different in contemporary jurisprudence where there is an “additional element as denial of justice, or
expropriation, or breach of treaty . . . .”); see also Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 168. Modern
investor-state cases continue to confirm that the well-rehearsed principle still holds true for general
international law, outside the context of BITs and FTAs. See, e.g., Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 5 (Oct. 12, 2005) (“The Tribunal recalls the well established rule of
general international law that in normal circumstances per se a breach of a contract by the State does not
give rise to direct international responsibility on the part of the State.”).
63. See, e.g., Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and
State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 Fordham Int’l
L.J. 1550 (2009).
64. See, e.g., Texaco v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
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law.65 Already in the seventies, then, the idea that state contracts have a
place in the hierarchy of international legal norms was not unheard of.
Yet from the outset the theory of internationalized contracts was ex-
tremely controversial as a matter of general international law—not least be-
cause there exists no general international law of contracts. Absent any more
sophisticated legal framework specific to contracts, the question and conse-
quences of a state’s breach of an internationalized contract had to be handled
according to (or by analogy to) the general system of state responsibility for
wrongful acts applicable to cases of treaty breach. In any case the idea did
not go particularly far. Arbitral and judicial authorities were few and far
between. And while the theory has been discussed across generations of
scholarship, it never ultimately retained a great deal of traction.
The possibility of internationalized contracts only came into the main-
stream in the investment treaty era—albeit under a number of different
names. The modern mechanism lies not in general international law but in
the vast web of treaties for the protection of foreign investment. The idea’s
resurgence has occurred through the operation and interpretation of
thousands of BITs and FTAs—through which states have granted a rela-
tively consistent set of property protections to private persons.66
As instruments for the protection of foreign property, it may not be obvi-
ous why investment treaties apply to contracts at all. Yet they have been
extended to the protection of contracts in several crucial ways. Some explic-
itly incorporate guarantees for certain contracts, including provisions pro-
tecting large-scale “investment agreements,”67 or even broader clauses
insulating the investor from breach of any agreements entered into with the
host state (known as an umbrella clause).68 But more importantly, tribunals
have interpreted these treaties’ general protections as effectively internation-
alizing state contracts, including in particular the guarantee against expro-
priation, and the powerful but amorphous grant of fair and equitable
treatment (FET). Though these provisions operate in very different ways, for
present purposes the material result is similar: so long as a state contract can
qualify as a covered “investment,” these treaties insert private agreements
with the state into the international legal hierarchy, and insulate them from
breach or diminution by contrary domestic law.
65. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 21, at 927; F.A. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsi-
bility 54 Am. J. Int’l L. 572 (1960); R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 156 (1961); Stephen Schewbel, International Protection of Contractual Agreements, 53 A.S.I.L. Proc.
266 (1959); Alfred Verdross, Protection of Private Property under Quasi-International Agreements, in Varia
Juris Gentium, Liber Amicorum Presented to J.P. François 355 (1959); James Hyde, Economic
Development Agreements, 105 Receuil des Cours de  l’Académie de droit international 267 (1962); A.F.M.
Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12
Eur. J. Int’l L. 309 (2001); Dolzer  & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 167.
66. See generally Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 167.
67. See, e.g., Trade Promotion Agreement U.S.–Peru, Apr. 12, 2006.
68. Id.
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1. Contracts as “Investments”
For a state contract to qualify for BIT or FTA protection, the main juris-
dictional prerequisite is that it must qualify as an “investment” under the
treaty.69 Tribunals are fond of explaining that not just any contract between
a foreign investor and the state will qualify, and often identify a simple
contract for the sale of goods as a hypothetical counterexample. As a one-off
exchange, such a contract would not seem to satisfy the durational aspect of
the definition70 (nor perhaps the requirement of at least a minimal contribu-
tion to the host state’s economy which some tribunals consider necessary).71
But the bar is very low, and the large-scale state contracts at issue here will
usually satisfy this legal standard without any difficulty.
The focus here is on contractual undertakings that would merit the
description of “lawmaking” in both a formal and material sense.72 The
kinds of contracts at issue usually involve a long-term relationship between
the putative investor and the state, and often entail some (temporary) trans-
ference of the state’s sovereign prerogatives to the private organization.73
These may include the exploration, extraction, and sale of a state’s natural
resources (minerals, oil and gas, etc.), the construction of fundamental infra-
structure, and the operation of utilities. Typical utilities cases have involved
contracts for the construction and maintenance of a major highway and the
operation of tolls,74 the modernization and provision of water infrastruc-
ture,75 and the long-term provision of electric power.76 The SGS cases, ex-
amined further below, involved contracts privatizing the state’s power to
inspect imports and levy customs duties,77 and Siemens v. Argentina even en-
tailed a partial contractual delegation of the state’s control over immigra-
tion.78 These agreements are typically long-term, entail substantial risks for
69. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 79–80.
70. See, e.g., SGS v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 420 (Feb. 12, 2010).
71. Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (Apr. 15, 2009).
72. For a recent canvass of such state contracts, see Schill, supra note 47, at 5.
73. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Ob-
jections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003). See Schill, supra note 47, at 5 (conceptualizing such state contracts
within the frame of the state’s public law); Serkin, supra note 34. This kind of transference can and
should be analogized to the transference of sovereign functions to public international organizations.
Gulieglmo Verdirame, A Normative Theory of Sovereignty Transfers, 49 Stan. J. Int’l L. 371, 371–72
(2013); Arato, supra note 46, at 646–47.
74. See, e.g., Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5 Decision
on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2001).
75. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respon-
dent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005) (2005); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 420 (July 14, 2006); Compañı́a de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi
Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Aug. 20, 2007).
76. See, e.g., Electrabel v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction Applicable
Law and Liability (Nov. 30, 2012); Himpurna California Energy, Ltd. v. Indonesia, Final Award, 25 Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 13, (UNITRAL Arb.), May 4, 1999.
77. See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13.
78. Siemens A.G.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Jan. 17, 2007).
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the investor, and are generally at least expected to benefit the economy of the
host state in a meaningful way.79
As long as an investor’s contract with a foreign sovereign can be charac-
terized as an investment—and most can—it will qualify for treaty protec-
tion. Through the treaty’s substantive guarantees, discussed further below,
the contract will be thereby elevated from the status of a mere domestic
agreement governed by national law to the international plane—converted
into a bundle of international legal rights, directly enforceable by the corpo-
ration through compulsory investor-state arbitration.
So how do investment treaties elevate domestic contracts to the level of
international law? In some instances they do so explicitly, through express
protections for investment agreements or via umbrella clauses. But such pro-
visions are not especially common and their applicability to domestic con-
tracts has generated significant controversy. More generally, and perhaps
more importantly, tribunals have come to extend the basic treaty protections
to contracts—crucially through FET, but also via guarantees against expro-
priation, non-arbitrariness, and others. Because tribunals and scholars have
most aggressively probed the nature, mechanics, and limits of international-
izing contracts in the context of umbrella clauses, that area of doctrine pro-
vides the best place to start. The next Section will thus begin with an
examination of the principal debates surrounding the internationalization of
contracts via the umbrella clause. The following Section will demonstrate
how FET proves the much more significant vehicle for converting state con-
tracts into international law, and requires more serious attention than it has
yet received in this regard.
2. The Umbrella Clause
Treaty provisions that explicitly elevate an investor’s contracts with the
state to the level of international law provide the most obvious mechanisms
for internationalizing state contracts. Some treaties expressly provide that
their protections apply to any “investment agreement”—that is, a contract
that actually establishes the investment, like the concession agreements or
licenses considered above.80 These clauses generally provide that any breach
of this main structural agreement between the investor and the host state,
by the latter, constitutes a violation of the state’s obligations under the
treaty. The umbrella clause operates in a similar way, though its scope has
significantly further reach. These provisions are usually interpreted as elevat-
79. Oil and gas concessions today tend to include long-term rights to explore and extract, coupled
with production-sharing or profit-sharing duties; public works, utilities, and infrastructure contracts may
entail more or less thoroughgoing privatization—ranging from mere construction, to “build, operate,
and transfer” (as in many waterworks cases) or “build, operate, and own” agreements. Dolzer &
Schreuer, supra note 21, at 80.
80. See, e.g., Trade Promotion Agreement U.S.–Peru, Apr. 12, 2006; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note
21, at 79.
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ing all contracts between the investor and the host state to the level of
international law, whether the main investment agreement or even merely
ancillary contracts associated with a broader investment. The idea is most
clearly expressed in Noble Ventures v. Romania, where the Tribunal held that:
In including [an umbrella clause] in the BIT, the Parties had as
their aim to equate contractual obligations governed by municipal
law to international treaty obligations as established in the
BIT. . . . [T]he Tribunal therefore considers the Claimant’s claims
of breach of contract on the basis that any such breach constitutes
a breach of the BIT. . . . [T]he host State may incur international
responsibility by reason of a breach of its contractual obligations
towards the private investor of the other Party, the breach of the
contract being thus ‘internationalized’, i.e. assimilated to a breach
of the treaty.81
Tribunals have made serious and sustained efforts to grapple with the
meaning of umbrella clauses, and to probe their limits. The jurisprudence
on the umbrella clause is especially convoluted, but the confusion across the
cases is also instructive. The first main issue is whether and to what extent
umbrella clauses elevate contracts to the status of international law. While
most tribunals tend to extend such provisions to state contracts, the ques-
tion of how much protection such clauses offer has been controversial—
specifically as to what extent they really insulate a covered contract from
state action, and, most importantly, to what extent international law dis-
places the law of the contract. The second point of discord is whether a
claimant must have a relationship of direct privity of contract with the host
state in order to invoke an umbrella clause.
Regarding the first issue, there seem to be three main approaches relevant
to the question of how far the umbrella clause transforms the municipal
state contract into an instrument of international law: one, the outlier, being
exceedingly restrictive; another completely embracing the internationaliza-
tion thesis; and the third adopting a more nuanced, hybrid approach. The
three approaches are nicely captured by a trio of cases decided between 2003
and 2012, brought by the same claimant, the Swiss customs inspection com-
pany Société Générale de Surveillance (“SGS”), against three different states
(Pakistan,82 the Philippines,83 and Paraguay84).
81. Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 61, 62, 64 (Oct. 12, 2005);
see also Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 168 (An umbrella clause in a treaty protects a contract that an
investor has entered into with the host state and is an expression of the maxim pacta sunt servanda. It
follows that in the presence of an umbrella clause a breach by the host country of an investment contract
with the foreign investor constitutes a violation of the treaty and can be raised in international
arbitration).
82. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13.
83. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004).
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The basic factual matrix in each of the SGS cases is largely the same. In
each case the state sought to privatize customs inspections and the levying of
customs duties on imports. SGS specialized in providing the relevant cus-
toms services at foreign ports, before imports reach their destination. In each
instance the state contracted with SGS to provide inspection and customs
levying services for inbound goods, thereby delegating to the company sub-
stantial aspects of their sovereign prerogatives to impose taxation duties.
Each of the contracts was executed under the law of the host state, and each
contract provided that the local courts would have exclusive jurisdiction
over any disputes over the contracts (including, obviously, disputes over al-
legations of breach). In each case the main dispute concerned the failure of
the state to pay substantial contractual fees to SGS for its services, and in
each instance the company ignored the contract’s exclusive forum selection
clause, seeking relief instead through ICSID arbitration by appeal to Swit-
zerland’s BIT with the host state.
All three tribunals accepted that the contracts counted as investments.85
But they diverged sharply on the question of whether and to what extent the
umbrella clause insulated the contracts from simple breach, based on the
state’s failure to pay monies in the required time and amount.
In SGS v. Pakistan the Tribunal took an extremely restrictive approach.
There the Tribunal simply held that it had no jurisdiction over purely do-
mestic state contracts, and that the umbrella clause could not be interpreted
as raising such contracts to the level of international law. The Tribunal em-
phasized the laconic terms of the umbrella clause, which provided that “Ei-
ther Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the
investors of the other contracting party.”86 Relying on a variety of textual
and contextual canons of interpretation, it held that such ambiguous lan-
guage could not support the monumental conversion—or in its words, “in-
stant transubstantiation”—of purely domestic contracts into international
treaties.87 The Tribunal further appealed to the venerable (though increas-
ingly disfavored) canon of in dubio mitius: that restrictions against sover-
eignty cannot be presumed.88 The upshot of this approach is that, absent
exceedingly clear language, treaties cannot be interpreted as transforming
municipal contracts into instruments of international law.
84. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29,
Award (Feb. 10, 2012) [hereinafter SGS v. Paraguay, Award].
85. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, ¶ 136; SGS v.
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, ¶ 101; SGS v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/29, ¶ 117.
86. Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Switz.–Pak., ¶ 11, Nov.  7,
1995, RO 1998 2601.
87. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, ¶ 172.
88. Id. ¶ 171.
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Clearly the restrictive approach harmonizes well with the traditional prin-
ciples of general international law. But despite the Tribunal’s reasoning, the
restrictive interpretation is difficult to square with the text of most umbrella
clauses, and this narrow reading has remained a fringe position.89
The following year, the Tribunal in SGS v. Philippines explicitly distanced
itself from SGS v. Pakistan. In the Tribunal’s view, the umbrella clause in
the Switzerland–Philippines BIT “would appear to say, and to say clearly,
that each Contracting Party shall observe any legal obligation it has as-
sumed, or will in the future assume, with regard to specific investments
covered by the BIT.”90 Thus in the Tribunal’s view the contract between
SGS and the Philippines came under the purview of the umbrella clause, and
created an international legal obligation for the host state to refrain from
engaging in action that would constitute breach of contract.
However the Tribunal did not consider that this position implied the
“full-scale internationalization of domestic contracts”—as the Tribunal in
SGS v. Pakistan had feared.91 Most importantly, it found that the umbrella
clause only imposed an international legal obligation to perform, and con-
verted the consequences of non-performance into an issue of international
law. “Article X(2) addresses not the scope of the commitments entered into
with regard to specific investments but the performance of these obligations,
once they are ascertained.”92 Putting it another way, the Tribunal held that
the umbrella clause
. . . makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to
observe binding commitments, including contractual commit-
ments, which it has assumed with regard to specific investments.
But it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such
obligations into an issue of international law.93
According to the Tribunal, the scope of these contractual commitments can
only be ascertained in light of the contract’s terms, supplemented by the
default and mandatory rules of the law of the contract—i.e. municipal law.
89. But see El Paso Energy v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr.
27, 2006); Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on
Preliminary Objections (July 27, 2006), both of which supported several aspects of the reasoning in SGS
v. Pakistan, without going as far toward closing off umbrella clause claims. Both Tribunals only went so
far as to limit the umbrella clause to protecting contracts from sovereign acts—i.e., in the exercise of
public power—as opposed to actions taken by the state in its capacity as a mere commercial party).
90. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, ¶ 115. The Tribunal held that the umbrella
clause in the Switzerland–Philippines BIT was more explicit, providing that “Each Contracting Party
shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party.” Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Switz.-Phil., ¶ 10, Apr. 23, 1999, RO 2001 438. The Tribunal also called into question its forbearer’s
reliance on the principle of in dubio mitius, as well as most of its textual arguments. SGS v. Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06 ¶¶ 121–25.
91. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, ¶ 126.
92. Id. ¶ 126.
93. Id. ¶ 128.
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And where the contract provides for an exclusive forum to resolve all con-
tractual disputes, the existence of a breach and the amount of damage
thereby caused can only be authoritatively determined by the contractually
provided forum.94 Noting that the contract here provided exclusively for
local court jurisdiction, as in each of the SGS cases, the Tribunal issued a
stay. It held that it would lack jurisdiction until such a time as the company
submitted its claim before the Philippines courts and the latter rendered an
authoritative judgment on the existence of a breach and the extent of any
damages. Only then would the state’s compliance become a matter of inter-
national law.
Finally, in 2010, a third Tribunal took a maximally expansive approach
in SGS v. Paraguay, holding that the umbrella clause fully internationalizes
municipal state contracts. The Tribunal first rejected what it viewed as the
textual contortions of SGS v. Pakistan.95 But SGS v. Paraguay went further
still, departing from SGS v. Philippines regarding the scale of international-
ization effected by an umbrella clause. Upon finding that the umbrella
clause applied, the Tribunal held that a covered state contract would simul-
taneously create both domestic legal rights and international legal rights
under the treaty. In the Tribunal’s view it had no jurisdiction over the for-
mer, but unlike SGS v. Philippines it asserted full jurisdiction over the latter.
For the Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay, the umbrella clause required it to
determine the disposition of the international legal rights generated by a
covered contract, irrespective of the disposition of the national legal rights
which would fall under the municipal law selected in the contract’s choice of
law provision. Likewise, even an exclusive forum selection clause choosing
local courts for the determination of all contractual disputes would only
affect jurisdiction over the national legal rights generated by the contract—
without affecting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over any and all claims of
breach under the treaty.
94. Id.
95. The Tribunal went even further than SGS v. Philippines in rejecting SGS v. Pakistan. While SGS v.
Philippines distinguished itself from SGS v. Pakistan in part on the basis of differences in treaty text, the
Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay had to interpret an umbrella clause phrased identically to that at issue in the
latter. SGS v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 169 (Feb. 12, 2010). Article 11
provides that “[e]ither Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments
it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party.”
Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.–Para., art. 11,
Jan. 30, 1992, Fed. Auth. of the Swiss Confederation, http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compila-
tion/19920027/index.html. The Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay found “no basis on the face of the clause to
believe that it should mean anything other than what it says—that the State is obliged to guarantee the
observance of its commitments with respect to the investments of the other State party’s investors.” SGS
v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 168. The Tribunal noted in particular that the
Swiss government was on record objecting to the SGS v. Pakistan holding.  Id. ¶ 169 (citing “Interpreta-
tion of Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and Pakistan in light of the
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of ICSID in Case No. ARB/01/13 SGS Société
Générale de Surveillance S.A. versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Note under Cover of Letter from
Swiss Government to ICSID Deputy Secretary-General, 1 October 2003, 19 Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep.
E-1, E-2 (Feb. 2004)).
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Thus, for the Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay, the umbrella clause had the
function of fully internationalizing any state contracts meeting the minimal
conditions of an “investment” in the host country. Unlike the previous two
cases, the Tribunal asserted jurisdiction over the entire dispute. In its merits
award, two years later, the Tribunal engaged in a full analysis of the Host
State’s performance under the contract as a matter of international law. It
found several breaches, rejecting the state’s contractual defenses, and as-
signed damages totaling $39 million, plus over ten years of interest accruing
from the date of termination in 1999.96
In sum, the salient lesson of the SGS cases lies in the variety of available
approaches to the protection of contracts under umbrella clauses, ranging in
the extent to which they entail internationalization.  Aside from the fringe
interpretation that such clauses are not meant to internationalize contracts at
all, represented by SGS v. Pakistan, the later SGS cases reflect the main
competing views. The broadest theory, represented by cases like SGS v. Par-
aguay, implies that umbrella clauses completely internationalize municipal
state contracts. On this view, such clauses turn state contracts into “pure”
sources of international law, whose breach and the consequences thereof
must be assessed within the framework of public international law, and in
particular the law of state responsibility. On this reading the umbrella
clause transforms state contracts into something close to a state-to-state
treaty. The more nuanced view, reflected in SGS v. Philippines, is that um-
brella clauses only transmute the contract into a kind of “hybrid” source,
whose breach must be interpreted on the basis of the original law of the
contract, with only the consequences of breach falling under the ambit of
international law. Arbitral practice oscillates between these theories—
though rarely as explicitly as the SGS cases, and most often only on the level
of assumptions.
Aside from the issue of contract elevation, the umbrella clause jurispru-
dence poses a second important wrinkle concerning the issue of privity of
contract: whether it is necessary for the claimant to be in a direct contractual
relationship with the Respondent. In many instances claimants sue host
states over contractual relationships which may be indirect on one or both
sides. In some cases claimants have sued over contracts executed with state
enterprises or local governmental bodies, which they have attempted to im-
pute to the state. On the other side, corporate claimants frequently sue over
disputes arising out of contracts between their subsidiaries and the host
state. Sometimes this reflects conscious corporate planning—strategic in-
vestment structuring intended to secure an arbitral forum.97 But more often
than not it happens because the host State has required the firm to act
through a local entity in hopes of stimulating the local economy—in full
96. SGS v. Paraguay, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶¶ 182–84, 188 (Feb. 10, 2012).
97. See infra Part II.C.
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awareness that the foreign parent would be able to secure arbitral jurisdic-
tion on the local subsidiary’s behalf.
Here again the cases are divided. Some treaties explicitly allow indirect
investors to take advantage of the umbrella clause, as in the ECT, which
refers to “any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment
of an Investor” —where “investments” of the investor includes its down-
stream subsidiaries.98 But for the most part umbrella clauses are more am-
bivalent, and tribunals have interpreted them on this issue in both ways—
sometimes expansively, and sometimes restrictively. On the one hand, in
Continental Casualty v. Argentina, the Tribunal held firmly that the umbrella
clause covered contracts between a corporation’s subsidiary and the respon-
dent state.99 On the other hand, a growing number of cases have required
privity of contract between the claimant investor and the host state, as in
Azurix v. Argentina. The Tribunal there emphasized that Azurix and the
Respondent had no contractual relationship on either side: the contract was
undertaken by the province of Buenos Aires (as opposed to Argentina), and a
local subsidiary of Azurix (as opposed to the U.S.-based company itself).100
The issue of privity strongly affects the central narrative of this Article—
the emergence of corporations as international lawmakers. If privity were a
precondition for considering a contract internationalized, as Azurix required
in the context of the umbrella clause, the corporation’s capacity to shop for
98. ECT, Art. 10(1) (emphasis added). According to the Reader’s Guide to the ECT, “This provision
covers any contract that a host country has concluded with a subsidiary of the foreign investor in the host
country, or a contract between the host country and the parent company of the subsidiary.” See also
Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/080/2005, Final Award, ¶ 110
(Mar. 26, 2008); Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 176.
99. Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 297 (Sept. 5,
2008) (holding that the umbrella clause at Article II(2)(c) in the U.S.–Argentina BIT did not require
privity of contract, but rather that as long as contractual “obligations have been entered ‘with regard’ to
investments, they may have been entered with persons or entities other than foreign investors themselves,
so that an undertaking by the host State with a subsidiary . . . [of the investing corporation] is not in
principle excluded”). Similarly, the Tribunal in Noble Ventures held that a contract between a foreign
corporation and a state enterprise had to be attributed to the host state, meaning that the umbrella clause
was in principle applicable. Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 85 (Oct.
12, 2005).  (“where the acts of a governmental agency are to be attributed to the State for the purposes of
applying an umbrella clause . . . breaches of a contract into which the State has entered are capable of
constituting a breach of international law by virtue of the breach of the umbrella clause.”) (emphasis in
original).
100. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 52 (July 14, 2006)
(However, as discussed below, the Azurix Tribunal came to the opposite conclusion in the next breath in
the context of FET); see also Impregilo S.p.A.  v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/
3, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 223 (Apr. 22, 2005)  (holding that the umbrella clause did not apply where
the state had not contracted in its own name); Burlington Resources v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case
No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability (Dec. 12, 2012) (confirming that an investor cannot bring a claim
under the umbrella clause over contracts concluded by its local subsidiary). But see Burlington Resources
v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Orrego Vicuña
(Nov. 8, 2012) (decrying the idea that a state can avoid the requirements of an umbrella clause by simply
requiring a foreign corporation to engage in all contracting via a locally incorporated subsidiary, even if
the latter is entirely wholly owned by the parent). See also Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at
175–77.
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BIT protection would be severely curtailed.101 By contrast, as explained fur-
ther below, under the interpretation proffered by Continental Casualty, its
capacity to shop for treaty protection for its contracts would be more or less
unrestrained.
Of all issues of interpretation in international investment law, the scope
and function of the umbrella clause remains one of the most controversial. It
is unclear how far umbrella clauses internationalize municipal state contracts
between corporations and foreign sovereigns, if at all. And it is further un-
clear what conditions they impose on corporations seeking to invoke their
terms, particularly regarding the issue of contractual privity. Under the
maximally expansive interpretations on both issues—reflected in cases like
SGS v. Paraguay and Continental Casualty—umbrella clauses fully elevate do-
mestic state contracts to the status of international law. They pay no heed to
how the sprawling multinational corporation actually executed the domestic
contract—whether through the parent, a local subsidiary, or through in-
termediaries established for the sole purpose of securing BIT protection. But
the picture becomes increasingly checkered as we take into account the qual-
ifications imposed by SGS v. Philippines (on the continued relevance of the
domestic law of the contract) or Azurix (requiring privity of contract to
activate a treaty’s umbrella clause as between a corporate claimant and the
host state). As discussed further below, these more nuanced cases reflect
much better approaches to the problem of grappling with contracts under
the ambit of investment treaties.
3. Fair and Equitable Treatment
If umbrella clauses were the sole mechanism for raising contracts to the
level of international law, it would be difficult to say unequivocally that the
international investment regime has clearly established state contracts as
sources of international law, or multinational corporations as international
lawmakers. The approach taken by SGS v. Paraguay strongly supports such a
view, but the moderate view adopted in SGS v. Philippines is more ambiva-
lent. However, most of the twists and turns of the umbrella clause jurispru-
dence are tacitly elided by the jurisprudence on the more general,
ubiquitous guarantee of FET. The umbrella clause cases are analytically val-
uable insofar as they help us frame and typify the central issues—and one of
them, SGS v. Philippines, offers the best view for negotiating the balance
between treaty protections and the bargained-for rights in state contracts.
But the far more powerful guarantee of FET paves over all such nuance—
and ultimately proves much more crucial.
None of the major limitations facing umbrella clauses arise where tribu-
nals assess whether the state failed to afford an investor fair and equitable
treatment regarding its contractual rights. Tribunals have consistently
101. See infra § II.C.
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treated this provision as the functional equivalent of the umbrella clause for
most purposes, perfectly capable of elevating contract norms to the status of
international law.102 As with the umbrella clause, tribunals have found states
internationally liable for breach of contractual obligations under the rubric
of FET. However, FET protection goes further than the umbrella clause in
most respects.
First, tribunals tend not to worry about the presence or absence of privity
of contract. Recall, for example, that the Tribunal in Azurix denied jurisdic-
tion over the corporation’s umbrella clause claims for lack of privity between
the claimant and the host state. In the next breath, the Tribunal accepted
jurisdiction over Azurix’s FET claim arising out of the same contract and the
same impugned measures, and ultimately found in the Claimant’s favor.103
And under FET there is no question of applying the law of the contract to
resolve any aspect of the dispute, as required by the hybrid theory of SGS v.
Philippines in the context of the umbrella clause.
Moreover, FET goes beyond the umbrella clause in that it protects the
private party from a significantly wider range of action than formal breach of
contract. As explained further below, tribunals have interpreted FET as an
extraordinarily robust standard of property protection. Not limited to guar-
anteeing the literal observance of commitments, this standard protects state
contracts from even governmental measures that merely depreciate the con-
tract’s value—on grounds ranging from discrimination to a failure to live up
to the investor’s legitimate expectations (which tend to be construed very
broadly).104 In other words, from the perspective of contract theory, FET
imposes a whole host of terms on state contracts, ranging from the condi-
tions of breach and defenses, to forum selection, to valuation and damages—
without much leeway for parties to contract around these strictures.
According to most tribunals, the sole limitation in extending FET to the
protection of contracts seems to be that it only protects them from sovereign
acts—meaning public acts that an ordinary commercial party could not
bring about, as opposed to state action taken in a merely commercial capac-
ity (like the simple failure to pay debts).105 In this alone umbrella clause
102. See, e.g., Mondev v. United States, NAFTA, Award, ¶ 134 (2002) (referring to the NAFTA’s
FET provision, the tribunal held that “a governmental prerogative to violate investment contracts would
appear to be inconsistent with the principles embodied in Article 1105 and with contemporary standards
of national and international law concerning governmental liability for contractual performance”); SGS v.
Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 146 (Feb. 12, 2010); Bayindar Insaat Turzim
Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S.  v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, ¶ 377
(Aug. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Bayindar v. Pakistan].
103. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶ 377.
104. See infra Part III.B.1.
105. Consortium RFCC v. Royume du Morac, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award, ¶¶ 33–34 (Dec.
22, 2003); Bayindar v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 377; see also Impregilo S.p.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17 Award, ¶ 299 (June 21, 2011) (to be compensable
under FET a breach of contract must involve the “misuse of public power”). But see SGS v. Paraguay,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, (Feb. 10, 2012) (finding that even a failure to pay debts can
constitute a violation of FET); Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21 at 154 (questioning the validity of
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protection seems to be broader than FET, with most tribunals making no
comparable distinction.106 However, in the present context this limitation is
not especially meaningful. The main concern here is to demonstrate the pri-
ority of internationalized contracts over domestic law and regulation, all of
which uncontroversially consists of sovereign acts.
Thus while the significant debates surrounding the umbrella clause help
reveal the stakes of internationalizing contracts through treaty protection,
the nuances mostly fall away where contracts are elevated through FET. This
powerful standard generalizes the possibility of internationalization and ren-
ders it more complete. At the same time, it provides the crucial link be-
tween the idea of the internationalized contract and the theory of
transnational property at the heart of international investment law.
B. An Absolutist Conception of Transnational Property
Once “internationalized,” the state contract attains a level of protection
from domestic actions that improperly depreciate its value. But how far does
this protection go? This Section argues that the scope of protection involved
is not determined by any law of contracts, or contract theory. The extraordi-
nary degree of substantive protection afforded to state contracts can only be
understood in light of a second, separate doctrinal trend: the entrenchment
of an aggressive theory of transnational property in investment law and
human rights jurisprudence, and its implicit ascription to state contracts.
This Section first probes the surprising breadth of the concept of property
in international law. I demonstrate how arbitral jurisprudence gives the
transnational property right a preeminence not found in any national legal
order, justified in part by a misguided appeal to regional human rights case
law. I then turn to the uncritical extension of these protections to contracts,
as investments entitled to FET and protection against expropriation.
1. The Breadth of Transnational Property Protection
Investment treaties generally incorporate broad and malleable treaty stan-
dards aimed at protecting foreign property from undue interference by the
host state. One of the central questions facing international investment law
concerns how far these standards go. Under what circumstances can foreign
investors claim compensation for regulatory measures that diminish the
value of their investments? What kinds of state action are compensable?
How much depreciation is necessary? To what kinds of assets do these stan-
dards apply? And what kind of compensation is appropriate? Investor-state
arbitral practice tends to give startlingly broad answers to all of these ques-
the distinction, and noting that “even if the underlying relationship and the breach are clearly commer-
cial, the motives of a government for a certain act may still be governmental).
106. SGS v. Paraguay, Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note
21, at 174.
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tions. Semantically, the textual treaty standards protecting foreign property
are not very different from standards found in many domestic legal sys-
tems.107 However, tribunals have regularly expanded the ambit of these
treaty guarantees.108 Their interpretive practice has insulated the transna-
tional property right from the state’s public powers to a degree far outstrip-
ping anything found in national law.109
Specifically, tribunals have tended to expand treaty protection for transna-
tional property to cover the total field of possible state action. In broad
strokes, tribunals have proven willing to review state action at all levels
(legislative, executive, or judicial, from the lowest organs of government to
the heights of constitutional amendment), and across all regulatory domains
(from taxation to public health, environmental action, and even the manage-
ment of national emergencies). Moreover they generally afford transnational
property extraordinarily deep protection from these measures. Like many
national legal orders, investor-state tribunals police direct, targeted takings
as well as regulatory efforts that completely (or nearly) destroy the economic
value of an investment. But they go much further in requiring compensation
for partial takings or even the simple diminution of an investment’s value
caused by general regulation—as in CMS Gas v. Argentina.110
The two central treaty standards undergirding the expansion of the trans-
national property right are also the most ubiquitous: the protection from
expropriation without compensation, and the guarantee of fair and equitable
treatment. Beyond requiring that foreign nationals be treated on at least
equal footing to similarly situated nationals of the host state (“national
treatment”), the expropriation and FET standards require that foreign inves-
tors be accorded a concrete minimum level of protection—as a matter of
international law, without regard to domestic conceptions of property.
Though the precise nature of each remains in flux, tribunals have tended to
interpret both expansively. Taken together, these guarantees go far beyond
merely standardizing property treatment across national legal systems; they
reveal a theory of transnational property more robust than anything found in
107. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 24, at 62.
108. See id., at 62–63; see also José Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Gov-
erning International Investment 177–88 (2009).
109. Writing in 2003, Been and Beauvais focused on comparing the early arbitral jurisprudence
under the NAFTA with U.S. takings jurisprudence. But when generalized, their basic conclusions are
even more apt. A broader look at international investment law, ten years later, reveals an even wider
disparity with takings standards in most domestic legal systems. As Been and Beauvais rightly note, U.S.
takings protections are “already among the most protective in the world.” Been & Beauvais, supra note
24, at 37; see also Terri L. Lilley, Keeping NAFTA “Green” for Investors and the Environment, 75 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 727, 749–51 (2002) (comparing property protections across the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico). At the same time, investor-state tribunals constituted under other BITs and FTAs have tended to go
significantly further toward protecting foreign property than NAFTA Tribunals, particularly as regards
the interpretation of FET. See Alvarez, supra note 108, at 188.
110. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award,
¶ 281 (May 12, 2005).
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national law, including even highly property-friendly national legal
systems.111
Expropriation is the weaker of the two standards, though it already dwarfs
analogous takings concepts in domestic law. International investment law
does not prohibit states from expropriating foreign property per se. Invest-
ment treaties generally permit states to expropriate foreign investments for a
public purpose, through due process of law, and on payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation (usually meaning the fair market value
of the investment).112 The key point is that they do not permit states to
expropriate without compensation, either through direct takings or through
“indirect” measures tantamount to an expropriation.113 The crucial ques-
tion, then, is on what basis these treaties permit drawing distinctions be-
tween compensable and non-compensable regulatory measures—whether
the state’s aims can be taken into account in some way, or whether it is
solely a matter of weighing the impugned measure’s effects.
Most BITs and FTAs say nothing about the relevance of the state’s aims
in determining whether a regulatory action amounts to a compensable indi-
rect expropriation, and tribunals usually assume that such guarantees protect
transnational property from domestic regulatory endeavors, regardless of
their purposes. Many tribunals have adopted a “sole effects” test, looking
only at the burden imposed by regulation. In a typical land-use claim, the
Tribunal in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica held:
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may
be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be
legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for this reason
does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensa-
tion to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting
the environment for which the Property was taken does not alter
the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation
must be paid.114
This approach assumes that even bona fide, general regulatory efforts in the
public interest are compensable where they amount to an expropriation, and
that a failure to compensate the investor constitutes a breach of her treaty
rights. The only qualification is that the deprivation be sufficiently substan-
tial, and even here a number of tribunals have gone far towards allowing
111. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 24, at 37.
112. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 99–100.
113. Id.
114. Compañı́a del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/
96/1, Final Award, ¶ 71 (Feb. 17, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 157 (2002). Note that Santa Elena involved a
direct taking. The ethos is reflected in indirect expropriation cases as well. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff v.
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 463 (July 24, 2008) (recognizing,
with approval, “that many tribunals . . . have tested governmental conduct in the context of indirect
expropriation claims by reference to the effect of relevant acts, rather than the intention behind them”)
(emphasis in original).
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partial expropriation claims where the affected assets could be “conceptually
severed” from the investment as a whole.115
The tide may be shifting against such an expansive view of regulatory
expropriation. States have begun to pull back the scope of indirect expropri-
ation in their more recent model treaties, especially in cases concerning gen-
eral regulation, requiring tribunals to balance the state’s aims in adopting
the impugned measure against its effects on the investor.116 The 2012 U.S.
Model BIT places a heavy thumb on the scales in favor of public regulation,
noting that “except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory ac-
tions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.”117 The point is that in general states
should not have to pay to regulate in the public interest. Additionally, a
number of tribunals have indicated a willingness to read concepts of defer-
115. There is some dispute over how much is enough to give rise to a compensable claim of expropria-
tion. The general rule is that the deprivation must amount to something close to a complete deprivation
of the investment. But a number of tribunals have gone further, accepting the idea of “partial expropria-
tion” whereby a deprivation of particular assets must be compensated where the assets can be concep-
tually severed from the larger investment. See Middle East Cement v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6,
Award, ¶¶ 138, 144 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 178 (2005); Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland,
Partial Award, ¶¶ 239–41 (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007). At the same time, another line
of cases has rejected the possibility of partial expropriation in international investment law. See contra
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, Jan. 12, 2011, ¶ 146,
UNITRAL Arb. (holding that under the NAFTA only a complete expropriation of the entire investment
would qualify for compensation); and Burlington Resources v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 398 (Dec. 12, 2012) (applying the test of expropriation “to the
investment as a whole,” and holding that “criterion of loss of the economic use or viability of the
investment implies that the investment as a whole has become unviable”). Perhaps surprisingly, from the
domestic lawyer’s standpoint, it is this latter line of cases that has provoked incredulity among scholarly
authorities.  One leading textbook has decried the skeptical view in cases like Grand River as overly
narrow, reflecting a failure “to distinguish between the questions of the definition of a taking and the
extent to which an investment may have been expropriated.” Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at
119; see also Ursula Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 J. World Investment & Trade 69 (2007). The
partial-takings enthusiasts go significantly further than domestic courts even in jurisdictions as property-
friendly as the United States, where the Supreme Court has balked at adopting a notion of conceptual
severance in regulatory takings cases. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1454, 1481 (2002) (“[E]ven though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of
regulatory takings claims, in such cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole’ . . . . [W]here an owner
possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.”);
Been & Beauvais, supra note 24, at 63–64.
116. Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Model Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty (2012), Annex B, para. 4(a) [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT] (noting that the determination
of whether an action constitutes an indirect expropriation is a fact-specific inquiry that must take into
account: the economic impact of the state’s action or actions; the extent to which such actions interfere
with “distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations”; and the character of the government action).
117. Id.; see also Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Canada, Model Foreign Investment
Protection Agreement (2004), Annex B.13(1)(c) [hereinafter Canada Model BIT] (“Except in rare cir-
cumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures are so severe in light of their purpose that they
cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good faith, non-discriminatory mea-
sures of a party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.”).
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ence and balancing into expropriation provisions in existing treaties of the
older, laconic style.118
But any real sea change remains far off. Most treaties do not yet specifi-
cally require tribunals to look at anything beyond a measure’s effects. More-
over it is not clear that balancing is really a full solution. Tribunals that
have introduced standards of review like “proportionality” and “the margin
of appreciation” have varied wildly in how they draw doctrinal tests from
these malleable concepts—to the point where it is not only unclear when
and where these doctrines will be read into treaty rights, but also what level
of deference they will entail.119 Worse still, it often appears that invocations
of these doctrines amount to little more than lip service. Even in applying
these dignified concepts of deference tribunals have tended to leave the state
precious little room for maneuver.120 The scholarly instinct behind calls for
greater judicial deference is usually a good one, reflecting an impulse to
relieve some of the pressure on domestic regulatory authority posed by inter-
national investment law. And given significant institutional reforms—like a
centralized investment court organized around doctrines of formal prece-
dent—doctrines of deference could have an important role to play. But as
things stand, doctrines like proportionality and the margin of appreciation
are at best overly malleable and uncertain safety valves, and at worst mere
window-dressing masking a strong preference for private property rights
over other public values.121
Meanwhile FET goes significantly further, dwarfing even the more expan-
sive theories of expropriation. It is far easier to establish a violation of FET
than of expropriation, and the standard protects investors against a wide
range of invasions of property that might not have had complete ex-
propriatory effect. FET is usually portrayed as a kind of stopgap, to catch
state action that may not be expropriatory but really should be compen-
118. See, e.g., Continental Casualty v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶
193–95 (Sept. 5, 2008); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed v. Mexico]; Azurix Corp. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 312–13 (July 14, 2006); Occidental Petroleum
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶¶ 404–09 (Oct. 5, 2012). See
Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J.
Int’l Disp. Settlement 577, 579 (2012); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s
New Frontier, 4 L. & Ethics H.R. 47, 76 (2010); William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 Yale J. Int’l L.
283 (2010) (advocating for importing the ECtHR’s “margin of appreciation” doctrine into international
investment law).
119. I have argued elsewhere that, given the fragmented institutional structure of the investment
regime, doctrines of deference are at best an inconsistent and incomplete fix. Julian Arato, The Margin of
Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 Va. J. Int’l L. 545 (2014).
120. E.g., Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122; Azurix Corp., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 377 (July 14, 2006). But see Continental Casualty, ICSID Case No. ARB/
03/9Award, ¶¶ 193–95; Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005) (both adopting substantially deferential approaches to scrutiniz-
ing the host states’ regulatory choices).
121. Arato, supra note 119.
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sated—including a denial of justice in domestic courts, or subjection to un-
fair practices that may not entirely annihilate an investment.122 However,
tribunals have interpreted the term so broadly that it has nearly eclipsed
expropriation. It is the clear favorite among claimants, and accounts for the
vast majority of awards in their favor.123 Indeed, while many awards
grounded in FET have found no expropriation, nearly every BIT award mak-
ing a finding of expropriation has also found a parallel violation of FET.124
Textually, FET clauses tend to be remarkably spare, consisting of little
more than the words “fair and equitable treatment.”125 However tribunals
have made much of these four sparse words, infusing the phrase with daz-
zling substantive and procedural meaning. The Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico
articulated the most frequently cited formulation, which is also among the
most aggressive. Noting first that bad faith is not required for its violation,
the Tribunal held that FET:
requires the [host state] to provide treatment that does not affect
the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign
investor to make the investment. The foreign investor expects the
host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and
totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations
that will govern its investment, as well as the goals of the relevant
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. . . . The
foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, i.e.
without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to as-
sume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its commer-
cial and business activities. The investor also expects the State . . .
not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required
compensation.126
122. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 132 (“Essentially, the purpose of the clause as used in
BIT practice is to fill gaps which may have been left by the more specific standards, in order to obtain
the level of investor protection intended by the treaties.”); Jan Paulson, Denial of Justice in Inter-
national Law (2005).
123. Rahim Moloo & Nathaniel Khng, (June 23, 2103) (working paper) (on file with author). See also
Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment 4 (2013); Alvarez, supra note 108, at 177.
124. Moloo & Khng, supra note 123 (noting, further, that most exceptions involved cases where the
FET was unavailable under the particular treaty, or where the Tribunal never reached FET in the interest
of judicial economy).
125. In some treaties the phrase is supplemented by language referring to the minimum standard of
treatment of foreign nationals under customary international law. See Treaty with Argentina Concerning
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection Investment, U.S.–Arg., art. II(2)(a), Nov. 14, 1991, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103-2 (1993) (“Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment
. . . and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law.”).
126. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) (also adding
that “Any and all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines,
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Needless to say, this is a broad and powerful rule for foreign investors. And
it has found substantial support in subsequent cases.127 The core idea is that
FET protects the investor’s “basic expectations,” (sometimes framed more
diminutively as “legitimate expectations” or “reasonable expectations”). For
Tecmed, this includes consistency, non-arbitrariness, freedom from ambigu-
ity, and “total transparency,” as well as compensation for the deprivation of
the investment. The latter aspect would already seem to entirely encompass
the idea of expropriation, and the rest serve to broaden the protection due to
foreign property substantially beyond that.
Today tribunals largely accept the centrality of the idea of legitimate ex-
pectations, organized around the same basic elements articulated in
Tecmed—if not always going so far as that decision in delineating their
boundaries.128 Summing up a number of awards on FET, the Tribunal in
Bayindir v. Pakistan considered that the standard is generally understood to
include: an “obligation to act transparently and grant due process”;129 as
well as obligations to refrain “from taking arbitrary or discriminatory mea-
sures”;130 “from exercising coercion”;131 or “from frustrating the investor’s
reasonable expectations with respect to the legal framework affecting the
directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the goals underly-
ing such regulations” and that the “investor also expects the state to use the legal instruments that
govern the actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually assigned to
such instruments”) (emphasis added).
127. Tribunals frequently quote the entire paragraph in full as an authoritative precedent on the
meaning of FET. See, e.g., Bayindar v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, ¶ 179 (Aug. 27,
2009) (acknowledging that Tecmed lays out a broad conception of FET, but nevertheless accepting it as an
“ ‘authoritative precedent’ with respect to the doctrine of legitimate expectations”); LG&E Energy Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 127 (Oct. 3, 2006); Oko
Pankki Oyj v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/6, Award, ¶ 242 (Nov. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Oko
Pankki Oyj]. Waste Management v. Mexico, decided the following year, provides a somewhat more re-
strained (but still quite expansive) version of the standard:
The minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by conduct
. . . harmful to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic,
is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety as might be the case with a
manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency
and candour in an administrative process. In applying this standard it is relevant that the
treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied
on by the claimant.
Waste Management v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 98 (Apr. 30,
2004). Tecmed and Waste Management are frequently quoted together in support of a generally broad
approach. See, e.g., Bayindar v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/09, Award, ¶ 178; Oko Pankki Oyi,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/6, Award, ¶¶ 239, 241–42.
128. See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 145–60 (breaking the analysis of FET into legitimate
expectations; stability; procedural propriety and due process; good faith; and freedom from coercion and
harassment.”). Of particular note for present purposes, Dolzer and Schreuer also include “compliance
with contractual obligations.” Id.
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investment.”132 Most tribunals start with a relatively similar approach, and
the main areas of debate entail how far the various elements go. With few
exceptions, the level of protection turns out to be high.133
Additionally, FET claims are not subject to an effects threshold in the
same way that expropriation claims are. All diminution in the value of assets
that fails to comply with the standard is compensable, and tribunals have
even held states in breach of FET where the actual damage caused turned
out to be de minimis in effect.134 Where the damage is sufficiently high,
Tribunals have proven willing to award the fair market value of the entire
investment—even if the state had not completely annihilated its economic
132. Id.
133. See Alvarez, supra note 94, at 108. A handful of NAFTA awards represent serious outliers,
adopting very narrow interpretations of FET. I elide full consideration of these awards and the well-
rehearsed debate they have engendered on the relationship between the international minimum standard
and FET, because the issue largely turns on the particular text of the NAFTA. Unlike most BITs,
NAFTA Art. 1105 only provides for FET as an aspect of the minimum standard of treatment under
customary international law. NAFTA tribunals have differed drastically on how to interpret FET in this
context. In very broad strokes, a handful of tribunals have held that the standard is completely limited to
the customary minimum standard, reflected in the words of the 1926 Neer award  requiring “outrage . . .
bad faith . . . willful neglect of duty . . . or an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insuffi-
ciency.” LFH Neer & Pauline Neer v. United Mexican States, (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61–62
(1926), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_IV/60-66.pdf. For example, the Tribunal in Glamis Gold held
that Art. 1105 had not evolved far beyond the Neer standard, and thus set a high bar for Claimants
Glamis Gold v. United States, (UNCITRAL), ICSID, Award, ¶¶ 22, 616, 627 (June 8, 2009) (requiring
an act to be “sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, bla-
tant unfairness, a complete ladbbck of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of rea-
sons. . .or the creation by the state of objective expectations in order to induce investment and the
subsequent repudiation of those expectations”); see also Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 286 (Sept. 18, 2009); Mobil Investments Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v.
Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability, ¶ 152 (May 22, 2012). The three parties
to the NAFTA (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) have all consistently advocated this limited view
of FET under Art. 1105. See Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission of Certain Chapter Eleven
Provisions (July 31 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf; Todd
Weiler, The Interpretation of International Investment Law: Equality, Discrimination,
and Minimum Standards of Treatments in Historical Context 246 n. 690 (2013). By contrast,
a number of NAFTA tribunals have treated FET as an autonomous treaty standard, broader than the
international minimum standard. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 100 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad]  (holding Mexico in breach of
FET for failing to provide a “transparent and predictable framework”); Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNI-
TRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, ¶ 110 (2001). The broad approach seems to be dominant, with
yet a third line of cases adopting reasoning closer to the cases like Glamis (i.e. that Art. 1105 exclusively
incorporates custom), but hewing toward the broader cases in finding that custom has substantially
evolved since 1926. See, e.g. Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada, UNITRAL, ICSID Administered, Award,
¶ 192 (2010) (finding that FET protects against “all such acts or behavior that might infringe upon a
sense of fairness, equity and reasonableness”); Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,  ¶ 117  (noting
that the rise of BITs has itself played a role in the development customary international law beyond Neer)
Alvarez, supra note 108, at 177–88; Paparinskis, supra note 123; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21,
at 139; T. Weiler, supra at 247–48; Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler, Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade
Commission and the Rule of Law, in Fifteen Years of NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, 175 (Emanuel
Gaillard & Frédéric Bachand, eds., 2011).
134. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award
(July 24, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf. One could of
course question whether such cases are worth the expense.
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use.135 In such cases tribunals simply order a forced sale on top of all dam-
ages, requiring the investor to transfer its remaining assets to the offending
state upon receipt of full compensation.136
Most states do not provide such expansive protection to private property
within their own borders. Even highly property-friendly jurisdictions like
the United States do not go as far as the typical tribunal’s approach to the
guarantee against regulatory expropriation, let alone FET.137 Taking these
standards together, transnational property is protected from state action at
all levels of government, and across all fields. The government’s regulatory
aims are often considered irrelevant, or ascribed only weak importance (ex-
cept where they show bad faith). Even partial deprivations of property are
compensable, either through strong notions of conceptual severance or
through a notion of legitimate expectations that far exceeds the role of ex-
pectations in domestic law (which is usually limited to those arising out of
specific representations by the government).138
Why should the protection of transnational property be so much broader
than the protection afforded to property under any national legal order? The
expansive theory of property at work behind all of these interpretive moves
is usually only implicit—something merely assumed, rather than explained
and justified. But in the uncommon cases where tribunals engage in closer
analysis, the justifications prove woefully thin.
Tecmed itself offered the clearest account for affording foreign nationals
heightened protection, drawing on the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Tribunal placed great emphasis on a pas-
sage from the ECtHR case James and Others v. United Kingdom:
. . . non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation:
unlike nationals, they will generally have played no part in the
election or designation of its authors nor have been consulted on
its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of property must always
be effected in the public interest, different considerations may ap-
ply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legiti-
135. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶
281 (May 12, 2005), 14 ICSID Rep. 158 (2012); Azurix Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶
420.
136. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8.
137. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 24, at 37; Lilley, supra note 109.
138. See Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (stability of legal systems enough); Tecmed v.
Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2006). Glamis
Gold provides an important exception, recognizing only a limited form of expectations based on actual
representations by the government made “in order to induce investment.” Glamis Gold v. United States
(UNCITRAL) Award, ¶ 627 (2009). But Glamis Gold represents a small minority, and may itself be
limited to the particularly confined text of the NAFTA provision on FET. See supra, note 133 (on the
debate around NAFTA Art. 1105).
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mate reason for requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the
public interest than non-nationals.139
The Tecmed Tribunal particularly stressed the concern about political partici-
pation, emphasizing that “the foreign investor has a reduced or nil partici-
pation in the taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because investors
are not entitle[d] to exercise political rights reserved to nationals of the
State.”140 As Arbitrator in the NAFTA case Thunderbird v. Mexico, Thomas
Wälde generalized from the reasoning in James, stating that “international
investment law is aimed at promoting foreign investment by providing ef-
fective protection to foreign investors exposed to the political and regulatory
risk of a foreign country in a situation of relative weakness.”141
Without denying that there is some truth to the idea that foreign inves-
tors are more vulnerable to domestic legislation than nationals, this logic
does not stand up as a justification for enshrining a level of transnational
property protection beyond levels known to national law. First of all, the
rationale is overly formalistic, by limiting the focus to formal political
rights. It vastly underestimates the material power and influence of foreign
capital on domestic politics, especially in the developing world. So while it
is of course possible that foreigners may be unfairly subjected to domestic
regulation, it is not clear why they should be entitled to heightened protec-
tion as a general rule. It certainly makes sense to have international stan-
dards for the protection of private property; but it is not at all clear that
these standards should be set so high. Second, it is not clear that nationals
should bear a greater burden than non-nationals in all cases, particularly
where the public interest at issue involves fundamental human rights or
global public goods like the environment or health.
Moreover the reference to human rights jurisprudence in this context is
misleading, and seems to over-glorify the idea that non-nationals should be
entitled to substantially higher protection than nationals. After all, the
ECtHR was not taking a clearly principled stance in James. That case did not
actually involve foreign investment, but was in fact purely vertical. The
Claimants were British property holders dispossessed of residential real es-
tate in London on the basis of recent tenant-friendly legislation by British
authorities. The issue of foreign nationality only arose because the Claimants
argued that the court should import the heightened standards of property
protection for foreign nationals under international law into the European
139. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63 (1986), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57507, quoted in Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003).
140. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122. See also Azurix Corp., ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 311–12 (finding that the reasoning in Tecmed and James provides “useful
guidance for purposes of determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory and give rise to
compensation”).
141. Thunderbird v. Mexico, NAFTA (UNCITRAL) Sep. Op. Arbitrator Thomas Wälde, ¶ 4 (2006)
(citing James v. U.K., App. No. 8793/79, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 63).
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Convention. In refusing to do so, the Court merely acknowledged that
“there may well be good grounds for drawing a distinction between nationals
and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned . . . especially as re-
gards a taking of property effected in the context of a social reform.”142 The
Court’s references to the vulnerability of foreign investors to domestic legis-
lation and their lack of participation rights were not meant as a statement of
principle, but something closer to a hypothetical observation.
The tacit and unjustified theory of transnational property characteristic of
international investment jurisprudence has had a substantial impact on
states. It is a matter of concern for developed and developing countries alike.
There is a real argument that, as things stand, the prevailing understanding
of property in investor-state arbitration is leading to serious regulatory
chill.143 And states’ reactions have been telling: Canada and the United
States have gone to great lengths to weaken expropriation protection in cases
of bona fide general regulation,144 and have repeatedly sought to dilute FET
protection in the context of the NAFTA.145 Others have gone further still,
resorting to exit by freezing their BIT programs,146 or by withdrawing from
certain BITs altogether.147
Yet the system remains exceedingly strong. The vast majority of BITs
remain firmly in place, and states are continuing to sign new BITs and even
large-scale multilateral investment treaties.148 Moreover, as demonstrated
142. James v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63. This sentence is always left
out in investor-state awards, even though it makes clear that the Court’s statement, quoted in Tecmed and
elsewhere, is relatively hesitant.
143. Been & Beauvais, supra note 24, at 132. See also Alvarez, supra note 1, at 22 (“To the extent a
standard such as that in [Tecmed] protects foreign investors from regulations that change over time be-
cause of changing information about health risks or changes in a government’s capabilities or willingness
to respond to such concerns, such protections of investors’ ‘legitimate expectations’ are controversial”;
moreover “poorer states may find the high expectations for the transparency and predictability of govern-
ment action implicit in [Tecmed] impossibly difficult to satisfy.”).
144. Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (2012), Annex B, ¶ 4(b); see also Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development Canada, Model
Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (2004), Annex B, ¶ 4(b); Model Agreement for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, Can. (2004), Annex B.13(1)(c); Alvarez, supra note 108, at 188.
145. See supra, note 133.
146. For example, Australia has frozen signing BITs with investor-state provisions in response to a
strong ongoing challenge by Philip Morris over its plain packaging laws. Australia Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more
jobs and prosperity, available at http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-a3df-
3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx.
147. Ecuador has already withdrawn from its BIT with the United States, and Bolivia, South Africa
and Venezuela have also withdrawn from a number of BITs. Ecuador is further considering withdrawing
from a twenty-six pre-existing BITs on grounds that they have caused serious regulatory chill. See reports
in state media on the recent conclusions of the Commission for Integrated Citizen Audit of Investment
Treaties and the System of International Arbitration, established by Ecuadorian President Rafael Corea,
available at http://www.andes.info.ec/en/news/international-commission-analyzes-26-bilateral-invest-
ment-treaties-will-recommend-end (noting public statement by commission member Muthucumaras-
wamy Sornarajah that “if the treaties are kept the way they are, Ecuador will not be capable of acting in
favor of the public interest.”).
148. The United States is currently negotiating two major multilateral investment treaties. The
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would link twelve states in the Pacific region, and the Transatlantic
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below, where the host state is party to any investment treaties, corporations
will be able to access treaty protection by structuring their investments
through the country’s treaty partners—and indeed, sophisticated corpora-
tions will seek to access the most protective treaty available.149 Finally, tri-
bunal practice under extant treaties does not show signs of especially
significant change. While recent attempts to reconsider the appropriate
standard of review may be promising, initial scholarly excitement in this
area has yet to be redeemed in practice.150 In many cases concepts like pro-
portionality appear to function as mere window dressing, as in the remarka-
bly expansive Tecmed and its progeny.151 But even accepting that some
tribunals have deployed deferential standards of review with greater rigor,
like the Tribunal in Continental Casualty,152 this form of arbitral self-limita-
tion is at best an irregular and incomplete mechanism for reform.153
2. Fusing Property and Contracts as Investments
The entrenchment of a highly protective theory of transnational property
dovetails with the issue of the previous Section in that it is extended to state
contracts that have been internationalized by investment treaties. FET and
guarantees against expropriation are uncritically extended to a wide spec-
trum of assets, including contracts between sovereigns and foreign investors.
And such protections are not, for the most part, tailored to accommodate
differences between contracts and the more classical forms of real and per-
sonal property. Contracts are afforded the full scope of these protections,
guaranteeing them against action ranging from takings154 to the mere dimi-
nution of value caused by a frustration of the investor’s legitimate
expectations.155
The simple fusion of the expansive theory of property with contract
claims is most often explained by a strangely circular reasoning. The expla-
Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) would link the United States with the member states of the
European Union.
149. See infra Part II.C.
150. Stone Sweet, supra note 118, at 76; Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 118, at 283; Schill,
supra note 118, at 579.
151. Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(A)/00/2, Award, ¶ 122, (May 29, 2003) (purporting
to apply proportionality review) (citing James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1986)); see also
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award  ¶¶ 312–13; Occidental Pe-
troleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶¶ 404–09, (May 29,
2003).
152. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/9, Award, ¶¶
193–95 (Sept. 5 2008) (subjecting Argentina’s emergency actions to a least restrictive means test, and
upholding most of the impugned measures under that standard).
153. See Arato, supra note 119.
154. See, e.g., Revere Copper v. Overseas Private Investment Co., Award, (Aug. 24, 1978).
155. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award,
¶ 281 (May 12, 2005) (finding that the damage to the Claimant’s gas transport concession caused by
Argentina’s emergency measures was not so extensive as to give rise to an expropriatory taking, but
holding the Respondent responsible for compensating the Claimant for diminishing the value of the
concession through measures that contravened the latter’s legitimate expectations).
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nation starts by noting that BIT negotiators generally shied away from refer-
ring to the concept of “property” as such, out of concern that the range of
assets covered by the concept might prove too limited.156 Instead, negotia-
tors almost invariably opted for the term “investment,” which seemed less
connected to pre-existing jurisprudential notions. Moreover, the resultant
treaties tended to define investment broadly—often explicitly including
contracts, and frequently extending to “assets of any kind.”157 As noted
above, state contracts practically always satisfy the definition.158 The circle is
finally closed by the assumption that the substantive treaty standards, incor-
porated and developed with the categories of real and personal property in
mind, simply apply to all covered investments without differentiation.159
Once tribunals find state contracts entitled to protection under the treaty,
they tend to adjudicate the investor’s contract claims on the basis of the
usual aggressive property theories implicit in the adjudication of FET or
expropriation claims regarding any other kind of asset. This fusion of prop-
erty theories with contract rights insulates protected contracts from regula-
tory change to the same (expansive) extent as tangible assets and other more
classical categories of property. It does so by supplementing or displacing
contract terms explicitly negotiated by the parties, almost invariably to the
advantage of investors. Private contracts between the state and foreign na-
tionals are thus converted into robust entitlements that significantly hinder
the regulatory capacities of the host state.
However, contracts are not the same as real or personal property, and it is
not clear why they should be treated as such. Unlike the rigid classical cate-
gories of property, contracts are negotiated bundles of rights and obliga-
tions, chosen against the background of a web of background default (and
only occasionally mandatory) rules incorporated under the law of the con-
tract—covering all issues, from breach and defenses to questions of damages.
They are, after all, bargains. If they are to be treated as a form of quasi-
property, they should still be subject to sophisticated rules oriented toward
their negotiated nature—for example through nuanced default rules favor-
ing party autonomy, negotiation, and the exchange of information, rather
than ham-handed mandatory terms.160 As Hanoch Dagan points out, in do-
mestic law the concept of property comprises a wide variety of types of assets
connected to very different values, without subjecting these to identical
rules that pave over their differences.161 From this perspective there is no
156. John Sprankling, The International Law of Property 24 (2014); Zachary Douglas,
The International Law of Investment Claims 172 (2009).
157. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.–Arg. Nov. 14, 1999; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra
note 21, at 62–63.
158. See supra Part II.A.1.
159. See, e.g., Sprankling, supra note 156, at 24; Douglas, supra note 156, at 172; Dolzer &
Schreuer, supra note 21, at 62–63.
160. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filing Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 87–89 (1989).
161. Dagan, supra note 24, at 27–31.
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problem with viewing contracts as a form of property as such, so long as
they are treated in a way sensitive to their particular nature.162 This insight
is just as valuable in the context of international investment law, and quite a
bit more pressing.
What is crucial is that in the context of state contracts, the protections
associated with FET and expropriation are not negotiated—at least not be-
tween the host state and the investor. Once internationalized, state contracts
are augmented with these highly investor-friendly protections by default.
And these defaults are highly sticky—that is, they are very difficult to con-
tract around.163 The assumption is generally that the contract does not opt
out of BIT provisions, but that substantive and procedural treaty terms dis-
place conflicting contract terms. This is a crucial insight: it is not a problem
that such contracts are extremely one-sided as such; but it is extremely prob-
lematic that, under the auspices of a BIT or FTA, investors need not negoti-
ate for such asymmetric protection.
The possibility of powerfully investor-friendly contracts is not unknown
in the history of international law. In particular, private corporations have in
the past extracted similar guarantees from the host state through incorporat-
ing provisions known as “stabilization clauses” in their contracts, freezing
aspects of the state’s regulatory policy vis-à-vis the concessionaire for the
duration of the contract (for example by exempting the investor from
changes in the tax regime).164 Christopher Serkin has aptly shown that anal-
ogous arrangements exist in national law as well. Serkin explains how, in
U.S. law, contracts forming public-private partnerships can entrench public
policies that bind the government in the future. These contractual regimes
freeze the relationship between the parties by specifically guaranteeing total
compensation in the event that the government pursues regulatory change
to the private party’s detriment.165 But crucially, in the context of stabiliza-
tion clauses and domestic public-private partnership agreements, such high
levels of protection are negotiated by the parties—indeed they represent, ipso
facto, specific guarantees of a continued level of treatment that would estab-
lish legitimate and reasonable expectations by even a very narrow standard.
One can readily assume that the state has priced such favorable treatment
into the deal.
By contrast, no such negotiation is necessary in the case of state contracts
coming under the auspices of an investment treaty. Through international-
ization, investment treaties infuse state contracts with the whole host of
broad protections that have been interpreted into FET and expropriation.
162. See id., at 34–35.
163. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 Yale L.J. 2032, 2084
(2012) (developing a concept of “sticky” default rules, meaning defaults that can only be contracted
around in special ways, e.g. through use of very specific language—making them difficult, but not
impossible to contract around).
164. See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 22; Kuruk, supra note 34.
165. Serkin, supra note 34.
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They constitute, in effect, a robust web of substantive and procedural default
rules. And the defaults are particularly sticky. For some tribunals, terms
like the procedural right to arbitrate are so sticky that they would arguably
amount to mandatory rules.166 As a result, arbitral jurisprudence tends to
just assume that states should be on notice that any contracts with investors
coming under an investment treaty will be entitled to this heightened level
of protection. This assumption is all the more troubling in view of the fact
that corporate investors can restructure their nationality to acquire BIT pro-
tection after executing the contract, discussed further below.167
The fusion of the broad theory of transnational property with the idea of
the internationalized contract thus accounts for a vision of state contracts as
a source of public international law. On the one hand, through treaty-based
internationalization, state contracts are inserted into the international legal
hierarchy, and bestowed protection from domestic law. On the other hand,
the ascription of aggressive property protection to such contracts insulates
them from deprivation or even mere diminution of value caused by regula-
tory measures at all levels of state action, chilling the state’s regulatory au-
tonomy across all fields. Seen in this light, these seemingly private
instruments impose serious constraints on the public law of the host state,
and severely limit the capacity of its citizenry to engage in democratic self-
government. Put another way, once imbued with such forceful property pro-
tection, the internationalized contract emerges as an indelible international
legal obligation opposable to the state party. These seemingly private legal
norms thus turn into a form of public law in the private interest.
166. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 160, at 121 (“As the cost of contracting around a default rule
becomes extremely large, the default rule starts to look like an immutable rule.”). SGS v. Paraguay is an
example of a tribunal treating a BIT provision entitling investors to ICSID arbitration as such a sticky
default rule that it seems to approach the mandatory. Recall that the state contract adopted Paraguayan
Courts as the exclusive forum to resolve all contractual disputes. The Tribunal’s pure-internationalization
stance implied that even such an explicit clause would be insufficient to defeat the default for interna-
tional arbitration set by the BIT. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Award, ¶ 179 (Feb.
10, 2012) (indicating that the BIT rule was still a mere default, but requiring an even more explicit
waiver—perhaps one actually mentioning the BIT right to international arbitration being waived by
name). The pure-internationalization approach thus treats ICSID arbitration as a remarkably sticky de-
fault bordering on a mandatory rule. But note that the hybrid approach of SGS v. Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/06, (Jan. 29, 2004) goes the other way, treating the BIT’s arbitration clause as a much
less sticky default. The latter Tribunal took the contracting parties’ choice seriously, finding that the
contract’s exclusive forum selection clause (choosing Philippine Courts) sufficed to waive ICSID jurisdic-
tion for the resolution of the underlying contract claims. SGS v. Philippines, ¶ 153 (“The Tribunal cannot
accept that standard BIT jurisdiction clauses automatically override the binding forum selection of a
forum by the parties to determine their contractual claims.”). It remains to be seen whether Tribunals
would accept a maximally explicit contractual waiver of ICSID jurisdiction or other BIT protection that
expressly mentions the relevant investment treaty. See S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbi-
tration: Wa(i)ve of the Future?, 29 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 690 (2014) (noting that in 2013 Colombia at-
tempted to impose such restrictions in a concession agreement, but ultimately reversed course in the face
of overwhelming opposition by concessionaires). Note, in any case, that it is not at all clear in any of
these cases why the tribunals consider that the defaults set by the BIT should be understood as more or
less sticky—this is a major lacuna in the jurisprudence, which I will confine to a subsequent paper.
167. See supra Part II.C.
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C. Corporate Nationality and Treaty Shopping
Taking together these developments in the international law of contracts
and the protection of foreign property, the state contract appears to have
emerged as a source of international law. However, the overarching thesis of
this Article—that corporations should be understood as autonomous
lawmakers—does not yet follow. I posited in Part I that the corporation’s
capacity to make law should not be reduced to a derivative or delegated
power dependent on the treaty arrangements of its home state. In this Sec-
tion, I demonstrate how the doctrine’s reverence for the corporation’s flexi-
ble form affords the multinational business enterprise significant leeway to
acquire treaty protection for its contracts with foreign sovereigns, far beyond
the scope of those treaties ratified by its state of nationality. The secret lies
in its capacity to augment its nationality by structuring or restructuring its
investment through wholly owned subsidiaries, allowing it to take advan-
tage of an enormous range of investment treaties which the parent could not
otherwise access.
As with the law of contracts, international investment law here upends a
second basic assumption of international law regarding corporate national-
ity: that the corporation is purely a creature of national law, which exists
only by grace of the municipal law of some country. Oppenheim’s International
Law again provides the classical formulation: “[i]t is usual to attribute a
corporation to the state under the laws of which it has been incorporated and
to which it owes its legal existence; to this initial condition is often added
the need for the corporation’s head office, registered office, or its siege social
to be in the same state.”168 By contrast, international investment law gives
more credence to the multinational existence of modern corporate entities.
Of course investment treaties permit corporations to sue foreign sovereigns
under treaties between the latter and their home state of nationality. But the
doctrine does not insist that the corporate parent’s nationality is its only
nationality for purposes of asserting BIT protection and arbitral jurisdiction.
It rather accepts that corporations can augment their nationality by structur-
ing investments through subsidiaries in third states, and thereby assert pro-
tection under those states’ treaty networks as well as that of the parent’s
state of nationality.
Through a series of arbitral awards over the last decade, investment tribu-
nals have indicated a deep unwillingness to look through corporate subsidi-
aries in assessing whether they qualify as nationals of a state party to a
particular BIT, absent extreme abuse (almost prejudicially branded a form of
“veil piercing” based on what is sometimes called “the veil of national-
ity”).169 Consistent doctrine enables multinationals to easily shop for BIT
168. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 21, at 859–60.
169. Tokios Tekeles v. Ukraine ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 56 (Apr. 29,
2004) (emphasizing irregularity of equitable veil piercing). On the idea of a “veil of nationality,” see, for
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protection wherever they choose to invest, not only before investing but
even afterwards.170 As regards contractual agreements, then, the multina-
tional can unilaterally raise a state contract to the level of international law
by creatively restructuring its downstream ownership structure—in princi-
ple without the assent or even knowledge of the state party to the agree-
ment. Given the normative force of such contracts and their impact on
domestic regulatory freedom, the jurisprudence justifies viewing corpora-
tions as autonomous lawmakers, significantly independent from both the
host state and their original state of nationality.
The corporation’s capacity to shop for treaty protection by shifting its
nationality is nicely captured by the 2005 Decision on Jurisdiction in Aguas
del Tunari v. Bolivia.171 The case involved a concession contract for the provi-
sion of potable water and sewage services in the City of Cochabamba and,
eventually, hydroelectric power.172 Bolivia negotiated and executed the con-
tract with Aguas del Tunari (AdT), a Bolivian corporation controlled by the
U.S.-based Bechtel Corporation. The Concession was concluded in Septem-
ber, and took effect on November 1, 1999.173 Bolivia’s selection of AdT as
concessionaire gave rise to major social and political unrest from the begin-
ning, due to a perceived lack of transparency in the selection and negotiation
processes, coupled with widespread fears of drastic rate increases that might
affect the population’s fundamental human right of access to water.174 Initial
unrest turned into intense civil society action against the concession, culmi-
nating in major violent protests in early 2000.175 In response, Bolivia termi-
nated the concession in April—a mere five months into the forty-year
contract. AdT filed for ICSID arbitration under the Netherlands–Bolivia
BIT.176
AdT sought damages from Bolivia over the allegedly wrongful termina-
tion of its state contract. As in the cases considered above, AdT portrayed
the contract as an internationally protected legal instrument insulated from
Bolivia’s prospective regulatory action, regardless of the state’s aims in re-
sponding to extreme societal unrest in a context implicating sensitive
example, Michael Reisman, The Quest for World Order and Human Dignity in the Twenty-
first Century 325 (2013).
170. See, e.g., Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Vene-
zuela,ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jun. 10, 2010), ¶ 190; ConocoPhillips
Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion and the Merits ¶¶ 267, 268, 273, 279 (Sept. 3, 2013).
171. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respon-
dent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005).
172. Id. ¶¶ 52–54. Cochabamba is the fourth largest city in Bolivia, with a population of nearly two
million.
173. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID ARB/02/3, ¶ 55.
174. Id. ¶ 63.
175. Id. ¶ 73.
176. Id. ¶ 8.
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human rights issues.177 Here, however, it was not a foregone conclusion that
the contract came under the aegis of any international treaty. The novel
question posed by Aguas del Tunari was how Bechtel, a U.S. company, and
AdT, a Bolivian company, were able to secure access to investor-state arbi-
tration through a treaty between Bolivia and the Netherlands. Deciding by
majority, the Tribunal held that a corporation is not only able to shop for
treaty protection by supplementing its nationality through acquiring or es-
tablishing foreign subsidiaries, but that it may do so unilaterally, even after
investing—i.e., after the state contract has already come into force. And an
investor need not even notify the host state of its maneuvers.
When the Cochabamba water concession was initially executed, Bechtel
controlled a 55% stake in AdT, structured through a subsidiary incorpo-
rated in the Cayman Islands. The contract listed AdT as the concessionaire
and the Cayman company as a “Founding Shareholder.” The latter was
wholly owned by Bechtel. Bolivia was not party to any BIT or FTA with
either the United States or the Cayman Islands. At this stage the contract
thus remained purely an instrument of Bolivian law, and could not be said
to create any international legal rights for either Bechtel or AdT. Neither
entity could claim access to BIT protection. Moreover, the Concession ex-
plicitly barred any transfer of a controlling stake in AdT to any other com-
pany, absent Bolivia’s consent.178
Nevertheless, as social unrest began to unfold Bechtel sought to restruc-
ture in order to protect its investment. Bechtel initially contacted Bolivian
authorities directly, through its local counsel, to request consent for a simple
transfer of all of its intermediary Cayman subsidiary’s shares in AdT to one
of Bechtel’s Dutch subsidiaries. Bechtel’s counsel assured Bolivian authori-
ties that the change would leave AdT “under the same control,” with “no
adverse effect or impact for the Bolivian Government, for Bolivian entities
or the town of Cochabamba.”179 Needless to say this restructuring would
have endowed Bechtel with substantial international rights that would, in
the event of a dispute, prove quite adverse to Bolivia: by advantageously
transforming the nature and force of the concession contract, and by generat-
ing access to ICSID arbitration. In any case, although Bolivian authorities
approved the request,180 Bechtel ultimately took a different approach. The
firm restructured its investment by inserting a new Netherlands subsidiary
into the chain of ownership and transferring all of Bechtel’s stock in its
177. See Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID ARB/02/3, ¶ 55; Letter by
Earthjustice to Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae (2003).
178. Bolivia attempted to argue—to no avail—that this provision, and the Concession more gener-
ally, were “carefully structured to preclude changes in the foreign ownership of AdT that might bring it
within the coverage of a BIT.” Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3)
Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 156, 165 (Oct. 21, 2005).
179. Id. ¶¶ 68, 182.
180. Id. ¶ 68.
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Cayman subsidiary to the new Dutch entity.181 In Bechtel’s view, this ap-
proach did not require Bolivia’s consent because no shares in AdT were di-
rectly transferred, and its assurances regarding its earlier request no longer
applied—positions which Bolivia strongly challenged at arbitration.
The Tribunal ultimately asserted jurisdiction, siding with AdT on all
counts. In particular, it held that the contractual restrictions on transferring
shares only applied to the “founding shareholders” (Bechtel’s Cayman sub-
sidiary) and not “ultimate shareholders” (Bechtel itself). In other words it
blocked transferring shares in AdT, but not transferring shares of any entity
that itself possessed shares in AdT.182 And the Tribunal considered Bechtel’s
assurances only applicable to its original proposal, which it never ultimately
pursued.183 Thus finding that AdT was legitimately restructured, it re-
mained for the Tribunal to determine whether AdT could claim protection
under the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT by reference to the Dutch vehicle newly
inserted into AdT’s upstream ownership chain.
The Netherlands–Bolivia BIT provides that for purposes of the treaty a
“national” of the Netherlands includes not only Dutch citizens and compa-
nies, but also “legal persons controlled directly or indirectly, by nationals of
that Contracting Party, but constituted in accordance with the law of the
other Contracting Party.”184 Obviously Bechtel’s wholly-owned Dutch sub-
sidiary possessed formal indirect control over AdT, because it wholly owned
the Cayman intermediary that itself possessed a controlling stake in AdT.
The dispute came down to whether the treaty term “control” meant only
ultimate or effective control, or whether it meant the mere legal potential to
control. For AdT the phrase had the latter, broader valence, thus potentially
181. The precise restructuring was more complex in several respects, but the additional wrinkles are
immaterial for present purposes. For the full restructuring process, see id., ¶¶ 71, 156–80.
182. Id. ¶ 165. Note that this is another case of a sticky default, and one where it is not at all clear
that stickiness is appropriate. See supra, text accompanying note 158. One might say that the Bolivian
lawyers responsible for drafting the contract simply did a bad job, leaving a loophole available to Bechtel
to change its nationality in some other way. But it was clear that the parties intended something with the
clause on transferring the company. Why should the default penalize the state here for failing to adopt a
sufficiently express prohibition? To paraphrase Charles Fried, it is not enough to say that in the absence
of fully clear choice the status quo ante should stand. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 64–65
(1981) (“The strict or literal view [that the loss should lie where it falls] always enforces or ratifies some
distribution of risk. . . . The reasons why some losses are shifted and others are not are as various as the
law itself, but there must be reasons.”). In Bechtel, the Tribunal was tasked with deciding the default, and
its assumption of a sticky one reflects just as much a jurisprudential choice as the opposite conclusion:
extending the logic of the clause in question to the unanticipated case that ultimately arose. Either way,
justification is sorely lacking. And in this case it is difficult to see any reason why a sticky default in favor
of the supposed “status quo” permitting restructuring for nationality would be appropriate.
183. See Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID ARB/02/3, ¶ 55. Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 189 (Oct. 21, 2005). In the Tribunal’s words, “it is not
uncommon in practice, and—absent a particular limitation—not illegal to locate one’s operations in a
jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and legal environment in terms, for examples, of
taxation or the substantive law of the jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.” Id. ¶ 330(d).
184. Netherlands–Bolivia BIT, art. 1(b)(iii). Such provisions are fairly common. They extend protec-
tion to foreign investors where they are required to operate through a subsidiary incorporated in the host
state (in the interest of creating local jobs and generally stimulating the local economy).
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encompassing “not only the ultimate parent of AdT, but also the subsidiar-
ies of the parent above the Claimant.”185 In Bolivia’s view, by contrast, the
phrase “controlled directly or indirectly” had to be read in the former light,
limited to the ultimate controller or at least the “effective” or “actual” con-
troller of AdT (which, in its view, meant Bechtel either way). In other
words, Bolivia’s view required determining the “reality of the corporate per-
sonality,” and looking through any mere corporate shells in the ownership
chain.186 Bolivia argued that the Dutch intermediary was a merely hollow
investment vehicle which did not meaningfully “control” AdT and thus
could not generate BIT protection.
The Tribunal again held against Bolivia. By majority, it held “that the
phrase ‘controlled directly or indirectly’ means that one entity may be said
to control another entity (either directly, that is without an intermediary
entity, or indirectly) if that entity possesses the legal capacity to control the
other entity.”187 By contrast, the Tribunal considered Bolivia’s position un-
tenable. The Tribunal considered limiting the provision to a single ultimate
controller to be irreconcilable with the text, which references both “direct
and indirect control,” and further rejected any “effective control” test as
“sufficiently vague as to be unmanageable.”188 According to the majority,
all that matters is to identify whether any entity in the Claimant’s upstream
chain of ownership has the appropriate nationality and the mere legal capac-
ity to control the Claimant—irrespective of whether it may in turn be con-
trolled by nationals of third states.
Aguas del Tunari thus stands for two crucial propositions. First, a corpora-
tion can in principle shop for treaty protection to which it might otherwise
not have access, by structuring its investment through intermediary subsidi-
aries seated in states party to BITs or FTAs with the target host state—a
practice fondly dubbed the “Dutch sandwich” by its adherents and detrac-
tors alike.189 In other words, a corporation can be truly multinational in a
legally significant sense. And second, a corporation can acquire treaty pro-
tection for its contracts with a state even after such contracts are executed
185. Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID ARB/02/3, ¶ 223. Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 189 (Oct. 21, 2005).
186. Id. ¶ 222 (quoting Resp. Counter Mem., ¶ 139).
187. Id. ¶ 264. The Tribunal further considered AdT’s view to enjoy more support in comparative
corporate law. It found that as a legal concept pertaining to corporations, the notion of control is gener-
ally associated with the mere capacity to control, not that capacity’s actual exercise, and is thus usually
measured simply in terms of shareholding percentile. Id. ¶ 245.
188. Id. ¶ 246. Moreover, the Tribunal considered that such an uncertain view of the Treaty’s scope
could not be squared with the object and purpose of the BIT, which it took to be “stimulat[ing] the flow
of capital and technology” to the Treaty parties. Id. ¶¶ 241, 247.
189. See Kahale, supra note 26. The sandwich is “Dutch” because, as in the instant case, corporations
frequently structure their investments through the Netherlands, which has a particularly extensive net-
work of especially protective BITs (approximately 98 according to the current UNCTAD database), and
very inviting national law of incorporation. Note, however, that Bolivia withdrew from its BIT with the
Netherlands in response to the outcome in Aguas del Tunari.
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and in force.190 This means that it can unilaterally elevate a state contract to
the level of international law, post hoc, without even notifying the state
party.191 Under this rule, the corporation can treat the domestic law of the
contract as merely optional.
The slightly earlier 2004 Award in Tokios Tekeles v. Ukraine rounds out the
logic of Aguas del Tunari on investment structuring, demonstrating the ex-
tent to which tribunals balk at scrutinizing corporate ownership chains in
relation to nationality. Here the Tribunal held that, absent extreme abuse of
the corporate form, investors can even sue their own state of nationality
through creative investment structuring. Tokios Tekeles, a Lithuanian com-
pany, brought suit against Ukraine under the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT.192
Ukraine protested that the company was itself 99% owned by two Ukrain-
ian individuals, and thus to allow the suit to go forward would essentially
internationalize a suit between Ukraine and its own nationals. The Tribunal
refused, by majority, to “pierce the corporate veil,”193 holding that “under
the terms of the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT . . . the only relevant consideration
is whether the Claimant is established under the laws of Lithuania.”194 Be-
cause Tokios Tekeles met this (meager) test, the Tribunal refused to look
through its corporate nationality and asserted jurisdiction.195
Neither Tokios Tokeles nor Aguas del Tunari was unanimous on the issue of
corporate treaty shopping, and both were subject to scathing dissents. In
Tokios Tokeles, the President of the Tribunal insisted that framing the issue in
terms of veil piercing and abuse of the corporate form was “beside the
point,” and practically prejudicial—completely obscuring the economic re-
alities and imposing a heavy burden on respondent states to show that cor-
porate claimants engaged in extreme malfeasance.196 More generally, the
dissent in Aguas del Tunari argued that opening the door to corporate treaty
190. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respon-
dent’s Objections to Jurisdiction ¶¶ 180, 330(d) (Oct. 21, 2005).
191. Restructuring may close off umbrella clause claims under the line of cases requiring privity.
However, it would create no such problem for the investor vis-à-vis FET. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 420 (July 14, 2006); see also supra Part II.A.
192. The Ukraine–Lithuania BIT defines “investor” very broadly as “any entity established in the terri-
tory of the Republic of Lithuania in conformity with its laws and regulations.” Ukraine—Lithuania BIT;
Tokios Tekeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Apr. 29, 2004).
193. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, ¶¶ 54–56.
194. Id. ¶ 38.
195. The Tribunal noted in passing that the Claimant appeared to have engaged in “substantial
business activity” in Lithuania, though it refrained from affirmatively deciding so—reemphasizing that
that the question “is not relevant to our determination of jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 37.
196. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion of President Pros-
per Weil, ¶ 21 (Apr. 29. 2004) (accepting that there is no evidence that Tokios Tokeles abused the
corporate form, but insisting that the question of abuse or “lifting of the veil . . . is beside the point”).
Weil challenged the majority’s excessive formalism, whereby all that matters “is the fact that the invest-
ment has been made by a corporation of Lithuanian nationality, whatever the origin of its capital and the
nationality of its managers.” Id. ¶ 11. He contended that the “assumption that the origin of the capital
is not relevant and even less decisive” is unwarranted, and here led to the perverse conclusion that two
Ukrainian individuals could effectively bring an international suit against their own state of nationality
as foreign investors. Id ¶ 6. For Weil, the majority’s appeal to the language of veil piercing completely
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shopping through investment structuring and restructuring would com-
pletely undermine the reciprocal nature of the BITs and FTAs in question.
The dissent objected that the majority’s interpretation would transform each
party’s bilateral obligations under the BIT into an “infinite offer to arbi-
trate”—not only to nationals of the other party, but to nationals of any
country, so long as they are able to structure their investment through any
kind of investment vehicle incorporated in the other state party.197
The dissenters in Aguas del Tunari and Tokios Tekeles perceived the stakes
well, but their challenges fell on deaf ears and soon faded to the background.
The majority rules established in these early cases have since become com-
pletely entrenched, and contemporary tribunals take the viability of treaty
shopping practically as a given—including even through post hoc restructur-
ing. Thus in Mobil Corp. v. Venezuela the Tribunal accepted outright that
“the main, if not the sole purpose of the restructuring was to protect Mobil
investments from adverse Venezuelan measures in getting access to ICSID
arbitration through the Dutch–Venezuela BIT.”198 The fact of post hoc re-
structuring to acquire treaty protection was of no consequence, taken on its
own. “Such restructuring could be ‘legitimate corporate planning’ as con-
tended by the Claimants or an ‘abuse of right’ as submitted by the Respon-
dents. It depends upon the circumstances in which it happened.”199 Under
the contemporary rule, the only exception pertains to situations of extreme
abuse or bad faith, particularly where restructuring occurs after a dispute has
arisen.200 As noted by the Tribunal in ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, “the stan-
obscured the issue: in his view all that matters, and all that should matter, is “the simple, straightfor-
ward, objective fact” that the dispute is not really about foreign investment at all. Id. ¶ 21.
197. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Dissenting Opinion
of Arbitrator José Luis Alberro-Semerena, Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 16 ICSID Rep. 303 (2005). Emphasizing the
essentially reciprocal nature of BITs and FTAs, and noting that examples of infinite offers of arbitration
do exist in certain contexts—for example the global offers included in certain countries’ statutes on
foreign investment—Alberro-Semerena strongly rejected that such an open-ended interpretation could
accurately characterize the exchange of rights and duties in a bilateral treaty—absent clear language or
any other evidence. Id. ¶ 9. Moreover the Dissent questioned Bechtel’s restructuring in this particular
case, emphasizing the timing and shrouded nature of its maneuvers. Id. ¶ 16.
198. Mobil Corp., Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jun. 10, 2010), ¶ 190.
199. Id. ¶ 191. See also ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and the Merits ¶¶ 267, 268, 273, 279 (Sept. 3, 2013)
(considering it irrelevant—absent more—that ConocoPhillips’ sole business purpose in restructuring
through Dutch “corporations of convenience” was to acquire ICSID jurisdiction).
200. Mobil Corp. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27 ¶ 205 (noting that “with respect to pre-
existing disputes, the situation is different and the Tribunal considers that to restructure investments
only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT for such disputes would constitute . . . ‘an abusive
manipulation of the system of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the
BITs.’”) (quoting Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 144 (Apr.
15, 2009)); ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/30. In both cases the Tribunals declined jurisdiction over aspects of the respective disputes born
before the relevant restructuring processes were complete. Mobil Corp. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/27 ¶ 206; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30 ¶¶ 287–89.
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dard is a high one,”201 and tribunals must bear in mind “how rarely courts
and tribunals have held that a good faith or other related standard is
breached.”202 Indeed, only one investor-state tribunal has yet dismissed a
case for failure to meet this lofty test.203
There is often little a state can do to preempt corporate maneuvering to
secure BIT protection. Some BITs and FTAs grant the treaty parties a de-
gree of control by incorporating a “denial of benefits” clause. These clauses
allow a party to deny treaty access to enterprises that are formally nationals
of the other party, but maintain no substantial business activities there and
are themselves controlled by third-party nationals. The U.S.–Peru TPA, for
example, includes a standard denial of benefits provision,204 as do the
NAFTA205 and the Energy Charter Treaty,206 as well as several of the more
progressive model BITs.207 However, several tribunals have held that states
must proactively deny benefits and give notice before a dispute arises, leav-
ing the utility of such clauses in doubt.208 In any case, denial of benefits
provisions are not especially common and can themselves be circumvented
201. ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/
30 ¶ 275.
202. Id.
203. Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 93 (Apr. 15, 2009)
(holding, on slightly different grounds and with perhaps more skepticism than usual, that “if the sole
purpose of an economic transaction is to pursue an ICSID claim, without any intent to perform any
economic activity in the host country, such transaction cannot be considered as a protected investment”).
204. U.S.–Peru TPA, art. 10.12(2) (“A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of
another Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise
has no substantial business activities in the territory of any Party, other than the denying Party, and
persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.”). See Voon et al., supra
note 26, at 13–15.
205. NAFTA, art. 1113(2).
206. ECT, art. 17.
207. U.S. Model BIT, art. 17; Canada Model BIT, art. 18.
208. See, e.g., Plama Consortium v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 161–62 (Feb. 8, 2005) (holding that under the ECT a state must give advance notice to deny treaty
benefits, though “a general declaration in a Contracting State’s official gazette could suffice; or a statu-
tory provision in a Contracting State’s investment or other laws; or even an exchange of letters with a
particular investor or class of investors”); Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA
Case No. AA 227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 458 (Nov. 30 2009). But see Pac
Rim Cayman v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional
Objections, ¶ 4.83 (Jun. 1, 2012) (ruling that denial of benefits under the CAFTA–DR need not occur
before the investor claimed benefits by filing for arbitration); Guaracachi America & Rurelec v. Bolivia,
PCA Case No. 2011-17, Award (Corrected) ¶ 372 (Jan. 31, 2014) (“Whenever a BIT includes a denial of
benefits clause, the consent by the host State to arbitration itself is conditional and thus may be denied
by it, provided that certain objective requirements concerning the investor are fulfilled. All investors are
aware of the possibility of such a denial, such that no legitimate expectations are frustrated by that denial
of benefits.”). On the controversy surrounding denial of benefits clauses, see further Voon et al., supra
note 26; Loukas Mistelis & Crina Mihaela Baltag, Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the Energy Charter
Treaty, 113 Penn St. L. Rev., 1301, 1320–21 (2009); Nils Eliasson, 10 Years of Energy Charter
Arbitration, available at http://www.offentligupphandling.se/filearchive/4/41105/Report%20Years%
20of%2020ECT%20Arbitration,%2030%20June%202011.pdf. Note, in this regard, that the Canada
Model BIT of 2004 allows a party to deny benefits to a shell corporation “subject to prior notification,”
while the 2012 U.S. Model BIT imposes no such condition. Canada Model BIT (2004), art. 18(2); U.S.
Model BIT (2012), art. 17.
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through careful investment structuring where the state is party to other
more favorable investment treaties. Beyond appeal to such specific treaty
protections, states can also attempt to protect themselves from corporate
treaty shopping by negotiating explicit restrictions on restructuring in the
state contract itself. But as Aguas del Tunari amply shows, such constraints
must be crafted meticulously, and corporations may well be able to find
ways around them.209
* * *
To sum up the argument of this Part: if the form and substance of corpo-
rate lawmaking derives from a blend of contract and property ideas, the
autonomy of the corporate lawmaker arises out of arbitral doctrine on the
law of corporate nationality. The corporation is not beholden to its state of
nationality to effectively internationalize its state contracts with foreign sov-
ereigns, because it can take advantage of third-states’ BITs and FTAs
through careful investment structuring. And neither is it fully beholden to
the host state with whom it contracts; indeed it can even elevate state con-
tracts to the level of international law unilaterally, after they come into force
(though not, perhaps, after a dispute has arisen). The image of corporations
as lawmakers does not come into focus via analysis of any of these three
trends on their own. But taken together these developments produce a strik-
ing vision: at least within the ambit of the pre-existing web of international
investment treaties, the corporation appears as a basically autonomous actor
empowered to make and directly enforce international law—with palpable
effects for the domestic regulatory freedom of its contracting partners.
III. Four Pathologies of Corporate Lawmaking
Corporations have emerged as international lawmakers through the con-
fluence of three trends in international investment law jurisprudence. But
the importance of this phenomenon transcends the seemingly narrow con-
fines of the doctrinal regime from whence it comes. At a higher altitude,
international law has come to allow multinational business firms to chill,
even potentially freeze, regulatory policy space in countries with which they
contract—to recreate domestic law in their own image. The rise of corpora-
tions as lawmakers threatens local and global public values, as diverse as
economic development, human rights, and the protection of public health
and the environment. It is a profound development—one that international
law has created, yet one with which the law has as yet failed to come to
grips. This final Part seeks to clear the ground for much-needed critique of
209. Aguas del Tunari, S.A., v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respon-
dent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005).
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the recent legal empowerment of corporations through international invest-
ment law. For the time being I only seek to draw out four pathologies that
emerge from this story. Each will require sustained further study.
The mere possibility that private corporations and foreign states can cre-
ate international legal arrangements by mutual agreement is not necessarily
a problem. We may have no qualm with the creation of international legal
norms by internationalization through negotiation in the famous style of
Texaco v. Libya. It is not necessarily a bad thing that states and private firms
can negotiate super-contracts at arm’s length. Such deals are not unknown in
either international or domestic law, and may be necessary to accomplish
major infrastructure projects in some cases. The problem in international
law today is that, under prevailing interpretations, the web of BITs and
FTAs internationalize all state contracts—that all state contracts under their
ambit are elevated to the status of super-contracts by default. Even worse,
the defaults seem awfully sticky—close, indeed, to mandatory rules. Add to
this the capacity of global business firms to select such rules unilaterally—to
graft them on to already executed contracts by shopping for treaty protec-
tion—and the scope of the problem starts to come into focus.
This story helps illuminate four specific and acute pathologies endemic to
international law today. The first two are doctrinal—arising out of the con-
stellations examined in Part II: first, the confusion between the logics of
contract and property in international investment law doctrine; and second,
the admission of corporate nationality shopping in cases involving contracts.
The third pathology is institutional. Even if we can identify doctrinal solu-
tions to the pathologies internal to investment law jurisprudence, it is hard
to see how these problems can be fully addressed within the current patch-
work structure of the global investment regime. Even accountability for
change in international investment law today remains diffuse and elusive.
We are in dire need of new institutional arrangements, based on multilater-
alism and systematized dispute settlement. The fourth pathology is concep-
tual. Irrespective of the doctrinal or institutional particulars at work in
international investment law, this story should make clear that the time has
come for international lawyers to rethink the position of business firms
within global legal space.
Corporations have emerged as international lawmakers through a series of
doctrinal constellations, and these jurisprudential linkages provide a natural
starting point for critique. Two constellations are particularly problematic:
the unexplained fusion of property and contract; and the admission of corpo-
rate nationality shopping in contract cases. These account, respectively, for
the transformation of state contracts into a (derivative) source of interna-
tional law, and the emergence of corporations as largely autonomous
lawmakers. From a private law perspective it seems that both constellations
create serious fairness concerns. At the same time, from the perspective of
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public international law it seems that each seriously implicates the core no-
tion of state consent.
The first pathology is thus the propertization of contracts through inter-
national investment treaties. Again, for the purpose of understanding the
dynamic between treaties and contracts, it is helpful to think of BITs and
FTAs in terms of default rules. On the one hand, (i) investment law treats
contracts as if they were any other classically rigid form of property, making
it difficult to contract out of the default protections set by the treaty. In
other words, BITs and FTAs create very sticky defaults. The tendency is to
assume that the treaty grafts protections onto any subsequently negotiated
contract, rather than the reverse assumption: that conflicting contract provi-
sions reflect the parties’ intent to opt-out of the background treaty. On the
other hand, (ii) these defaults set an exceedingly high level of protection for
investors. Provisions like FET graft highly capital-friendly protections onto
contracts, pertaining to conditions of breach, the state’s available defenses,
and even the appropriate method of calculating damages.
In the old conception of the internationalized contract—where the con-
tract was elevated to the level of international law by express agreement
between the state and the private party—there could be no question of con-
sent to the operation of international law for the determination of any and
all rights not specifically negotiated by the parties. The state would have
clearly consented to fill gaps in the contract with a host of legal terms drawn
from public international law. The parties, for better or worse, chose interna-
tional law as the law of the contract. By contrast, in the modern investment
regime it is presumed that the state party pre-committed, through the over-
arching BIT or FTA, to supplement the terms of any covered foreign invest-
ment contract with provisions drawn from the treaty and general
international law—displacing the agreed law of the contract for the purpose
of filling gaps. This difference already raises questions about consent in the
context of terms like FET. Did the parties really intend such vague provi-
sions to displace national law as the law of the contract? Absent any specific
language in BITs and FTAs to that effect, perhaps outside of umbrella clause
cases, it seems a stretch to assume that the states parties intended their
investment treaties to act as a complex of default contract rules.
But investment law doctrine goes much further.210 Even if one accepts the
idea that states intended BITs and FTAs to apply to contracts by default, as
a baseline set of protections against which negotiations can take place and as
gap-fillers, it is quite another thing to assume that states intended to make
these rules sticky, or even mandatory. The instinct that treaty rights should
presumptively trump subsequently negotiated contract terms should seem
210. At least it tends to go further, under the general approach to contracts under FET and expropria-
tion claims, and in umbrella clause cases in the school of SGS v. Paraguay. The better approach—pio-
neered in umbrella clause cases by SGS v. Philippines, but as yet sorely lacking in FET and expropriation
case law—is considered further below.
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particularly suspect from the perspective of state consent. This kind of rigid-
ity is characteristic of the law of property, with its inflexible forms. But
contract is the realm of choice—the domain of party autonomy. Clearly
states intended investment treaties to apply to contracts in some way, but it
is hard to imagine that they intended to make subsequent contractual choice
and negotiation so difficult. It seems more likely that the received doctrine
suffers from a category mistake.
Even if we postulate away the problem of consent, the dominant theory of
contract internationalization generates glaring problems of fairness and effi-
ciency. Not only does the doctrine treat BITs and FTAs as sticky default
rules, but provisions like FET set the defaults at highly investor-friendly
levels—most evidently by infusing contracts with protections for the inves-
tor’s legitimate expectations in the style of Tecmed. In effect they provide
investors with a maximizing insurance policy by default—shifting the bulk
of contractual risk to the state. It is neither just nor efficient to expect states
to start all negotiations so squarely on the back foot. It is suspicious that so
much of the risk lies with one party by default, especially if the defaults are
hard to contract around. To the extent that states remain at all unaware of
their weak negotiating position—and especially its stickiness—the arrange-
ment seems clearly unfair. But even assuming states consented to such an
arrangement, and approach their contracts with investors from a position of
perfect rationality, this approach to the treaty/contract conundrum seems
likely to prove grossly inefficient in the long run. Rational states will have
to respond by pricing the risk into their contracts. In thinking about current
doctrine, it is worth asking whether investors would want to pay for such a
high level of risk insurance, and whether the doctrine as it presently stands
will really promote investment in the long term.
The seeds of a doctrinal solution can be found in the umbrella clause case
law, in the decision in SGS v. Philippines. States and tribunals should call
into question the easy conflation of state contracts with property protection
and property remedies in investment arbitration. Assuming the possibility
that contracts are entitled to some kind of international protection under
various investment clauses, it does not necessarily follow that a treaty must
fully internationalize all covered contracts. In other words, it does not follow
that international arbitrators are entitled to disregard the law of the contract
for purposes of determining the existence of a breach, the method of calcu-
lating damages, the appropriate forum, and so on.211 We can take state con-
tracts more seriously as bargains by relying on the negotiated law of the
contract to determine whether a breach has occurred, while looking to pub-
lic international law to determine the consequences of breach. This is the
approach pioneered by the tribunal in SGS v. Philippines, treating contracts
211. Such is the consequence of the full internationalization approach adopted by SGS v. Paraguay and
FET cases like Azurix v. Argentina.
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as a kind of hybrid source of international law212—and not a pure source in
the sense implied by the later SGS v. Paraguay.213 By this view, even if the
consequences of breach of contract should be derived from public interna-
tional law, the scope and meaning of the contract should be derived from the
law of the contract itself214—which is (almost) always the municipal law of
some country.215 And the same should be true when analyzing contracts
under the other treaty standards, like FET and expropriation. Under the
SGS v. Philippines approach, the assumption is that later-in-time contracts
opt out of conflicting terms in the overarching BIT or FTA—reducing the
treaty to a collection of ordinary default rules that provide a baseline for
negotiations, and fill gaps as necessary.
At the same time, we ought to go further toward challenging the pecu-
liarly aggressive vision of property implicit in most investor-state arbitral
awards. Here we can gain important insight from domestic and comparative
property theory. Even outside the realm of contractual disputes, the maxi-
malist conception entrenched in investor-state arbitral practice assumes a
primacy of property rights over other domestic values unimaginable in most
modern societies, including both capital importing and capital exporting
states.216 The primacy of property rights is all the more perplexing when
grafted onto the ill-thought-through doctrine of international contract pro-
tection under investment treaties—even merely by default.
There is ample room to revisit the more aggressive doctrines, like legiti-
mate expectations under FET. And surely some solace can be found in the
notions of deference and the standard of review.217 Concepts like FET and
indirect expropriation should not be assessed solely on the basis of the effects
of a State’s measure on the investor’s bottom line, even where treaty text is
vague about the relevance of bona fide regulatory purposes. Some degree of
balancing is warranted. And indeed tribunals and scholars are increasingly
coming to accept this position. However, care must be taken to avoid per-
petuating the extremely property-oriented position by paying mere lip-ser-
vice to malleable concepts like proportionality and the margin of
appreciation. Likewise, seemingly progressive citations to ECtHR-style bal-
ancing in cases like Tecmed and Azurix have to be taken with caution.218
212. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004).
213. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29,
Jurisdiction (Feb. 10, 2012); id., Award (Feb. 10, 2012).
214. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06;
James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 Arb. Int’l 351 (2008).
215. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 21, at 927; Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 21, at 168.
216. Jeremy Waldron, “Public Rule of Law,” Keynote, Inaugural Conference of the International
Society of Public Law, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2480648.
217. See Stephan Schill, supra note 118; Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 118; Arato, supra note
119.
218. See Turkuler Isiksel, The Rights of Man and the Rights of Man-Made: Corporations and Human Rights,
Working Paper (2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2546401.
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The second doctrinal pathology lies in the linkage between the idea of
internationalized contracts under BITs and FTAs and the ease with which
corporations can shop for treaty protection—even for already existing con-
tracts. This is the doctrinal move responsible for the corporation’s wide
sphere of autonomy as a lawmaker. In the first place, there is ample room to
question the leeway that investment law doctrine currently affords multina-
tional firms in shopping for treaty protection. It is still not clear why the
doctrine so easily dismisses looking through subsidiary investment vehicles
as an anathema form of “veil piercing.” Perhaps the very image of the veil of
nationality is prejudicial. It leads too easily to the pervasive conclusion that
looking through ownership chains is appropriate only given extreme abuse
of the corporate form. In any case, the assumption that treaties between
states for the reciprocal protection of one another’s nationals create infinite
offers to arbitrate claims by any multinational creative enough in its plan-
ning should be subjected to quite a bit more scrutiny.
Whatever the merits of corporate nationality shopping generally, how-
ever, the extension of these ideas to contract claims must be challenged in
the strongest possible terms. The doctrine recognizing the viability of re-
structuring for BIT protection produces alarming problems of fairness in
this context. It is difficult to accept the position that the domestic law of the
contract is merely optional for the private party. And indeed a handful of
cases are beginning to recognize the problem that allowing unilateral corpo-
rate restructuring to effectively change the law of the contract might go too
far in straining the legitimate expectations of the host state—under the ru-
bric of a privity requirement.219 However, the issue only seems to have
arisen in umbrella clause cases, and is generally ignored in the much more
important context of FET. Recall that in Azurix the Tribunal refused to
elevate the contract via the Treaty’s umbrella clause for want of privity, but
nevertheless extended FET protection to the contract without any comment
on the apparent discrepancy. Just as importantly, we would not want a for-
malism like privity to get in the way of fairness on the other side—that is,
fairness to the investor. What about the situation where the Claimant was
forced to incorporate a local subsidiary and all contracting with the state had
to occur through the local investment vehicle? It is not clear that we should
always allow the Respondent to avoid liability for breach of protected con-
219. Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 132
(Dec. 12, 2012) (undercutting the viability of forum shopping in cases involving investment contracts by
conditioning invocation of the umbrella clause on a relationship of contractual privity between the claim-
ant and the host state); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic ¶¶
94–95 (Dec. 25, 2007); Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Jan. 17,
2007). But see Continental Casualty v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/0, Award, ¶ 297 (Sept. 5,
2008) (finding no need for claimants to demonstrate privity of contract with the host state); Burlington
v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Orrego Vicuña (Nov. 8, 2012).
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tracts simply because it required the investor to contract through a locally
incorporated entity.
The problem is that the notion of privity raised by cases like Azurix and
Burlington simply misses the mark. The domestic legal concept of privity
certainly points to an important problem in the context of treaty shopping
through corporate shells, but it does not fully capture the problem. On the
one hand, it seems underinclusive in that it would allow restructuring in
cases of BITs, like that in Aguas del Tunari, which allow the local subsidiary
to bring suit if it is legally controlled by a corporate national of the other
treaty party. Since it would always be the contracting subsidiary bringing
suit in these cases, a privity consideration would not bar upstream restruc-
turing as a means of transmuting the contract into international legal
rights—even after its entry into force. At the same time, a privity rule may
also be overinclusive, insofar as it would bar cases where the investor is
required to execute its investment contracts through a local subsidiary and
the BIT does not provide for the local subsidiary to bring suit. Privity thus
seems, in this context, more confusing than useful for determining the ap-
propriate bounds of contract-based suit.
The relevant consideration should be timing, rather than the identity of
the parties emphasized by the notion of privity. We should be suspicious of
contract claims where the firm acquired jurisdiction by restructuring its in-
vestment after executing the contract, regardless of which corporate entity
ultimately brings the claim. This means going further than the current doc-
trinal limit, which calls for scrutiny only where restructuring occurred after
the dispute arose. But there is equally reason to be tolerant of a lack of
privity where the corporate structure in place at the time of execution would
otherwise have secured jurisdiction under the relevant BIT or FTA.
It should also be noted that the approach to the internationalization of
contracts in SGS v. Philippines would release much of the pressure here as
well. If that hybrid approach were adopted, not just for umbrella clause
claims but for all treaty protections, then the most glaring injustices of the
treaty-shopping rule would fall away. Because the acquisition of treaty pro-
tection would leave the law of the contract intact, it would no longer be
possible for an investor to unilaterally displace large swaths of a contract
with more favorable terms ex post. Restructuring for treaty protection would
still be questionable from the perspective of state consent, but it would lose
much of its sting for host states in contractual relationships with foreign
investors.
Even with numerous doctrinal fixes at hand, however, the global invest-
ment regime suffers from a third pathology—arising out of its institutional
deficiencies. The basic problem is the fragmented nature of the international
investment regime—comprised of thousands of BITs and FTAs, and devel-
oped by hundreds of arbitral tribunals, constituted on a one-off basis. As we
have seen, the patchwork nature of the treaty regime empowers the flexible
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multinational corporation. But at the same time the fragmented character of
the system makes it exceedingly difficult for states to effect systemic change.
From the perspective of a state party to a number of BITs or FTAs—as most
states are—terminating or amending a single treaty would accomplish little,
so long as it remains party to other more favorable treaties with third states.
Corporations can simply change their nationality—not only to acquire
treaty protection, but to acquire the best form of treaty protection available
under the host state’s treaty network. A single state interested in seriously
reforming its position under international investment law must look at re-
forming every treaty to which it is a party—which also requires the coopera-
tion of all its treaty partners. From a global perspective, reformers have to
envision all (or most) states reforming all of their treaties. Given the reali-
ties of corporate treaty shopping, change on the level of bilateral treaties is
not impossible—but it is a big task.
The second side of the institutional problem is that accountability for the
nature of the regime is diffuse and elusive. Imagine that in a (democratic)
national state the default rules for the protection of domestic public con-
tracts were identical to those enshrined under the most aggressive readings
of a BIT—that any kind of diminution in the value of the contract by the
state would be fully compensable, calculated in terms of expectation dam-
ages. Even if we consider such an investor-centric rule odious, it would not
necessarily be completely illegitimate. At the very least there would be in-
stitutions accountable to the citizenry for the consequences of such a rule.
And those institutions would be able to change the rules going forward. In
international investment law there are no such accountable institutions.
There is no unitary judiciary, and no unitary legislative power. Single states
may be accountable to their citizens, but as we have seen the path for a
single state to reform its obligations is remarkably hard.
The deficiencies of our institutions compound and entrench the doctrinal
paradoxes that have so empowered multinational firms against the state.
Ultimately, they call into question the legitimacy of the investment regime
as a whole. The problem is evident for many in the field, and at least, in
broad outline, the right solutions are clear.220 The most obvious long-term
solution to the many problems engendered by the patchwork nature of the
regime—not least the inequalities and irregularities generated by corporate
treaty shopping—is its replacement with a multilateral investment treaty.
Likewise the long-term solution to the fragmented arbitral jurisprudence is
institutional centralization and systematization—through a standing tribu-
nal, perhaps modeled on the structure of the appellate mechanism of the
220. See Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report, June 2013 No. 2, available at http://
unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf. See further the over sixty articles compris-
ing a special issue of Transnational Dispute Management in response to (and named after) the report, Reform
of Investor-state Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap1 Transnat’l Disp. Mgm’t, (2014), available at
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key=52.
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WTO.221 Any kind of full proposal lies far beyond the scope of the present
Article. And serious institutional solutions will involve significant tradeoffs
that will have to be negotiated, in any case. Suffice it to say that multilater-
alization and institutional centralization should be the touchstones of long-
term reform.
The fourth pathology, finally, is conceptual. As the doctrinal puzzles sur-
rounding corporate treaty shopping make clear, international law has had
trouble coming to grips with the global business as a unified actor. The
dogged focus on corporate forms rather than the large-scale organization of
business enterprises is a case in point. Arbitral apprehension of looking
through corporate entities unduly empowers global firms—allowing them
to shift and shed their nationality in order to take advantage of international
legal rights that seem clearly not meant for them. I thus raise one final
point, only by hypothesis for the time being—shifting gears to assess the
rise of the multinational corporation as a lawmaker at a higher level of
altitude.
It is worth returning to the structure and grammar of public international
law, to ask whether we must now conceive of the multinational firm as a
unified semi-public actor for purposes of international law. And if so, what
normative and prescriptive consequences might follow? In light of their au-
tonomy and growing capacity to make law, it would be irresponsible to
dismiss global firms as merely national entities. Through their engagement
with the vast network of investment treaties—admittedly contingent, yet
still real and entrenched—multinational corporations have emerged as
global agents, grossly empowered by the international legal order, but not
fully encompassed by it. International law does not even have rules for at-
tributing acts to corporations, let alone for assigning them civil or criminal
responsibility.
In view of the corporation’s empowerment within international law, it
appears increasingly uncomfortable to hold to the aging notion that the
multinational business enterprise is at most a mere object of international
law, best regulated by the national state. Even though international law has
provided the essential engine for empowering the corporation against the
state, it has since failed to cope with the rise of corporate power. At present
the doctrine takes corporate capacities insufficiently seriously. In view of the
multinational’s increasingly public capacities—including literally authoring
the law—the time has come to challenge the laissez-faire attitude of interna-
tional law to the corporate form by comparison to the more robust formal
understanding of the traditional legal subjects: states and public interna-
221. Joseph Weiler, Editorial, 25 Eur. J. Int’l L. 963, 966 (2014) (rightly pointing out that much of
the success of any scheme to centralize and systematize investor-state dispute resolution will turn on the
mechanism for the selection of judges). Weiler further wonders, tongue only partially in cheek, whether
it would be sacrilege to propose simply piggybacking on the already-constituted WTO Appellate Body
rather than founding a new court. Id.
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tional organizations. Ultimately we can and should expect more of states—
the plenary authors of international law—toward providing international
legal rules that render corporations more accountable.
IV. Conclusion
Under the present web of international investment treaties, corporations
can author international law by agreement with sovereign states. In some
cases, through creative treaty shopping, they can even unilaterally elevate
domestic contracts with the state to the level of international law. Global
firms can reshape the domestic law of their contracting partners in their own
image—with tangible effects for the host state’s populace. At the same time,
their emergent power has no counterweight at the international level, in the
form of international legal responsibility or other accountability mecha-
nisms.222 The doctrinal status quo puts both local and global public values
at serious risk. And the difficulty of effecting coherent systemic change
under current institutional arrangements entrenches the problem.  To bor-
row Max Weber’s phrase, BITs and FTAs have become an iron cage223—
both for states and, in the long run, investors.224 The problem of the day is
to chip away at the cage, and ultimately to break it, to achieve a more
balanced regime for the protection and promotion of investment across the
globe.
Given the complexity of the global investment regime, and the asymmet-
ric capacity of global firms to navigate its currents, what can be done? Insti-
tutional and doctrinal solutions are at hand, but the road toward achieving
them is a hard one. The ideal solution is, of course, the most distant. This is
the grand approach, of large scale systemic change, through multilateraliza-
tion and institutionalization. These are important goals, but it is important
to see that quite a bit of progress can be made more immediately through
rethinking the private law concepts undergirding the investment regime.
Both states and arbitral tribunals can make important inroads on this score,
and both bear a certain responsibility to do so.
What can states do in the short to medium term? There are at least two
clear areas where states can do better to protect themselves: in negotiating
222. And of course the investment regime acts as a powerful shield against domestic liability. See
Chevron v. Ecuador, UNITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Partial Award on Track I (Sept. 27,
2013).
223. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 123 (trans. Talcott
Parsons, 1992).
224. The point bears repeating: if the default levels of protection remain exceedingly high, then states
will have to price such levels of protection into their contracts accordingly. It is not at all clear that
investors would want to contract for such high levels of protection if they actually had to pay for them in
the deal. And if the defaults set by BITs and FTAs are so sticky that contracting out is not feasible, it
will become very difficult for parties to negotiate an optimal level of risk in their contracts—which
would undermine the prospect of making a deal at all. This would, incidentally, frustrate a primary
purpose of BITs and FTAs: the promotion of foreign direct investment.
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contracts with foreign investors, and in negotiating, amending, and jointly
interpreting investment treaties with their treaty partners.
Most immediately, states can be more careful in their contracts with for-
eigners. They can do better to close off the risk of ex post nationality shop-
ping through careful contract drafting, and can similarly experiment with
waiving aspects of BIT protection—for example by negotiating liquidated
damages provisions. And if investors balk at such waivers, states can try to
build the risk of internationalization and investor-state arbitration into the
price of their contracts.
Though solutions on the level of contract negotiations are a start, they
will not be enough. To the extent that BITs apply to contracts at all, they
constitute packages of (mostly) default rules. It is not at all clear why the
defaults should be set so favorably for investors—a product, I suggest, of
confusing contracts with more typical forms of property like real estate. And
it is additionally unclear why the defaults should be so sticky. States need to
change their treaty obligations, either through renegotiation or—where
there is sufficient will—by advancing joint interpretations of particular
terms in existing treaties.225  States need to reset the default position in BITs
and FTAs on more balanced and nuanced terms appropriate to the law of
contracts. And they need to be clearer about when treaty defaults can be
contracted around easily, or when and why it ought to be more difficult.
What about the tribunals? Surely the responsibility for change is not all
in the state’s lap. Arbitral tribunals simply have to do better. What tribu-
nals must do is refrain from standing in the way of states’ attempts at achiev-
ing a more balanced investor-state regime. In terms of contracts, they must
take seriously attempts by the parties at negotiating waivers for various pro-
visions.226 Tribunals should not treat BITs as immutable rules in the face of
contractual bargains, and must be much more careful about treating them as
sticky defaults—especially when such stickiness functionally converts them
into mandatory provisions. Stickiness may make sense in some cases, but
there have to be reasons—and tribunals must do better about making those
reasons clear.227
225. Anthea Roberts, Recalibrating Interpretive Authority, Colum. FDI Perspectives, No. 113, Jan 20,
2014, available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_No113.pdf; see also Julian Arato, Subsequent
Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 L. &
Prac. Int’l Cts. & Tribs. 443 (2010).
226. Such was the case with regard to treatment of exclusive forum selection clause in the SGS cases.
See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Phillipines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, Decision on Juris-
diction (Jan. 29, 2004) (respecting the contract’s exclusive selection of domestic courts for the resolution
of all contractual disputes), and Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/29, Jurisdiction (Feb. 10, 2012); id., Award (Feb. 10, 2012) (displacing an identical
clause with international investor-state arbitration under the BIT); see also Crawford, supra note 214.
227. Though the Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay never made the point clearly, we might justify its
decision to replace the contract’s forum selection clause with BIT arbitration by appeal to a penalty
default with an information-sharing rationale. The Tribunal might have said that an exclusive forum
selection clause that specifically mentions waiving treaty arbitration would suffice to contract out of the
BIT right to investor-state dispute settlement, while a forum selection clause like that in the actual
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Tribunals must also respect states’ attempts to scale back the levels of
protection in their treaties. Where states sign BITs that draw back the levels
of protection inhering in FET or expropriation provisions, as in several of
the most recent Model BITs, tribunals must respect the states parties’
choices. Similarly, where states advance joint interpretations scaling back
the level of protection in already extant treaty provisions, tribunals must
respect the states parties’ interpretive authority. At a bare minimum, tribu-
nals must not stand in the way of states’ attempts at creating a more bal-
anced investment regime.
The issue of whether tribunals should walk back more settled interpreta-
tions is of course more complicated, even where these interpretations today
seem egregious. This is the thorniest question. On the one hand, states con-
tinue to re-ratify treaties even after odious interpretations have become
known to them. But on the other hand states are often stymied in their
attempts at changing treaty rules, especially given the ease of forum-shop-
ping. This question probably cannot be answered the same way for all mat-
ters of interpretation. And given the patchwork nature of the global
investment regime, we can expect that different answers will emerge across
different tribunals.
In the long term the only real solution involves multilateralization and
institutionalization. This is the only way to adjust the regime without sim-
ply falling into the trap of strategic forum shopping. Multilateralization and
institutionalization represent the best prospect for breaking the cage of to-
day’s BITs and FTAs. And distant as these prospects might seem, incentives
for large-scale change are perhaps more closely aligned than ever before. The
era when mainly investors from Western States sued while Eastern and
Southern States got sued is rapidly coming to a close.228 The large-scale
regional FTAs under negotiation between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) and between
the United States and eleven countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region
(Trans-Pacific Partnership) may prove to be the crucial testing grounds.229
contract—exclusively selecting domestic courts with no mention of international arbitration—would not
pass muster. The argument would be that while the latter was plenty explicit, requiring the maximally
explicit former approach would force the state to reveal information to investors in the contracting
process—specifically the information that a BIT exists, and that signing the contract would waive BIT
rights. This kind of penalty default would thus penalize the state unless it were upfront with the investor
about her rights.
228. Chinese multinationals’ increasing engagement with the global investment regime is doubtless
accelerating this shift. See, e.g., Ping An Life Insurance Company of China v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case
No. ARB/12/29 (involving a suit by a Chinese insurance company against Belgium, arising out of the
latter’s nationalization of a bank in which Ping An had heavily invested).
229. For Weiler, “solutions are at hand and not only for the TTIP . . . but also as a model for a whole
rethinking of the pathologies of BITs and perhaps as a micro-example for what may later be regarded as a
‘best practice’ for BIT reform and even, in the longer run, a model for a multilateral investment agree-
ment. There would be poetic justice if the two greatest trading blocs, instead of walking away from the
problem, charted an agreed functional way ahead.” Weiler, supra note 221, at 966.
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All these changes are workable and worthwhile. It is thus not impossible
that the empowerment of corporations to make law will be scaled back—to
some degree or another. Still, for now, their newfound position in global
legal space seems alarmingly secure. The phenomenon of corporations as
lawmakers is a bizarre product of a relatively obscure regime of international
law. But it is a reality with profound consequences for public values, domes-
tic and global. International law must now find a way to come to grips with
the global corporate interests that it has itself so empowered—however con-
tingent this state of affair may be.
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Investment treaties protect foreign investors who contract with sovereign states. It 
remains unclear, however, whether parties are free to contract around these treaty 
rules, or whether treaty provisions should be understood as mandatory terms that 
constrain party choice. While investment treaties clearly apply to contracts in some 
way, they are silent as to how these instruments ultimately interact. Moreover, 
arbitral jurisprudence has varied wildly on this point, creating significant problems 
of certainty, efficiency, and fairness—for states and foreign investors alike. 
 This Article reappraises the treaty/contract issue from the ex ante 
perspective of contracting states and foreign investors. I make three novel claims: 
one conceptual, one descriptive, and one normative. First, I argue that investment 
treaties must be understood as having generated a rudimentary, yet broad, law of 
contracts—governing agreements between states and foreign investors on pivotal 
issues, from substantive rights and duties, to damages and forum selection. Second, 
I argue that this emerging international law of contracts has developed 
sporadically, irregularly, and inconsistently, due in part to a tendency among 
tribunals to confuse the logics of contract and property. As a result, it remains 
undecided whether contracting parties should understand background treaty norms 
as defaults, sticky defaults, or mandatory terms—leaving the meaning of their 
contracts under a cloud of doubt. Third, I argue that the best way to resolve this 
problem for both states and investors, ex ante, is generally to privilege their 
contractual arrangements over background treaty rules. Even when these parties 
have different interests and values at stake, the treaty/contract problem is not zero-
sum. Both sides usually stand to benefit from the freedom to negotiate around treaty 
rules as mere defaults—though I explore certain cases where treaty norms might 
justifiably exert a greater pull. In general, prioritizing party choice is not only 
optimal from the economic standpoint—it also provides states with the tools to 
secure their future capacities to regulate in the public interest.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A traditional maxim of international law holds that all contracts are purely 
instruments of some domestic legal order.1 Until very recently a contract between 
a private party and a foreign state, like any contract between private parties, would 
create rights and obligations under only the domestic law chosen by the parties. 
Today, however, this maxim is no longer correct.2 Most clearly in the realm of 
sales, the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) has 
established a robust regime governing transnational contracts for the sale of goods, 
augmenting such instruments with a host of default and mandatory terms.3 More 
recently, and far more quietly, a regime of international contract law has emerged 
in the field of foreign direct investment (FDI). A great deal of international 
contracting takes place under a manifold of treaties for the protection of foreign 
investments, which augment contracts between states and foreign investors—in 
whole or in part—with international legal rules. The advent of this world of 
investment treaties has subtly brought into being a rudimentary law of contracts—
a broad complex of default and mandatory rules that alter contracts between states 
and foreign investors in relation to all kinds of questions, from the conditions of 
breach and defenses, to damages and forum selection. However, unlike the CISG, 
this emerging law of contracts has developed only sporadically, inconsistently, and 
irregularly. Contracts between states and foreign investors are no longer purely 
instruments of national law. But a better international law of contracts is essential 
if we are to remain sensitive to both the needs of foreign capital and the vitality of 
local and global public values. 
 The root of the problem is that investment treaties tend to say nothing, or 
only very little, about how they relate to contracts.4 They often clearly apply to 
contracts between states and covered foreign investors (state contracts), either 
explicitly or by evident implication.5 Some treaties even incorporate provisions that 
equate breach of a state contract with breach of the treaty (the “umbrella clause”).6 
But treaties generally do not spell out the consequences of their application to 
                                                
1. See, e.g., Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v. Serbia), Judgment, 1929 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 14, at 41 (July 12) (“Any contract which is not a contract between States in 
their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country.”). 
2. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 229-230 (2015). 
3 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264–6280 (Mar. 2 1987), 
Art. 6 (“The parties may exclude the application of the Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”) 
4. See James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 351, 360-61 
(2008); Arato, supra note , at 249.  
5. See Arato, supra note , at 249. 
6. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW 166–178 (2d ed., 2012). 
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contracts—for questions of breach, defenses, forum selection, calculating damages, 
or the whole host of terms articulating the life of any contractual agreement.7 From 
the perspective of contract theory, crucial questions remain totally unaddressed: are 
treaty rules on such matters defaults that the contracting parties can simply 
negotiate around, or are they mandatory rules that take precedence over conflicting 
contractual provisions? If mere defaults, how difficult is it for the parties to opt-
out? What level of clarity or specificity is required and why? Are the answers the 
same for all kinds of treaty provisions, or are some mandatory and some merely 
default? Are some defaults “stickier” than others? And what about the parties’ 
contractual choice of law—what is the proper relationship between the demands of 
the treaty and the whole host of rules selected by the parties by implication, through 
their choice of law clause? 
 The broad problem can be illustrated through a simplified hypothetical. 
Assume that two countries, Acadia and Ruritania, have established a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT), to promote and protect the flow of investment across their 
territories. The treaty lists contracts as covered investments, along with real 
property, intellectual property, and so on. It further guarantees foreign investors 
against expropriation, requiring that an expropriating state compensate the investor 
for the “fair market value” of her loss. As will be discussed below, in contract cases 
this standard of damages is generally taken to mean expectation damages.8 By 
contrast, assume that the Ruritanian law of public contracts only guarantees 
investors reasonable reliance damages when the state breaches—so as not to bind 
the government’s hands if future regulatory exigencies arise.9 An Acadian investor 
contracts with the government of Ruritania to operate a dolomite quarry for twenty 
years. The contract comes under Ruritanian law, and makes no express mention of 
damages. Ten years into the deal, Ruritania cancels the contract, citing newly 
discovered environmental concerns about dolomite mining. Assuming an 
expropriation occurred, which standard of damages controls? The domestic 
standard (reliance damages), or the treaty standard (expectation damages)? And 
what if the parties had included a provision in their contract expressly limiting 
                                                
7. The closest these treaties come to defining their relationship to contracts is by requiring investor-
state tribunals to apply both national law (contract) and international law (treaty), with priority to 
the latter in case of conflict. See Crawford, supra note , at 353. But this conflicts rule only applies 
if treaty provisions are presumed mandatory. See id. Express contract terms would not properly 
“conflict” with diverging defaults. See Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract 1-2 (Coase-Sandor 
Inst. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No.33, 1995). For a clear example of this relationship in 
international law, private parties are expressly empowered to contract around most provisions of the 
CISG – a multilateral treaty enacted exclusively by states. See CISG, supra note ___, Art. 6. (“The 
parties,” meaning the private parties to a covered sales contract, “may exclude the application of 
this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”).  
8. See infra Part II.B. 
9. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 957-58 (2011); see also Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: 
Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, SOUTH. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L. REV. 467 
(1999). 
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damages (liquidated damages)? Surprisingly, international investment law does not 
adequately resolve these questions. 
 This Article grapples with the treaty/contract problem systematically, as a 
question of contract theory. I argue that privileging party-choice in the context of 
transnational investment contracts is the best way to protect both the private law 
values of fairness and efficiency and the state’s capacity to govern in the public 
interest.  
 From the ex ante perspective of contracting states and foreign investors, the 
ultimate relationship between treaty and contract will be of fundamental 
importance. As a purely commercial matter, the relative rigidity or flexibility of the 
treaty regime will bear strongly on the parties’ ability to negotiate efficiently. At 
the same time, as a political matter, these questions will determine whether and how 
a state desiring foreign direct investment might effectively work protections for its 
future capacity to regulate into its contractual arrangements with foreign investors. 
Thus it is unsettling that the treaty/contract relationship remains generally 
undecided and, moreover, that it is so often decided the wrong way. 
 Uncertainty is the more glaring problem. It is clearly undesirable for all 
parties if, ex ante, they cannot predict whether tribunals will give effect to their 
contractual efforts to opt out of treaty rules ex post. Yet, in the face of treaty silence 
on the treaty/contract issue, arbitral jurisprudence has been highly uneven and 
irregular—often resolving these questions merely on the level of assumptions.10 As 
a result, the meaning of state contracts in the world of investment treaties remains 
under a cloud of doubt. 
 But the deeper problem is that tribunals too often slip into an overly rigid 
and formalistic approach, prioritizing treaty provisions over duly negotiated 
contractual bargains.11 This tendency is usually bad policy, with negative 
implications for both states and investors. It undercuts the autonomy of the parties, 
thereby undermining their capacity to allocate risk as they see fit. For the investor, 
this means risks associated with the viability and profitability of the project. States 
share those commercial concerns, but also bear responsibility for the full range of 
non-commercial values of import in their respective societies. States negotiating 
investment contracts thus have to seriously manage the risk that any such project 
might create future regulatory chill. In other words, the tendency of arbitral 
tribunals to implicitly prioritize treaty norms over states’ and investors’ contractual 
arrangements ultimately reduces both parties’ ex ante flexibility to negotiate 
efficiently; at the same time, it weakens the state’s capacity to define the scope of 
its potential future liability under an investment treaty through contract, which risks 
damaging the flow of foreign capital in the long run—the very goal that investment 
treaties are meant to achieve. 
 Much of the confusion arises out of the fact that investment treaties apply 
to both foreign-owned property and contracts between states and foreign investors, 
                                                
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See infra Part III. 
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without drawing much of a distinction between these categories. Investment treaties 
are designed and interpreted with property protection in mind—a Blackstonian 
vision of property law, oriented around fixed rules for particular assets.12 For 
example, they classically protect foreign-owned real and personal property from 
expropriation, and other forms of interference. But these treaties typically apply to 
a much broader, open-ended category of “investments,” including contracts 
between sovereigns and foreign investors.13 What does it mean for a treaty to afford 
protection to a contract? 
 By contrast to property, the logic of contract is normally oriented around 
party choice. Parties choose the basic rules that bind them. To the extent that 
contracts are supplemented by default rules, or even altered by mandatory 
provisions under a particular domestic legal order, the goal is usually to give better 
effect to what the parties wanted,14 or to impute what they would have wanted had 
they considered an issue.15 Of course national laws of contract occasionally entail 
certain mandatory rules and sticky defaults that protect important areas of public 
policy rather than party choice—and some nations more than others.16 But in 
essence, if the law of property is the realm of fixed categories and rigid rules, the 
law of contract is the realm of flexibility and choice.17 One might think that, to the 
extent investment treaties apply to contracts at all, they would do so in a way 
tailored toward effectuating the parties’ contractual arrangements. Yet investment 
treaties are often interpreted as applying to contracts in much the same way as they 
apply to property, imposing rules that take precedence over provisions agreed to by 
the contracting parties. Quite apart from the issue of uncertainty, this kind of 
rigidity poses significant problems for states and investors alike. 
 This Article makes three main claims: one conceptual, one descriptive, and 
one normative. Conceptually, I argue that investment treaties create contract law—
if only informally. Their merits, in this regard, thus have to be analyzed and 
assessed in terms of contract theory. Critically, the treaty/contract issue cannot be 
                                                
12. See Arato, supra note , at 234, 238 & n.33. See generally Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 
VA. J. INT’L L., 397, 406 (2010). 
13. See Arato, supra note , at 231; Yackee, supra note , at 402-03. 
14. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 57-73 
(2d ed. 2015). 
15. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 
1603, 1631–33 (2009); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (advancing the concept of 
“penalty defaults,” which set background rules at levels the parties would not have wanted in order 
to incentivize parties to contract out—for example, to reveal information).  
16. HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS (forthcoming 
2017). 
17. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 83-84 (2011). 
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properly understood without taking into account the ex ante perspective of the 
parties to an investment contract. It matters to contracting parties whether or not 
they are able to contract around treaty rules. Formalities aside, it must be 
understood that the resolution of the treaty/contract question will have a deep 
material effect on the meaning of any state contract negotiated against the 
background of an applicable investment treaty. These effects must be understood 
(and evaluated) from the point of view of those economic operators whose activity 
investment treaties seek to stimulate: foreign investors and states.18 This 
perspectival shift helps illuminate the deep indeterminacy in the arbitral 
jurisprudence on the treaty/contract issue, and reveals a better path.  
 This Article’s descriptive claim is that, in the face of treaty silence, answers 
to these questions have been few, irregular, and generally thinly justified. Arbitral 
tribunals have come down on all sides of this issue, privileging treaty over contract 
here, and contract over treaty there.19 If anything, tribunals slightly tend toward the 
former position—but they usually resolve the issue only implicitly. I argue that, as 
things stand, the vagaries surrounding the treaty/contract issue create real problems 
of predictability, efficiency, and fairness that are now beginning to come to light in 
practice.  
 Normatively, I argue that the prevailing interpretive tendency to subordinate 
contractual choice to treaty rules is usually bad policy.20 It creates unjustified 
impediments on the state’s ability to regulate, which in turn impedes both states’ 
and investors’ capacity to negotiate and contract efficiently ex ante. All this 
potentially hinders the very flow of foreign capital that investment treaties are 
meant to induce. I contend that, as a general principle, states and foreign investors 
should be able to freely contract around treaty rules—left, in other words, to 
manage their respective risks as they see fit. While there may be some cases where 
treaty rules should be difficult, or even impossible, to contract around, such 
instances must be carefully justified—either in terms of values immanent to the 
logic of contract (like information sharing), or external values (like environmental 
protection).  
 This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by exploring the meaning of 
a contract, and attempts to analytically separate a number of ways in which we 
might think about the relationship between investment treaties and the contracts to 
which they apply. I start from the position that any contract is a complex legal 
instrument, often going far beyond its express terms. The codified choices of the 
                                                
18. Cf., mutatis mutandis, Panel Report, U.S.—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶¶ 7.81–
7.82, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301](indicating, in the 
context of the WTO, that in interpreting a “treaty the benefits of which depend in part on the activity 
of individual operators,” an interpreter must take the perspective of such operators into account in 
order to give effect to the treaty’s object and purpose). Indeed, the Section 301 Panel noted that in 
the WTO/GATT context “the rationale in all types of cases has always been the negative effect on 
economic operators”). Id., ¶ 7.84. 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Part III. 
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parties are always supplemented by a great many default and mandatory provisions, 
drawn from the applicable “law of contracts.” I argue that thinking in terms of 
default rules, sticky defaults, and mandatory terms provides the right rubric for 
understanding the possible interactions between investment treaties and state 
contracts. 
 Part II examines how investment tribunals have approached these questions 
in practice, and how they have justified their approaches (if at all). I focus 
principally on rules relating to the protection of investor expectations, damages, 
and forum selection. In each area it will become apparent that answers have been 
inconsistent, irregular, and almost always left implicit. However, the tribunals tend 
to assume that treaty rules are effectively mandatory, or at least highly sticky.  
 Part III advances a normative argument about how the treaty/contract issue 
ought to be approached, when left ambiguous by the treaty text. I argue that, in 
general, the principle ought to be that explicit contractual terms trump treaty 
provisions as the authentic expression of the contracting parties’ division of risk. 
As a matter of treaty interpretation, the presumption that treaties create mere 
defaults hews closest to the object and purpose of investment treaties as a matter of 
international law—namely, to protect and promote foreign direct investment. 
Moreover, there are strong policy reasons for understanding most treaty rules as 
mere defaults based in both the structure of private law (like efficiency and party 
autonomy) and extrinsic public values (such as public health, the environment, and 
the state’s capacity to regulate and to control its liability for major privatization 
projects more generally). Yet all this should only be taken as a presumption. There 
may be good reasons why, in certain cases, treaty rules ought to be understood as 
sticky defaults—even when the treaty text gives no indication one way or the other. 
Here I explore the possibility that the forum selection clause makes a good 
candidate. But, crucially, I argue that in all such cases adjudicators must justify 
constraining the principle of choice in light of the values of international investment 
law—a regime best understood as a system of private law sensitive to public values. 
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VALUES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
This Part briefly considers the meaning of a contract in both domestic and 
transnational legal orders. I first distinguish between formal and material 
conceptions of the contract, in the context of diverse background rules in national 
legal systems. Second, I examine the meaning of a contract within the transnational 
system of international investment law, distinguishing between the logics of 
property and contract. I then provide an ideal-typical schema for exploring the 
possible relationships between treaty and contract to frame the analysis in the 
descriptive and normative Parts that follow.  
A. The Material Contract: Defaults, Sticky Defaults, and Mandatory Rules 
As Robert Scott puts it, the explicit terms of any contract reflect only the tip of the 
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iceberg.21 In all national legal orders, contracts are formally (and sometimes 
informally) augmented by a manifold of legal rules, covering all kinds of potential 
price terms—from basic obligations like good faith, defenses, and damages to 
procedural rights like forum selection.22 The full meaning of a contract can only be 
appreciated in light of a host of regulatory, legislative, and constitutional rules that 
affect its disposition.23 
 Though the parties may not have explicitly negotiated over the apposite 
background rules, all such terms must be considered part of the deal—and 
sophisticated parties will have to take this edifice into account ex ante in their 
negotiations. For an example from U.S. law, if a domestic company contracts with 
the City of Chicago to set up municipal parking meters, the private party will want 
to know whether the government retains the right to back out of the contract, or to 
vitiate its value through regulatory action.24 Absent any explicit agreement by the 
parties, the background rules of the Illinois law of public contracts will obviously 
affect the terms of the deal, and will have to either be priced in or contracted around. 
Similarly, even if the government is not entitled to simply back out, the investor 
will want to consider whether any special rules about public contracts entitle the 
city to pay only limited damages in case of regulatory breach.25 As it happens, in 
many domestic systems, including the United States, the law of public contracts 
subjects states only to reliance damages by default—not expectation damages.26 
Such background rules on damages are price terms, which sophisticated private 
parties must either stomach, price in, or contract around through express language 
on indemnification for regulatory change. 
 Not all background rules relate to contracts in the same way. Ian Ayres 
usefully distinguishes between defaults, sticky defaults, or mandatory rules.27 
Classically, default rules supplement contracts and fill gaps, and parties are free to 
contract around them.28 Mandatory rules, by contrast, cannot be contracted 
                                                
21. Scott uses this turn of phrase in his lectures. For the core idea, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. 
Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 133 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003). 
22. Ayres & Gertner, supra note , at 88. 
23. Id. at 87-88. 
24. See Serkin, supra note , at 895. 
25. See id. at 916. 
26. Id. 
27. Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 
2084 (2012). 
28. Id. at 2034. 
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around.29 Sticky defaults lie somewhere in between.30 They can be contracted 
around, but doing so requires more concerted action than with ordinary defaults—
typically some requirement of clear statement, or via the adoption of certain 
formalities in the contract.31 
 Mandatory rules are only justifiable where they protect some value, which 
might be intrinsic to the logic of contract (like equality of information, or the 
protection of unsophisticated parties)32 or extrinsic public goods (like the 
prohibition on slavery).33 Like mandatory rules, sticky defaults are meant to protect 
certain values—though to a weaker degree.34 Typically, the values concerned here 
are relational, and would not be undercut if informed and sophisticated parties were 
to opt out.35 Moreover, sticky defaults may be more or less difficult to contract 
around. Some may be subject only to clear statement rules.36 Others might be 
stickier, requiring parties to use special language.37 For example, in cases where 
parties are likely to have asymmetric information, stickiness can have the function 
of forcing better informed parties to disclose information to their counterparties by 
insisting that attempts to contract out must use language that discloses the necessary 
information.38 In general, however, mandatory rules and sticky defaults are the 
exception.39 Absent compelling justification in intrinsic or extrinsic values, it is 
generally best to leave it to the parties to allocate risk and price amongst themselves 
as they see fit—choice is, after all, the central fundament of contract, key to the 
core private law values of autonomy, utility, and community.40 
 In transnational contracts the situation becomes more complex in a number 
of ways. First, it should be recognized that investment contracts are not always 
negotiated under the law of the host state; often the parties negotiate over the law 
of the contract by incorporating a “choice of law” provision.41 The parties’ choice 
                                                
29. Id. at 2087. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note , at ch. 10. 
33. Craswell, supra note , at 1-2. 
34. Ayres, supra note , at 2084. 
35. Id. at 2088. 
36. Id. at 2037.  
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 2062. 
39. Id. at 2087-88. 
40. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note . 
41. George A. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial 
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of law dictates, in the first cut, which national law will apply to their contract, 
thereby filling gaps through default rules, and potentially augmenting its express 
terms via sticky defaults and mandatory terms.42 Still, so far, the situation is still 
basically similar to the above. 
 Second, such contracts may come under the ambit of an international treaty, 
which imposes its own set of default rules – as with transnational sales contracts 
coming under the ambit of the eighty-four party CISG. That multilateral treaty 
expressly imposes its own set of (mostly default) background contract terms, which 
displace any conflicting defaults or mandatory terms in the national law of the 
contract. Private contracting parties are still able to contract around the CISG if 
they do so explicitly – hardly anything in it is mandatory.  
Given the multiplicity of legal orders involved, things are already more complex – 
but at least in the context of the CISG the basic structure and hierarchy of norms is 
clear. The meaning of any covered sales contract can only be ascertained by careful 
analysis of the express terms of the contract (in the first instance), as supplemented 
by a web of background terms found in the CISG, and with any remaining gaps 
filled by the national law of the contract. 
 Investment treaties provide a more vexing wrinkle. Insofar as an investment 
treaty applies to contracts between the state and a foreign investor, it becomes—
like the CISG—an additional source of background rules.43 As with transnational 
sales contracts, any such investment contract may be augmented by defaults and 
mandatory provisions arising out of two legal orders—the chosen domestic law of 
the contract, and any opposable international investment treaty. The problem, here, 
is that it is not at all clear how investment treaties, national contract law, and express 
contract terms are supposed to interact.  
 What is clear is that these relationships matter to states and investors alike. 
The bottom line is that, from the ex ante perspective of the contracting parties, any 
background treaty rules that apply to the contract must be considered materially 
part of the deal. Without clarity as how such treaties and contracts will ultimately 
relate, it is impossible for contracting states and investors to know just what kind 
of legal arrangements they are getting into. 
B. Property and Contract in International Investment Law 
One major source of the confusion surrounding the treaty/contract question arises 
out of the treaties themselves. In extending their coverage to a wide range of 
“investments,” these treaties tend to muddy the lines between contract, classical 
                                                
Agreements, 3 INT’L TRADE L.J. 311, 311 (1978). 
42. Id. 
43. Investment Treaties, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
http://www.iisd.org/investment/law/treaties.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8CN-V3ER] (last visited Apr. 
6, 2016). 
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forms of property, and myriad other assets.44  
 Investment treaties are agreements between two or more states, governing 
interactions between each state and foreign private parties hailing from the 
other(s).45 Their twin purposes are to protect foreign investors’ assets and promote 
foreign direct investment (FDI).46 They codify a number of basic protections, 
framed largely in the style of property rules—in particular guarantees against 
expropriation and standards like “fair and equitable treatment” (FET).47 These 
protections are generally explicitly or implicitly linked to rules on damages.48 
Investment treaties also create important procedural protections for investors. 
Critically, they endow private investors with the capacity to sue states directly 
before international arbitral tribunals (investor-state dispute settlement), and they 
key into powerful mechanisms for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.49 Put 
another way, investment treaties seek to promote foreign direct investment by 
mitigating three typical areas of risk: the risk that a host state will afford insufficient 
protection to the investment as time goes on; risks associated with suing a sovereign 
state, as a foreigner, before its own courts; and the risk that, upon losing at litigation, 
a state will simply refuse to pay up. 
 Though framed as treaties establishing rules for the protection of foreign 
property—in other words, property law—these treaties apply to a surprisingly 
broad range of assets, including not only real and personal property, but also 
intellectual property, going concerns, and a vast range of contracts with the state 
(state contracts).50 There has been some debate about the extent of these treaties’ 
scope.51 But there has been precious little discussion about whether they apply to 
                                                
44 Arato, supra note ___, at 271. For a rare counter-example, see Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, et al. 
v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 267-270 (July 8, 2016) 
[hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay] (carefully distinguishing the trademarks at issue from 
classical real property, finding that, unlike the latter, the former generally do not include rights of 
use insulated from state action); and at ¶ 423 (distinguishing between trademarks and contracts, for 
purposes of determining the content of legitimate expectations protected under FET).  
45. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note , at 13. 
46. Id., at 22, 29-30. 
47. Id., at 13. 
48. Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. 88-89 
(2012), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SP7-FB9H]. 
49. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note , at 310. 
50. Id., at 62-63. 
51. See Poštová Banka, A.S. v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award, ¶ 333 (Apr. 
9, 2015) (sovereign debt did not qualify as a covered asset); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 93 (Feb. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter SGS v. Paraguay] (noting that a one-off contract for the sale of goods might not 
qualify as an investment).  
129
J. Arato / Logic of Contract 
Forthcoming: Wm & Mary L. Rev. (2016) 13 
all covered assets in precisely the same way.52 
 Here we are concerned with contracts specifically, and to draw out the 
treaty/contract problem it is enough to contrast the basic orientation of contract law 
with the law of real property. Here I put to the side the normative, substantive 
question of how far these treaties ought to protect foreign property rights,53 and 
focus only on the form of that protection. Whatever we think about the content of 
the various substantive and procedural treaty standards, it is fairly clear that they 
are meant to apply to foreign property holdings in much the same way that national 
property law would. Investment treaties afford a set of consistent protections to 
foreign property owners, in order to mitigate certain risks and induce FDI. In the 
context of property, it makes sense that these protections are relatively certain, 
rigid, and stable. This resonates well with the logic of property, where a putative 
investor relies on a received regime of property law in planning an investment, for 
example in land development.54 The law of property affords only limited space for 
investors to choose how the law will apply to their holdings.55 Investors may have 
options, but property law places little emphasis on choice.56 The rules are not 
generally up for discussion—they just have to be known (or knowable) in advance. 
 The logic of contract has a different orientation. Here, the general principle 
is that parties have the capacity to regulate themselves—to negotiate, and allocate 
risk as they see fit.57 True, as explained above, they do so against a complex 
                                                
52. This Article represents part of a broader project, in which I seek to disaggregate how investment 
treaties are applied to different categories of investment, in light of the varied values that different 
corners of private law seek to promote. See Arato, supra note , at 247, 292 (regarding contract and 
property). See also Zachary Douglas, Property, Investment, and the Scope of Investment Protection 
Obligations, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE 363 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge Viñuales, eds., 2014) (distinguishing 
between property, contract, and value as different categories of investment); Rochelle Dreyfuss & 
Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International Law is Reconceptualizing 
Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 560 (2015) (exploring how investment treaties seem 
to “propertize” IP); but see Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, ¶¶ 267-270 
(distinguishing trademarks from classical forms of property). 
53. As I have suggested elsewhere, arbitral tribunals have tended to assume an overly rigid 
“Blackstonian” vision of property in interpreting investment treaties, which may well go too far 
toward displacing the state’s capacity to define the scope of property rights. See Arato, supra note , 
at 247. It is certainly up for debate whether the dominant conception of property in arbitral 
jurisprudence affords states sufficient flexibility, or—more crudely—whether investment treaties 
afford too much substantive protection to foreign property. However, these questions necessitate 
going too far afield for present purposes, and I confine a more systematic treatment of the concept 
of property in international investment law to a future paper. 
54. Id. at 238 n.33. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 286. 
57. Scott & Schwartz, supra note __, at 87–88; Dagan & Heller, supra note ___, at ___; Arato, supra 
note ___, at 238 n.33. 
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background of norms—which fills gaps, and occasionally nudges parties to contract 
in certain ways (sticky defaults) or even forces them to do so (mandatory rules).58 
But the basic principle is that parties get to choose how to govern their relations.  
 While it is perfectly clear how investment treaties apply to foreign property 
holdings, it is much less obvious how their varied provisions ought to act on a 
contract between a foreigner and a state. Clearly treaties apply to contracts, but it 
remains unclear whether and to what extent their provisions should augment 
contractual arrangements between the parties—or even displace them. The issue is 
almost invariably undecided in the treaties, and is too often overlooked when it 
comes to arbitration.59 
 As will be discussed further in Part III, there are two main harms here. The 
first is more glaring—the jurisprudence on this issue is highly irregular and 
inconsistent, leaving significant uncertainty about the meaning of contracts 
between states and foreign investors where an investment treaty applies. Even 
assuming perfect rationality among states and foreign investors, such uncertainty 
provides a serious hurdle to efficient contracting and makes it extremely difficult 
for states to manage potential risks to their regulatory autonomy. The second 
potential harm lies in making the wrong choice about how treaties and contracts 
ought to interact. Too often tribunals simply assume that treaties apply to contracts 
as they would to any other asset: on the property model.60 In other words, there is 
a tendency in investor-state jurisprudence to treat contracts as assets subject to a 
fixed set of treaty rules.61 As I argue in Part III, this confusion creates significant 
inefficiencies that harm both states and investors.  
C. How Might Treaty and Contract Relate? 
The starting point cannot be overstated: as soon as we decide that an investment 
treaty applies to contracts, we create an international law of contracts—even if only 
partial, thin, and rudimentary. This much international investment law has already 
done. What remains to determine is what kind of law of contracts it is: whether this 
regime should be understood as thin or thick, rudimentary or sophisticated; and 
                                                
58. See Ayres, supra note , at 2084. 
59. Crawford and Abi-Saab are among the few authorities to have recognized the problem. See 
Crawford, supra note , at 352–53; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata, et. al v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits, Dissenting Opinion 
of Georges Abi-Saab, ¶ 32 (Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips, Abi-Saab Dissent] (“a treaty 
claim is necessarily based on a right that has been allegedly violated. If that right is created by 
contract, it is this contract that governs its legal existence and the modalities of this existence, 
including its contents and limits”) (emphasis added). Abi-Saab adds, “to assert, as does the Majority, 
that the treaty applies, without taking into consideration the terms of the contract, amounts to 
revising and rewriting the contract.” Id., ¶ 32. 
60. Arato, supra note , at 231. 
61. Id. at 271. 
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what values such choices might serve. As the next Part will suggest, these choices 
remain very much open, thanks to vague treaty language and highly varied 
jurisprudence. But before turning to the cases, it is worth conceptually schematizing 
the possible relationships between treaty and contract, to organize our analysis 
going forward. 
 In assessing how treaty and contract might interact, what matters are the 
material relationships. We must not only look at the treaty terms that are formally 
applicable to contracts, but to any provisions that materially affect the disposition 
of the contractual deal—even if only implicitly. The most obvious formal provision 
is the “umbrella clause” which equates most breaches of contract with a breach of 
the treaty.62 But provisions guaranteeing investors fair and equitable treatment 
(FET), or protecting their assets from regulatory takings (“indirect expropriation”) 
can also strongly affect the disposition of the contract—for example by protecting 
an investor’s expectations, by providing more favorable measures of damages than 
might be available under the law of the contract, or by providing access to 
advantageous international fora.63 What matters from the ex ante point of view of 
the contracting parties, and what should matter from the point of view of dispute 
settlers ex post, is the material scope of the deal. 
 Schematically there are four types of relationships available between a 
treaty provision and a contract. The first possibility is that a treaty rule has no effect 
on any contractual provision. The latter totally contracts out of the former. Here the 
explicit terms of the contract take precedence, as do all default and mandatory terms 
incorporated therein through the choice of law provision. The entire meaning of the 
agreement is determined by domestic law, except in the rare instance where the 
treaty fills gaps left by both the express contract and domestic background rules. 
Note that this is close to the position that the treaty does not apply to the contract 
at all, and most forcefully separates the logic of contract from the logic of property 
rules. It is, however, difficult to square with the text of most treaties, which 
generally indicate clearly that they apply to contracts in some way—as covered 
investments. 
 The second possibility is that a treaty rule does not trump any express choice 
by the parties, but may augment background rules in the relations between the 
parties. By this view, the treaty rule supplants any conflicting background rules set 
by the domestic law of the contract, but still only fills gaps in any particular 
contract.64 The parties can contract out of the treaty rule with no added difficulty. 
                                                
62. Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRADE INNOVATIONS 102 
(2008), https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/40471535.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/42V8-LFGJ]. 
63. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
7, 11-12 (2013). 
64. See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 169 (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SGS v. Philippines] (finding 
that the contracting parties had contracted around the treaty provision providing for investor-state 
arbitration). Crawford and Douglas come closest to this view in discussing exclusive forum selection 
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The CISG explicitly adopts this approach for transnational sales contracts.65 I 
suggest, below, that most of the time this also represents the better approach in the 
law of foreign direct investment—most resonant with both the goals of investment 
treaties and the logic of contract. 
 The third possibility is that a treaty rule creates a sticky default, which 
parties can contract around only under certain conditions—typically via requiring 
certain formalities, or a clear statement rule.66 For example if a treaty makes 
international arbitration available as a forum for resolving disputes, it might be held 
that the contracting parties can only waive the treaty rule if they do so in a certain 
way. The rule might require an exceptionally clear waiver.67 An even stickier rule 
would require specific language to validate a waiver—that is by only recognizing 
waivers of BIT jurisdiction that mention the treaty by name.68 
 Fourth, a treaty term might impose a mandatory rule that cannot be waived 
under any circumstances. Few argue explicitly that investment treaty provisions are 
fully mandatory, though occasionally commentators have explored whether it 
might not be possible to waive treaty protection by contract in toto.69 However, this 
kind of thinking is implicit in some of the cases, discussed further below, in which 
tribunals make assumptions that effectively render treaty provisions impossible to 
contract around. 
 Note that these categories are ideal types. There is no reason why answers 
need be the same for all treaty rules. But it is essential that the relationship between 
treaty and contract be certain and predictable vis-à-vis any particular treaty 
provision. Otherwise it becomes extremely difficult for contracting parties to plan 
ex ante. To that end, the ideal solution would be to clarify how each treaty norm 
relates to contracts in the treaty text – as is done in the CISG.70 Note, however, that 
this would call for the amendment of thousands of treaties. What follows is thus 
primarily an argument for how adjudicators ought to approach the treaty/contract 
in the face of treaty silence. At the same time, it serves as a normative argument for 
how treaty drafters might best address the issue in tomorrow’s treaties.  
 In the next Part, I suggest that tribunals have varied markedly in answering 
this question—usually without even considering the issue explicitly. This 
                                                
clauses. Crawford, supra note , at 363; Douglas, supra note , at 363. 
65 CISG, supra note , art. 6. 
66. See Ayres, supra note , at 2048 (discussing sticky defaults in domestic law). 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 2048-49. 
69. See S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration: Wa(i)ve of the Future?, 29 
ICSID REV. 690, 691 (2014); Bart Smit Duijzenkunst, Of Rights and Powers: Waiving Investment 
Treaty Protection, EJILTALK!, http://www.ejiltalk.org/of-rights-and-powers-waiving-investment-
treaty-protection/ [https://perma.cc/H27K-QZ9P]. 
70 CISG, supra note , at art. 6. 
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irregularity poses a serious harm for both states and investors as they seek to 
structure investment deals ex ante. The cases do, however, suggest a tendency 
toward privileging treaty over contract. In Part III, I argue against this tendency, 
and conclude that the general rule should be respect for party choice—a baseline 
that best serves the interests of both investors and states. However, I suggest that 
this rule must be nuanced and flexible, and I explore the possibility that in limited 
cases sticky defaults and mandatory rules may be appropriate where justifiable in 
light of compelling intrinsic or extrinsic values.  
II. IRREGULARITIES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN INVESTOR-STATE JURISPRUDENCE 
This Part examines how investment tribunals have approached the relationship 
between contract and treaty in practice, and how they have justified their 
approaches (if at all). To illustrate the uncertainty of the adjudicative status quo, I 
focus on three specific provisions found in most treaties: forum selection, the 
substantive guarantee of fair and equitable treatment (FET), and damages. Answers 
to the treaty/contract question have been inconsistent and irregular within and 
across each term. Any of these provisions may be price terms—and potentially 
important ones—relating to common questions over which contracting parties 
regularly consider and dicker over in their negotiations. Nevertheless, investment 
treaties are almost invariably silent on how their terms interact with contracts, and 
tribunals have been highly inconsistent and unclear in grappling with these 
questions. At most, it appears that tribunals tend to assume that treaty rules are 
either mandatory or highly sticky—a tendency I challenge directly in Part III. 
A. Forum Selection 
Forum selection provides the clearest example of how tribunals have diverged on 
the relationship between treaty and contract. As it happens, tribunals have given 
closer attention to the relationship on this issue than in any other context. This is 
largely because the leading cases have turned on a relatively uncommon investment 
treaty provision known as the “umbrella clause,” which has the effect of elevating 
contract claims to the level of treaty claims.71 Disputes under such clauses 
necessarily put the treaty/contract issue front and center. I discuss these 
controversial provisions in further detail elsewhere.72 As generally understood, 
umbrella clauses transform at least some kinds of contractual promises between 
                                                
71. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 54-56 (Oct. 12, 2005) 
[hereinafter Noble Ventures]. Note that this question need not arise exclusively with regard to the 
umbrella clause—it can and does arise in FET and expropriation cases as well. See, e.g., CMS Gas, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 296-303. 
72. Arato, supra note , at 251–58. 
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states and investors into obligations actionable under the treaty.73 For our purposes, 
the issue is what happens when those underlying contracts include exclusive forum 
selection clauses, limiting jurisdiction to the national courts of the host state. 
 The leading cases here are SGS v. Philippines and SGS v. Paraguay—which, 
conveniently, involved the same company, similar contracts, and similar facts. Each 
of the contracts was executed under the law of the host state, and each contract 
provided that the local courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over any disputes 
over the contracts.74 In each case, the main dispute concerned the failure of the state 
to pay substantial contractual fees, and, in each instance, the company ignored the 
contract’s exclusive forum selection clause, seeking relief instead through investor-
state arbitration by appeal to Switzerland’s BIT with each host state.75 
 Both tribunals faced the same tension.76 On the one hand, the umbrella 
clause expressly elevates contracts to the level of the treaty, creating arbitral 
jurisdiction under the treaty’s dispute resolution clause. On the other hand, the 
contracts themselves expressly disclaimed any jurisdiction other than that of 
national courts. Each tribunal had to consider which provision controlled. 
 SGS v. Philippines provides a nuanced and uncommonly well-reasoned 
authority on the treaty/contract issue. Most importantly, it found that the umbrella 
clause only imposed an international legal obligation to perform, and converted the 
consequences of non-performance into an issue of international law. In the 
Tribunal’s view, the umbrella clause 
 
makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe 
binding commitments, including contractual commitments, which it 
has assumed with regard to specific investments. But it does not 
convert the issue of the extent or content of such obligations into an 
issue of international law.77 
 
According to the Tribunal, the scope of these contractual commitments can only be 
ascertained in light of the contract’s terms, supplemented by the default and 
mandatory rules of the law of the contract—that is, municipal law.78 And, where 
the contract provides for an exclusive forum to resolve all contractual disputes, the 
existence of a breach and the amount of damage thereby caused can only be 
                                                
73. Id.; see, e.g., Noble Ventures, ICSID Case NO. ARB/01/11, ¶ 53. 
74. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 34 (Feb. 12, 2010); 
SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 22 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
75. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶¶ 125-176; SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 67. 
76. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 125; SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/6, ¶ 92. 
77. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 128. 
78. Id. 
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authoritatively determined by the contractually provided forum.79 Forum selection 
is, after all, part of the deal—a price term that could have been negotiated non-
exclusively but, here, was not. Noting that the contract provided exclusively for 
local court jurisdiction, the Tribunal issued a stay.80 It held the claim inadmissible 
until such a time as the company submitted its claim before the Philippines courts 
and the latter rendered an authoritative judgment. Only then would the state’s 
compliance become a matter of international law.81 
 Six years later, SGS v. Paraguay departed from SGS v. Philippines on this 
issue, privileging the treaty provision providing investors with access to investor-
state arbitral jurisdiction over the contract’s exclusive forum selection clause opting 
for domestic courts.82 The Tribunal’s key assumption was that treaty and contract 
could be kept wholly discrete.83 The Tribunal held that, once covered as an 
investment,   state contract would simultaneously create both domestic legal rights 
and international legal rights under the treaty.84 In the Tribunal’s view it had no 
jurisdiction over the former, but it asserted full jurisdiction over the latter.85 And, 
unlike SGS v. Philippines, it viewed the contract’s exclusive forum selection clause 
as no bar to adjudicating the treaty claims.86 For the Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay, 
the umbrella clause required it to determine the disposition of the international legal 
rights generated by the covered contract, irrespective of the disposition of the 
national legal rights under the municipal law of the contract.87 In its view, even an 
express, exclusive forum selection clause choosing local courts for the 
determination of all contractual disputes would only affect jurisdiction over the 
national legal rights generated by the contract—without affecting the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction over any and all claims of breach under the treaty.88 
 From the ex ante perspective of the parties to an investment contract, these 
cases differ markedly in their bearing on the parties’ contractual autonomy. Under 
                                                
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 175. 
81. Id. ¶ 128. 
82. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 131, 138-142 (Feb. 
12, 2010). 
83. Id. ¶¶ 177-184. 
84. Id. ¶¶ 167, 176, 181. 
85. Id. ¶ 130. 
86. Id. ¶ 174. 
87. Id. ¶ 175 & n.104. 
88. Id. ¶¶ 142, 174. Ultimately, the Tribunal ruled against the State on the merits—finding the State 
responsible for several breaches of contract, rejecting its contractual defenses, and assigning 
damages totaling $39 million plus interest. Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of 
Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Award, ¶¶ 182–184, 188 (Feb. 10, 2012). 
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the rule adopted by SGS v. Paraguay and others like it, treaty provisions offering 
investors access to investor-state arbitral jurisdiction attain something like 
mandatory status.89 Even when the treaty claim at issue arises directly out of the 
underlying contract, via the umbrella clause, express and exclusive contract terms 
on forum selection will not displace the treaty’s provision on dispute settlement. 
Rather, on this view, the treaty forum (or fora) will be available irrespective of the 
parties’ arrangements—a point which would be of obvious significance to parties 
negotiating contracts under the ambit of investment treaties. The approach in cases 
like SGS v. Philippines, by contrast, hews much more closely toward the 
arrangements negotiated by the contracting parties.90 On this reading, treaty 
provisions on dispute resolution represent only a default, which can be contracted 
around via clear express language in the contract.91 
 The treaty/contract issue surrounding forum selection is not limited to 
umbrella clause cases. It has emerged in numerous cases invoking the standard 
substantive protections like expropriation and FET, though rarely as explicitly as 
the SGS cases. Of these, the very recent Crystallex Award represents an important 
precedent.92 
 Crystallex charts a clear middle ground between SGS v. Philippines and 
SGS v. Paraguay. This Tribunal acknowledged that it might be possible for parties 
to contract out of treaty dispute resolution, but it imposed a heavy burden of clarity 
on any contracting parties attempting to do so. If SGS v. Paraguay viewed treaty 
dispute resolution as effectively mandatory, and SGS v. Philippines understood it 
as a simple default, Crystallex understood it as something in between – a classic 
sticky default, which parties might be able to contract around if they did so in just 
the right way. In the its words,  
 
even if the Tribunal were minded to find that an investor may waive by 
contract rights contained in a treaty, any such waiver would have to be 
formulated in clear and specific terms: a waiver, if and when admissible at 
all, is never to be lightly admitted as it requires knowledge and intent of 
                                                
89. For an example outside the context of the umbrella clause, see Parkerings, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) (asserting a similar argument in a case turning on FET).  
90. See also Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v. 
Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 142 (May 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter BIVAC v. Paraguay] (“Assuming that [the umbrella clause] does import the obligations 
under the Contract into the BIT ... [t]his would include not only the obligation to make payment ... 
[under] the Contract, but also the obligation (implicit if nothing else) to ensure that the Tribunals of 
the City of Asunción were available to resolve any ‘conflict, controversy, or claim which arises from 
...’ the Contract.”). 
91. See Crawford, supra note , at 363-64; see also GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND 
SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAIN IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 122-24 
(2013). 
92 Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Repub. of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, 
(Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Crystallex]. 
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forgoing a right, a conduct rather unusual in economic transactions.93 
 
In this case, the contract contained an explicit and exclusive forum selection clause, 
opting to resolve all disputes in Venezuelan courts.94 But this, for the Tribunal, was 
not enough to overcome its presumption against an investor’s waiver of treaty 
fora.95 Though waiver might be possible, even a clear contractual statement of 
affirmatively opting for domestic courts to the exclusion of all other fora would not 
do the trick. As is typically the case with sticky defaults in domestic law, the 
Tribunal indicated that some special language would be required. 
 Importantly, the Tribunal gave some indication of the kinds of magic words 
that might make a contractual waiver effective to displace the background treaty 
fora. The Tribunal notes, in the negative, that the contractual forum selection 
provision “makes no mention of the Claimant’s rights under the BIT, and no 
reference to the BIT in general terms or to the Claimant’s right to seek recourse in 
arbitration for the alleged violation of those rights.”96 Though the Tribunal never 
comes out and says that such references would have made a difference, it clarified 
that what it was looking for, and could not find, were “indices that the Parties did 
in fact contemplate such a set of circumstances,” and that the investor affirmatively 
agreed to dispense with his right to a treaty-based forum.97 
 The Tribunal did not explain its rationale for viewing forum selection as a 
sticky default in any great depth, but we can reverse-engineer some of its thinking 
from its cursory discussion of what language might have made such a waiver 
effective. In finding that an express but general exclusive forum selection clause 
was not enough, the Crystallex Tribunal tentatively suggested that what was 
missing was some express reference to the treaty – as an indication that the Parties 
specifically contemplated discarding treaty arbitration. Conversely, to get around 
such a sticky default, the parties would have to include language evidencing their 
mutual awareness of what was being given up. As will be discussed further in Part 
III, below, the justification for such a rule might be to ensure that parties contracting 
under the ambit of a BIT share pertinent information in their negotiations.98 
Specifically, a sticky default of this kind would ensure that a party seeking to 
foreclose investor-state dispute settlement ensure that the other party is aware of 
his right to compel international arbitration, and that the parties consciously agreed 
to give it up.99  
                                                
93 Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 481.  
94 Id., at ¶ 482. 
95 Id. 
96 Id., at ¶ 482. 
97 Id. 
98 See Ayres, supra note , at 2092-96 
99 See infra, Part III.C. 
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 Finally, it bears noting that, at the time of litigation, the Claimant’s and 
Respondent’s interests do not always fall on the same side of this issue. While in 
above cases it was always the Respondent invoking the contract’s exclusive forum 
selection clause, the same kind of clause stymied a Respondent’s efforts in Oxus 
Gold v. Uzbekistan. There the Tribunal ruled against the Respondent’s attempt to 
bring counterclaims against the Claimant under a contract associated with the 
investment in light of a contract clause vesting exclusive jurisdiction in national 
courts. The Tribunal considered that the contract’s forum selection clause 
“constitutes a sort of carve-out from a potential jurisdiction under the BIT and 
deprives the Arbitral Tribunal of any jurisdiction over such counterclaims.”100 As 
in SGS v. Philippines, the BIT dispute resolution provision was, in the Tribunal’s 
view, a mere default. Unlike in SGS v. Philippines, the Tribunal’s emphasis of the 
contractual provision accrued to the Claimant’s benefit.  
B. Legitimate Expectations and Stabilization 
The content of substantive investment treaty standards remains the gravitational 
issue in international investment law, and none more centrally so than the vague 
catch-all guaranteeing investors fair and equitable treatment (FET). The thorniest 
point of contention is whether it includes an obligation on states to protect an 
investor’s “legitimate expectations,” and, more specifically, to what extent that 
includes an obligation to compensate investors for losses arising out of regulatory 
change (such as a duty of “stabilization”).101 
 Tribunals have disagreed fiercely on just how far FET entails a guarantee 
of regulatory stabilization (if at all).102 To be clear, there is no need here to take a 
position on the debate over FET’s precise substantive content. At issue here is a 
question hidden inside of the stabilization debate: whether and to what extent the 
treaty standard augments contracts between host states and foreign investors, and 
whether it is something that can be contracted around. 
 To contextualize the issue from the contracts perspective, absent any 
investment treaty, stabilization is something for which parties often can and do 
contract.103 Most national legal orders have special rules for public contracts—
                                                
100 Oxus Gold v. Republic of Uzbekistan, Final Award, UNCITRAL (17 Dec., 2015). 
101. Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note , at 82-85. 
102. Compare Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 260-
261(May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron] (holding that FET entails a strong obligation of legal 
stabilization); with Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, ¶ 423 (holding that FET 
entails only a weak stabilization protection against general legislation); and Mesa Power Group v. 
Government of Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-17, ¶ 502 (Mar. 24, 2016) (holding, in the context of 
the NAFTA, that “legitimate expectations in and of itself does not constitute a breach of [FET], but 
is an element to take into account when assessing whether other components of the standard are 
breached.”).  
103. See INT’L FIN. CORP., STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4-5 (2009). 
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meaning contracts with the government, or sub-units of the government, and in 
some cases with state-owned enterprises.104 Usually the defaults are government-
friendly.105 It would be uncommon for a national legal order to guarantee an 
investor against legislative change by default. In the U.S. law of public contracts, 
for example, a private party is not, by default, guaranteed against general legislative 
changes that diminish the value of her contract with the government.106 But to the 
extent parties are sufficiently concerned about the risk of regulatory change, they 
can negotiate for a stabilization clause.107 Stabilization is, in other words, a price 
term–one which investors are not entitled to by default, and which they will have 
to pay for. And the same goes for transnational contracts, absent an applicable 
investment treaty. 
 The usual question in international investment law is to what extent FET 
provisions impose a stabilization requirement on states at all, vis-à-vis any kind of 
asset.108 Our question is related but conceptually independent from the issue of 
content. The question for us concerns how FET operates in contract cases—
specifically where the investment is itself a negotiated agreement between the state 
and foreign investor reflecting their agreed allocation of risk—whether the treaty 
grafts an obligation of stabilization on to such contracts, and to what extent the 
parties can contract around the treaty standard.  
 Notice that no such issue arises with pure property cases, where it poses no 
problem that the treaty establishes received rules for the disposition of foreign 
property, binding the state over and above its own property law. With property, the 
point of the treaty is clearly to provide investor-friendly rules to attract 
investment.109 The only debate vis-à-vis property claims is about how far the 
substance of the standard extends. But in contract cases an additional issue arises: 
how much to respect the parties’ own efforts to allocate risk. Investor-state cases 
involving contracts have thus far tended to debate the issue of content vigorously; 
but they have generally disposed of the contracts-specific questions only on the 
                                                
104. See generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42635, WHEN CONGRESSIONAL 
LEGISLATION INTERFERES WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS: LEGAL ISSUES 7-9 (2012). 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 9. 
107. See Serkin, supra note , at 958. Note that such clauses are considered unconstitutional in some 
national legal orders, due to their potential to constrain future governments’ ability to regulate. Id. 
at 886 n.27; Howard Mann, Stabilization in Investment Contracts: Rethinking the Context, 
Reformulating the Result, INV. TREATY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/10/07/stabilization-in-investment-contracts-rethinking-the-context-
reformulating-the-result/ [https://perma.cc/Q44Q-HQK3]. 
108. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
7, 20–29 (2013); see also Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable Treatment and Stabilization 
Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in International Law, 12 J. WORLD INV. 
& TRADE, 783, 805-06 (2011). 
109. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note , at 19. 
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level of assumptions. 
 As Dolzer notes, jurisprudence on legitimate expectations is in a state of 
flux.110 The case law can be usefully divided into two lines, reflecting broad and 
narrow approaches to legitimate expectations. The cases are quite a bit messier, but 
this simplified division serves to illustrate the underlying treaty/contract issue. Note 
at the outset that all of the cases seem to agree that normally, in protecting 
expectations, FET will materially add something to state contracts within its ambit. 
Clearly, the cases differ on how much FET adds (ultimately a question of 
substantive content). But, more importantly for our purposes, the cases further 
differ on how much the content of FET will depend on just what the contractual 
arrangements entail in particular cases—in other words, on whether and how much 
a tribunal must dig into terms of the contract to determine just what an investor can 
legitimately expect.111 For one line of cases, FET contains a robust guarantee of 
legitimate expectations, applicable in full to investment contracts regardless of the 
underlying contractual arrangements; on the other view, FET imposes only a 
narrower minimal core on investment contracts, which may be expanded (and 
perhaps even contracted) by the terms of the underlying contract. 
 The broad approach to legitimate expectations in contracts cases is typified 
by a series of gas disputes against Argentina arising out of the 2001-2002 financial 
crisis, including Sempra v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, and CMS Gas v. 
Argentina (collectively the Argentine Gas Cases).112 Each of these disputes arose 
out of regulatory changes that severely devalued long-term gas distribution 
contracts between the private investors and the Argentine state.113 In the early 1990s 
Argentina embarked on a comprehensive privatization program, part of which 
involved designing a regulatory framework covering the gas sector designed to 
attract foreign direct investment.114 The framework included guarantees that 
companies could calculate rates in U.S. dollars and convert them to pesos at the 
prevailing exchange rate, to be recalculated every six months for the thirty-five year 
                                                
110. Dolzer generally supports the view that, under the legitimate expectations component of FET, 
contracts should establish some stabilization duty. See Dolzer, supra note , at 25-26. But see 
Crawford, supra note , at 373 (“The relevance of legitimate expectations is not a licence to arbitral 
tribunals to rewrite the freely negotiated terms of investment contracts.”).  
111 I owe this important clarification to Julianne Marley. 
112. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 
2007) [hereinafter Sempra]; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3; and CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Gas]. 
See generally José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A 
Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in THE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2008/2009, at 379 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009) (discussing the 
decisions in the Argentine gas cases). 
113. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note , at 379-88. 
114. Id. at 388-89. 
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life of the contract.115 At the time, the peso was also pegged to the dollar.116 As 
Argentina slipped into financial crisis in the l990s, the state took a series of 
emergency measures altering the regulatory framework for gas distribution: 
repealing the convertibility guarantees (requiring rates to be set in pesos); 
converting all rates from dollars into pesos at a rate of 1:1 (“pesification”); and 
subsequently devaluing the peso.117 Needless to say, these measures severely 
depreciated the value of the underlying contracts and undermined their viability as 
investments.118 
 CMS, Sempra, and Enron each sued Argentina under the U.S.—Argentina 
BIT.119 The key question in each case was whether the treaty guaranteed the 
investor rights of legal stabilization beyond what was contained in the contracts–
whether, in other words, FET grafted a duty of stabilization onto the underlying 
contracts between the investors and the Argentine State.120  
 First, each case defined FET broadly to include a duty of stabilization.121 
The Tribunal in CMS Gas held that “[t]here can be no doubt ... that a stable legal 
and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.”122 
The Enron Tribunal concurred, adding that the standard protects investor 
expectations “derived from the conditions that were offered by the State to the 
investor at the time of the investment [and on which the investor relied].”123 For 
Enron, such “offers” are not limited to the terms of the contract, but include the 
state’s regulatory regime at the time of investment.124 In each case the tribunal 
further noted that the stabilization component of legitimate expectations was an 
                                                
115. Id. 
116. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 82; id. at 389. 
117. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 116; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 ¶ 72; CMS 
Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 65. 
118. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 81; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 69-72. 
119. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 5; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 4; CMS Gas, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 4. 
120. Each of these contracts included some stabilization clauses of their own, but they fell short of 
the degree of stabilization being read into the treaty. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note , at 388-89, 
391-92. The implicit issue here is whether the treaty clauses would afford investors greater 
protection than that available under the contracts. 
121. Each tribunal was careful to note that the State might not be under a total stabilization 
requirement, but none clarified how far the requirement goes. See CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8, ¶ 277; see also Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 261; Sempra, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16 ¶ 300. 
122. CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 274. 
123. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 262. 
124. See id. ¶ 264. 
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objective standard–to be assessed only in light of a measure’s effects on the 
investor’s bottom line, and not in light of the state’s regulatory aims.125 Each 
tribunal found Argentina had violated its obligation to provide FET. As the Enron 
Tribunal stated, “[t]he measures in question ... have beyond any doubt substantially 
changed the legal and business framework under which the investment was decided 
and implemented.”126  
 What is hardly discussed in any of these cases is the relationship between 
FET and the underlying contracts, or the extent to which the tribunals’ 
interpretations of the standard affect the contractual arrangement. Much like SGS 
v. Paraguay, Sempra merely waves the question away formalistically. According 
to the Sempra Tribunal, treaty claims and contract claims can be neatly separated.127 
In its view, the FET claim involves only the treaty, not the contract, because it arises 
out of the state’s legislative action and not exclusively and merely a commercial 
dispute about the contract–as if such things can be neatly separated.128 Materially, 
on this view, FET protects investors’ expectations to the same degree no matter 
how they choose to invest; if the investment is structured through a contract, the 
treaty standard simply supplements that contract. In other words, the tribunals treat 
the contracts as generic assets, which are subject to additional treaty protections 
like “legitimate expectations” under FET on the pure property model.  
 If, however, we change our perspective to the point of view of the parties 
negotiating such a contract ex ante, it becomes clear that any such background rule 
must be considered as materially part of the deal. Where stabilization is permissible 
in national law at all, its presence or absence becomes a price term like any other. 
The assumption in the Argentine Gas Cases is that the treaty creates a background 
norm requiring the state to afford investors a degree of legal stabilization, whether 
or not they specifically negotiate a stabilization clause. At a minimum, on this 
interpretation of FET, stabilization becomes a default rule applying in contractual 
relations between states and foreign investors, regardless of whether or not the law 
of the contract includes any such principle. While it is not entirely clear whether 
this treaty-based default is something the parties could have expressly contracted 
around, the tribunals’ strict separation of treaty and contract implies that the full 
measure of legitimate expectations under FET is effectively mandatory. 
 Another line of cases—typified by Parkerings v. Lithuania—presents a far 
narrower approach to FET in contract cases.129 Parkerings concerned a 1999 
                                                
125. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 304; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 ¶ 268; CMS 
Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 280-281. 
126. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 264. 
127. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 310. 
128. Id. ¶¶ 99-101. 
129. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (Sept. 11, 
2007) [hereinafter Parkerings]; see also EDF Servs. Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, 
Award, ¶ 217 (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter EDF] (objecting to the idea that FET might mean “the 
virtual freezing of the legal regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal 
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contract between Parkerings, a Norwegian Company, and the municipality of 
Vilnius, for the creation, operation, and enforcement of a new public parking 
system in the city.130 The company was to retain, for a period of thirteen years, the 
rights to collect parking fees, and to enforce the system through clamping 
delinquent cars and imposing fines.131 Less than one year into the contract, 
however, the national government began taking measures that undercut 
Parkerings’s rights under the contract—including the passage of national 
legislation that prohibited private companies from collecting parking fees and 
enforcing violations.132 Lithuania eventually terminated the contract, and 
Parkerings sued the State under the Norway—Lithuania BIT.133 
 Parkerings claimed that Lithuania violated FET by frustrating the 
company’s legitimate expectations.134 The Tribunal was, however, fairly 
circumspect in its view of the treaty standard. In particular, the tribunal found that 
a contract does not, of itself, give rise to expectations actionable under FET—nor 
does it create an obligation on states to stabilize their laws vis-à-vis the investor.135 
The Tribunal emphasized that a “State has the right to enact, modify, or cancel a 
law at its own discretion,” as a corollary to its “sovereign legislative power.”136 To 
the extent that FET entails any protection of an investor’s expectations, no investor 
could legitimately expect that signing a contract with a state would entail a tacit 
promise of stabilization. To the contrary, the Tribunal stated that “any businessman 
or investor knows that laws will evolve over time.”137  
 Importantly, the Tribunal focused on the deal as actually negotiated by the 
parties, emphasizing in particular the absence of a stabilization clause in the 
underlying contract.138 As the Tribunal pointed out, in contract it is up to the parties 
themselves to allocate risk as they see fit.139 If an investor wants to reduce risk, she 
“must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure [her] 
                                                
regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life”). 
130. Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶ 82. 
131. Id. ¶ 84. 
132. Id. ¶ 328. 
133. Id. ¶¶ 195, 201, 234. 
134. See id. ¶¶ 196-197. 
135. Id. ¶¶ 337-338. 
136. Id. ¶ 332. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at ¶¶ 334-338. 
139. Id. 
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investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment.”140 
The Tribunal rightly analyzed expectations in terms of the parties’ own risk 
allocation. Parkerings “could (and with hindsight should) have sought to protect its 
legitimate expectations by introducing into the investment agreement a stabilisation 
clause ... protecting it against unexpected and unwelcome changes.”141 If grounded 
in an express commitment in the underlying contract, it might indeed become 
legitimate to expect such stabilization for purposes of FET.142 But crucially 
Parkerings would have had to pay for such a right, likely yielding a less attractive 
deal—assuming the state would have agreed at all. The Tribunal thus held that “[By 
deciding to invest notwithstanding this possible instability, the claimant took the 
business risk to be faced with changes of laws possibly or even likely to be 
detrimental to its investment.”143  
 Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not entirely limit the effect of FET in contract 
cases. It considered that the treaty does impose a residual requirement on the state 
to refrain from exercising its legislative power “unfairly, unreasonably or 
inequitably” to the detriment of its private contracting partners.144 But it viewed 
this condition minimally, and found no evidence that Lithuania ran afoul of its 
obligations under the BIT.145 In other words, for the Tribunal, FET imposes certain 
minimum levels of treatment on contracts, though the treaty standard’s protection 
of legitimate expectations can be ratcheted up where the contract itself contains 
specific commitments like a stabilization clause or other heightened guarantee.146 
Left open is the borderline question of whether even the minimal vision of FET 
could be ratcheted down by the contracting parties by sufficiently explicit waiver, 
though importantly, nothing in the Tribunal’s reasoning excludes the possibility 
that such conditions are themselves mere defaults (or sticky defaults). Ultimately, 
the line between the contents of FET and the treaty/contract question remains 
muddy. What is clear is that, for this line of cases, the content of an investor’s 
legitimate expectations in contract cases depends mightily on what the state and 
foreign investor worked out in their deal. 
                                                
140. Id. ¶ 333. 
141. Id. ¶ 336. 
142 Id. ¶ 332. 
143. Id. See also EDF, ¶ 217 (“Except where specific promises or representations are made by the 
State to the investor, the latter may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance 
policy against the risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework.”). 
144. Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶ 332. 
145. Id. ¶¶ 336-338. 
146 Id., ¶ 332; see also EDF, ¶ 217; Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, ¶ 423 
(“changes to general legislation (at least in the absence of a stabilization clause) are not prevented 
by the fair and equitable treatment standard if they do not exceed the exercise of the host State’s 
normal regulatory power...and do not modify the regulatory framework relied upon by the investor 
at the time of its investment ‘outside of the acceptable margin of change.’”). 
145
J. Arato / Logic of Contract 
Forthcoming: Wm & Mary L. Rev. (2016) 29 
 The two lines of cases discussed above diverge sharply as to the content of 
legitimate expectations in FET. CMS Gas, Enron, and Sempra contemplate an 
objective test with strong stabilization effects.147 Parkerings and its ilk contemplate 
a much more minimal test of fairness and reasonableness that is not based purely 
on the material effects of legislative change.148 But they also differ on the separate 
issue of the relationship between treaty and contract. Abstracting from the 
substantive content of FET, both lines of cases seem to assume the treaty standard 
represents a background default against which all contracting takes place. But they 
differ on whether and to what extent the underlying deal is relevant to determining 
just what the guarantee of legitimate expectations might entail. The implication of 
the Argentine Gas Cases is that legitimate expectations is comprehensive and 
effectively mandatory. This is particularly clear in Sempra, which, like SGS v. 
Paraguay, forcefully frames FET as a treaty obligation totally distinct and 
severable from the contract – one which applies in full force on top of any 
investment contract, regardless of what the contract says.149 By contrast, the 
implication of Parkerings and its ilk is that FET’s contents depend mightily on what 
the contracting parties actually agreed. On this reading, FET includes a minimal 
core, but it clearly acts as a kind of default-it can be ratcheted up, and arguably even 
watered down, by the contracting parties.  
 For analytical purposes I have tried, here, to keep separate the question of 
FET’s content and that of its relationship to investment contracts. It bears noting 
that in the real world, however-the world actually lived by parties engaged in 
negotiating investment projects-these questions surely interrelate. Indeed, the 
content of the FET standard will turn out to matter quite a bit, from the perspective 
of contract theory, when we turn to the normative question of how adjudicators 
ought to resolve the treaty/contract question.150 If FET is an extremely robust 
standard of protection incorporating a stabilization requirement, then it will be 
critical to the state (and arguably to investors) to be able to contract around it. 
However, the sting of the problem dissipates as the interpretation of FET narrows. 
Even if, in contract cases, the core of FET is mandatory, but limited to something 
like a guarantee that the state will use its sovereign powers in good faith, its 
consequences would be far less intrusive. 
                                                
147. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 304 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 268 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 280-281 
(May 12, 2005). 
148. Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶¶ 336-338. 
149. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 296-304. This formalistic recitation obscures the 
material relationship between these instruments. From the point of view of two contracting parties 
negotiating ex ante, the question of whether their deal will create a stabilization obligation for the 
state by triggering a treaty obligation will absolutely bear on the material meaning of the contract. 
If known and understood, it would be viewed as an implied price term that obviously affects the 
allocation of risk. 
150 See infra, Part III. 
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C. Damages 
The realm of potential interactions between treaty and contract on questions of 
substantive law goes well beyond standards of treatment like FET and 
expropriation. Indeed, investment treaties create fulsome regimes of background 
rules which, if applicable, would cover most aspects of the life of the contract. Of 
these, rules on the measure and calculation of damages are among the most 
important. 
 All contracts entail rules on damages—either in their express terms, or by 
default under the law of the contract. Often, in national legal orders, contracts with 
the state are not automatically subject to the fullest measure of expectation 
damages. In such instances, where the government opts to breach, investors are 
typically entitled to some lesser measure—like recuperation of reasonable reliance 
damages.151 The rationale is typically an entrenchment concern about regulatory 
autonomy and the possibility of chill—a worry that one government might tie the 
hands of future governments through privatization contracts.152 By contrast, the 
usual measure of damages in international investment law is, today, fair market 
value (FMV).153 In cases involving the expropriation of property, FMV is typically 
measured in terms of the present value of the asset, taking into account its capacity 
to generate income over time.154 Applied to contracts, this measure of damages is 
more or less equivalent to expectation damages. If the law of the contract calls for 
mere reliance damages by default, but the investment treaty calls for FMV, which 
controls? And what happens when the parties explicitly negotiate for a particular 
measure of damages, say in a liquidated damages clause? Here again the cases 
display significant variation, without much explicit discussion of the issue. 
 Notably, investment treaties do not usually include express, general 
provisions on damages applicable to each and every treaty standard.155 Typically, 
provisions on expropriation do include language on compensation—usually 
invoking FMV.156 But standards like FET tend to be laconic on the issue, leaving 
much up to the adjudicator’s discretion.157 Suffice it to note, for present purposes, 
                                                
151. See Serkin, supra note , at 916; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Government 
Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 316 (1999). 
152. Serkin, supra note , at 894-96; see also Arato, supra note , at 273. 
153. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13, at 47 (Sept. 13). 
154. See, e.g., id. 
155. Renne-Yves Tschanz & Jorge E. Viñuales, Compensation for Non-Expropriatory Breaches of 
International Investment Law: The Contribution of the Argentine Awards, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 729, 
729-30 (2009). 
156. SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 78-
79 (2008). 
157. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note , at 404-05; Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note , at 729. 
147
J. Arato / Logic of Contract 
Forthcoming: Wm & Mary L. Rev. (2016) 31 
that the tendency is to read FET in light of customary international law principles 
of compensation applicable in relations between states, which ultimately means 
FMV.158  
 Some cases simply assume that, once a treaty breach is involved, damages 
must be assessed under international law principles. CMS Gas, Sempra, and Enron 
are typical in this regard. Again, these tribunals each found Argentina in breach of 
FET for enacting emergency measures that severely diminished the value of the 
investors’ contracts.159 Once these tribunals determined that the state had violated 
FET, they simply assumed that the appropriate measure of damages was to be 
drawn from international law—meaning, in their view, FMV.160 Under that rubric, 
the tribunals measured each private party’s losses in light of expected future earning 
potential over the thirty-five year life of the contract, calculated via discounted cash 
flow (DCF) analysis—which amounts to a sophisticated approach to expectation 
damages in the context of long term investment contracts.161  
 While each of the Enron, Sempra, and CMS Gas Tribunals took pains to 
explain why FMV was the appropriate measure for assessing violations of FET as 
a matter of international law, none even considered whether international law was 
the right place to look in cases arising out of contracts. None examined whether the 
appropriate measure of damages might rather be found in the underlying contract 
over which the claim arose—either in its express terms, or in the default rules of 
the law of the contract (Argentine law in each case). They simply took as a given 
that international law supplied the answer.162 Under this rule, contracting parties 
                                                
158. See See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note , at 404-05; Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note , at 735. 
159. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 304 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 268 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award ¶ 281 (May 
12, 2005). 
160. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 400-403; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 ¶¶ 359-
363; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 410. 
161. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB 02/16, ¶ 416; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 384–385; 
CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 411. 
162 A similar issue regarding investment contracts and FMV arose in ExxonMobil v. Venezuela and 
ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela. See Venezuela Holdings et al. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award (Oct. 9, 2014)[hereinafter ExxonMobil]; ConocoPhillips 
Petrozuata, et. al v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (Sept. 3, 2013) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips]. These cases involved similar 
underlying oil contracts, which contained specific clauses limiting contractual damages. 
ExxonMobil, ¶ 61; ConocoPhillips, ¶¶ 375-376. Like the Argentine Gas Cases, the ExxonMobil 
Tribunal held that the appropriate damages rule under the applicable BIT was FMV (for an 
expropriation claim). In these cases the contracts were between investors and state-owned entities. 
In ExxonMobil, the Tribunal ignored, and thereby effectively displaced, the contractual limitations 
on compensation explicitly incorporated in the contract—finding those limitations opposable only 
to the state-owned entity that was formally party the contract, and not the State itself. Exxon Mobil, 
¶ 373. The issue has yet to be addressed fully by the Tribunal in ConocoPhillips (the Tribunal has 
yet to rule on damages at time of writing). Yet, arbitrator Georges Abi-Saab raised the issue 
preemptively, in a dissent to the Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits (prior to his resigning from the 
tribunal for health reasons). ConocoPhillips, Abi-Saab Dissent, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30. In 
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would have to assume, ex ante, that investment treaties displace domestic contract 
law on the question of damages in FET (and expropriation) cases, establishing 
expectation damages as the new background rule. And while it is not entirely clear 
how sticky such a rule might be, from the way these tribunals formalistically 
severed treaty and contract the strong implication is that expectation damages qua 
FMV should be understood effectively mandatory.163 It seems unlikely that these 
tribunals would have been swayed by even express contractual provisions on 
damages.164 
 Other tribunals have taken a more nuanced approach to damages in disputes 
arising out of investment contracts, more mindful of the parties’ underlying 
contractual arrangements. Kardassopoulos & Fuchs v. Georgia addressed the issue 
in particularly clear dicta. Seemingly echoing the Argentine Gas Cases, the 
Kardassopoulos tribunal noted that the claims were treaty based–grounded in 
violations of FET and expropriation.165 As a result, for the Tribunal, “the relevant 
provisions for the purpose of both liability and quantum are contained in the treaties 
and, more broadly, international law”166—which, for both claims turned out to be 
FMV.167 However, the Tribunal did not treat the separation between treaty and 
contract as entirely strict. It noted, that its “finding is without prejudice to a host 
State and an investor’s ability to contractually limit the compensation which may 
be owed following an expropriation where a treaty is also in play.”168 The Tribunal 
added that it would be “loathe to accept the categorical denial of such an 
                                                
Abi-Saab’s view, even if the treaty imposes an FMV standard, any express limitations on profits 
must be considered in assessing the contract’s fair market value for purposes of assessing 
compensation or damages. Id., at ¶ 34  (“the calculation of the market value of the nationalized 
investment in casu – consisting of contractual rights...has necessarily to take into account (i.e. to 
pass by or be filtered through) the compensation clauses of these Agreements which quantify and 
limit those rights protected by the BIT.”)In other words, for Abi-Saab, FMV cannot act to impose a 
measure of expectation damages blind to express provisions in the contract that limit compensation, 
because that would overstate the contract’s value on the open market. Crucially, he explains that 
this conclusion rests “not only on legal, but also on economic grounds....How can any homo 
economicus exercise rational choice as a ‘willing buyer’ of ConocoPhillips shares or contractual 
rights in the Strategic Association Agreements, calculate the price he would be willing to pay, 
without factoring in (or taking into account) the terms of the compensation clauses of the 
Agreements?” Id., at ¶¶ 35, 37.  
163. See, e.g., Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 401. 
164. See also ExxonMobil, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, ¶¶ 61, 373.  
165. Kardassopoulos & Fuchs v. Republic of Georg., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, 
Award, ¶ 480-481 (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Kardassopoulous]. 
166. Id. ¶ 480. 
167. Id. ¶¶ 501–504, 533–534. 
168. Id. ¶ 481. 
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arrangement ... as a matter of law.”169 Clearly, in its view, the treaty rule on 
damages is only a default. 
 Going further, the Tribunal began to consider how informed parties might 
contract around a treaty on questions of damages—asking, in other words, how 
sticky the treaty default might be. The Tribunal drew attention to an exchange with 
the Claimants at oral argument, where the latter hesitantly acknowledged that 
investors and governments could contract around an investment treaty through a 
clear liquidated damages clause or other cap on damages.170 One of the Arbitrators 
(Vaughn Lowe) pressed the Claimants on this point, asking the crucial question of 
what such a clause would look like if the parties intended to contract around the 
treaty.171 The Claimants responded that to validly contract out, the clause “would 
[have to] say ‘...notwithstanding article 11 of the Energy Charter Treaty, the parties 
hereby agree that...’, or it would say ‘Notwithstanding the provisions of public 
international law...’”172 The Claimants’ point was similar to that of the Crystallex 
Tribunal in the context of forum selection: that contracting out would be possible 
if the contractual language indicated both parties’ awareness of the existence of the 
relevant treaty standards.173 Put in contract theoretical terms, on the Claimants’ 
understanding, the treaty rules on damages would thus represent a fairly sticky 
default, whose stickiness would be justified on an information-sharing rationale.174 
 Ultimately, however, Kardassopoulos did not decide the issue. In the end 
the Tribunal did not inquire into whether the contract or treaty took precedence in 
this case because it determined that that the question would make no material 
difference.175 In view of the particular stabilization clauses in the underlying 
contract, the Tribunal considered that “the result would be the same as the 
application of international law principles of compensation.”176 The Tribunal thus 
disposed of the damages issue under the FMV principles of the relevant treaties. 
 From the ex ante contracting perspective, the Argentine Gas Cases and 
Kardassopoulos offer two competing answers to the treaty/contract issue. Each of 
these cases accepts that FMV reflects the correct approach to damages under FET 
                                                
169. Id. 
170. Id. ¶ 481. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id.; See Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482. 
174. The Kardassopoulos discussion is exceptionally helpful analytically because, like Crystallex, 
it raises the all important question of how a sticky default might be contracted around—a point even 
domestic courts frequently elide, but which strongly tests the rationale behind the rule’s stickiness. 
See Ayres, supra note , at 2092-96. 
175. Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶ 483. 
176. Id. ¶ 482. 
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(meaning expectation damages in contract cases). However, the former cases 
simply assume that a violation of FET invokes the international law standard of 
damages, whatever the contract (or law of the contract) provides.177 
Kardassopoulos, by contrast, acknowledges that the contracting parties can control 
damages in their own arrangements if they do so expressly.178 From the contracting 
perspective, the former approach positions treaty damages as something like a 
mandatory background rule. The latter rather understands treaty damages as a 
default–leaving it unclear just how sticky a default it might be.179 
D. Jurisprudence and Uncertainty 
The jurisprudence on the treaty/contract issue lies in disarray. The question is 
handled irregularly within and across all treaty issues, from forum selection to 
substantive obligations and damages. Such uncertainty is a real problem in private 
law. From the ex ante perspective, states and foreign investors cannot be confident 
about the meaning of any contract they ultimately adopt. Will the contract be 
augmented by the background norms set by an applicable investment treaty? If so, 
are such provisions mandatory, or are they subject to negotiation—can, in other 
words, the parties opt out of treaty arrangements if they prefer to allocate risk in a 
different way? And, if the treaty rules are mere defaults, how sticky are they? Must 
parties do anything specific to contract around their parameters, to ensure that 
tribunals give force to their choices? The cases give wildly different answers to 
these questions, typically without much explanation.180 Such uncertainty is 
problematic, to say the least, in the sensitive realm of high risk, high value foreign 
investment projects—where it can strongly affect the state’s regulatory capacities 
and where disputes often turn into “bet the company” cases. 
 As a first step, it is essential to see how tribunals’ implicit choices affect 
investment contracts, and what they mean for future contractual negotiations 
between states and foreign investors. It is crucial, in this regard, to get past the 
formalistic idea that treaty and contract claims are on purely separate tracks. Treaty 
and contract cannot be neatly separated. In Crawford’s words, “treaties and 
contracts are different things. But they are not clean different things ... between 
                                                
177. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 400-403 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 359-363 (May 27, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 
¶ 410 (May 12, 2005). 
178. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶ 480-481. 
179. Id. ¶¶ 480–482. 
180. Only a handful of cases address the treaty/contract issue directly. See, e.g., Crystallex, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶¶ 481-482; Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & 
ARB/07/15, Award, ¶ 211 (Mar. 3, 2010); SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 92 (Jan. 29, 2004). 
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them there is no great gulf fixed.”181 As Abi-Saab puts it, to simply “assert... that 
the treaty applies, without taking into consideration the terms of the contract, 
amounts to revising and rewriting the contract.”182 Taking the ex ante perspective 
of states and foreign investors—as contracting parties—helps to clarify how their 
messy interactions might be better harmonized. 
 Under most interpretations, where a treaty claim arises out of a contract 
dispute the treaty adds (or can add) something to the contract—whether a 
heightened standard of treatment under FET, a new measure of damages, or access 
to international fora. Cases like SGS v. Paraguay and the Argentine Gas Cases 
insist that these additions arise purely out of the treaty and are completely separate 
from the contract.183 But this reasoning is overly formalistic—focused too much on 
the general relationship between international and national sources of law, and not 
enough on the private law logic of those very contracts the treaty seeks to protect.184 
 From the ex ante perspective of the parties to an investment contract, the 
strict separation refrain only obscures the treaty’s material, economic effect on the 
contract. Formalities aside, if the contracting parties are aware that an overarching 
treaty will add to or alter their bargain, they will have to consider such alterations 
materially part of the deal. From their point of view, the treaty creates a fairly 
comprehensive set of background rules supplementing their arrangements. Parties 
with any sophistication will have to price these norms into their contract, or weigh 
whether to contract around them.  
 From this vantage point, it becomes clear how much it matters how we think 
about these background norms—a point distinct from the content of the treaty 
provisions, and obscured by the neat separation of treaty claims from contract 
claims. If, as in the strict separation logic, an investor’s treaty rights cannot be 
affected or disclaimed by the terms of the contract, then the treaty provisions act as 
mandatory investment protections and cramp the parties’ ex ante ability to 
efficiently allocate risk. But if the treaty rules are defaults, as in the reading of 
Kardassopoulos, Crystallex or SGS v. Philippines, the parties may then dicker over 
                                                
181. Crawford, supra note , at 373. 
182 ConocoPhillips, Abi-Saab Dissent, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ¶ 32. 
183. See, e.g., Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award ¶ 310 (Sept. 28, 2007) 
184 Contrast this to the logic of the CISG, as an international treaty which clearly seeks to erect 
international background rules to govern transnational sales contracts, but which explicitly allows 
private non-state actors to contract around its terms. See CISG, art. 6. Nothing about the general 
relationship between international law and national law prevents an international treaty from 
envisioning—even encouraging—private parties to opt out through their transnational contracts. To 
the contrary, enshrining the capacity to opt out is one of the CISG’s central features. Though 
investment treaties differ from the CISG in their silence on this issue, it is important to see how 
nothing about the general relationship between international and national law bars treaties from 
establishing a more integrated approach oriented toward private party choice. The real question 
Tribunals should be asking is: what kind of relationship between treaty and contract do BITs 
envision, interpreted in light of their object and purpose to protect and promote foreign direct 
investment. 
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them in their negotiations as they would with any other price term.185 On this 
reading the treaty may well change the baseline for negotiations from potentially 
more lenient default structures in the national law of the contract, perhaps putting 
the state more on the back foot. But the parties will still be able to negotiate over 
the ultimate allocation of risk and reward.  
 On the specific question of how contract and treaty provisions interact, the 
cases are irregular, inconsistent, and often markedly unclear. Most simply make 
assumptions about how treaties and contracts interact—and their assumptions are 
not always the same.186 Indeed, only a few cases consider the issue explicitly—for 
most it is a matter of reading between the lines to excavate their underlying 
assumptions. Still, there do seem to be trends. The tendency seems to be to treat 
investment treaty provisions as effectively mandatory, as in the Argentine Gas 
Cases and SGS v. Paraguay.187 But a significant minority of tribunals have taken 
party choice in contract more seriously, viewing investment treaties as defaults of 
varying degrees of stickiness. As in Kardassopoulos and Crystallex, some tribunals 
have viewed treaty provisions as highly sticky defaults, which apply unless the 
contracting parties opt out with exceedingly clear and specific language.188 And a 
handful of others buck the trend even further, as in SGS v. Philippines and Oxus, 
viewing treaty provisions as simple defaults, wholly subject to contracting party 
choice.189 These variations are not limited to any particular treaty provision or issue, 
and they are occurring with increasing frequency. 
 The main goal of this Part has been to highlight and analyze the disorder in 
the case law on the interaction between treaty and contract. One normative point 
should, however, already be obvious. The current state of uncertainty is hugely 
problematic from the ex ante perspective of contracting parties—states and foreign 
investors—who cannot be confident about the material meaning of any contractual 
arrangements under the shadow of an investment treaty. This makes planning 
extremely difficult and expensive, as rational states and investors will have to build 
insurance into their arrangements. And it adds significant transaction costs to the 
contracting process. If sufficiently well understood, such uncertainty risks seriously 
chilling contractual relations between states and foreign investors—precisely the 
opposite of what investment treaties seek to achieve.  
                                                
185. See, e.g., Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15 ¶¶ 216-223. 
186. Compare SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 134 
(Jan. 29, 2004) (viewing treaty dispute resolution provisions as defaults), with Crystallex, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482 (viewing treaty dispute resolution provisions as highly sticky 
defaults), and SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 138-142 
(Feb. 12, 2010) (viewing treaty dispute resolution provisions as mandatory). 
187 See also ExxonMobil, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, ¶¶ 61, 373. 
188. Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15 ¶ 481; Crystallex, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482. 
189. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 134; BIVAC v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/9, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 148 (May 29, 2009). 
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 The next Part shifts more fully from the descriptive to the normative. I start 
from the position that certainty and consistency of any kind would already be a 
boon.190 However, I argue that tribunals’ apparent tendency to privilege treaty 
norms over negotiated contract provisions reflects the wrong approach from the 
perspective of contract theory–in most, though perhaps not all instances. 
III. EFFICIENCY, AUTONOMY, AND CHOICE 
Thus far I have argued that the moment investment treaties are made to apply to 
contracts, they establish some kind of international law of contracts. Given that the 
treaties are invariably laconic on this issue, however, it is difficult to determine just 
what kind of law they create. Investment treaties clearly establish full panoplies of 
substantive and procedural rules that relate to all investments in some way. Their 
application to contracts might be fully extensive—supplying norms ranging from 
breach, defenses, and damages to forum selection. Investment treaties might also 
be read more narrowly, as applying to contracts more minimally than they would 
to assets like real property. Likewise, these treaty rules might be read as rigid 
provisions that apply over and above the parties’ choices, or more flexibly as 
defaults to be contracted around. On all these questions the treaties remain silent—
and the jurisprudence has only compounded the uncertainty facing states and 
investors contemplating contractual relations. An international law of contracts is 
gradually emerging, but its contours are yet to be defined.  
 This Part examines how the treaty/contract issue ought to be approached. 
Contrary to the prevailing tendencies, I suggest that it should generally be presumed 
that explicit contractual provisions trump treaty provisions as the authentic 
expression of the contracting parties’ division of risk. In the first place, as a matter 
of treaty interpretation under international law, a general presumption that treaties 
create mere defaults is essential to the object and purpose of these treaties—to 
protect and promote foreign direct investment. There are also strong policy reasons 
for understanding most treaty rules as mere defaults, grounded in both the logic of 
private law and in concern for public regulatory values. But, crucially, this 
conclusion is not an absolute. Even on these rationales there may be reasons why, 
in certain limited cases, treaty rules ought to be understood as sticky defaults. By 
hypothesis, I explore the possibility that the forum selection clause makes a good 
                                                
190 Note that the problem of certainty is not is not likely to improve through arbitral action alone, 
given that investment tribunals are constituted on a one-off basis with total discretion to reinvent 
the wheel on this issue in each case. See Arato, supra note , at 294. Treaty change is necessary – 
either to clarify the treaty/content relationship as is done in the CISG, or–more radically–through 
instituting a centralized investment court along the lines recently championed by the European 
Union. But note, on this issue, change need not be systemic to have an important effect – it is not 
essential that all investment treaties change all at once. Clarifying the treaty/contract relationship in 
any one treaty will have the effect of enhancing certainty for its states parties, and all covered 
investors. See further infra, Conclusion. 
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candidate.191 It may even be that some treaty provisions ought to be understood as 
mandatory. But crucially, I argue that these choices must be justifiable in light of 
both the positive law of the treaty and the private and public values it seeks to 
promote.  
 Since the nature of the treaty/contract relationship is generally undecided in 
treaty text, the first touchstone for treaty interpretation must always be the 
investment treaty’s object and purpose. This entails, in most cases, the twin 
overarching goals of protecting and promoting investments. Investment treaties are 
not solely about endowing foreign direct investment with protections as a matter of 
justice or fairness to the investors. States rather agree to afford such protections in 
order to encourage investment, which they view as essential drivers of development 
and a key component of diversified economic health.192 If states did not want to 
induce investment, they would not sign modern investment treaties. 
 Yet different provisions may well serve these treaties’ goals in different 
ways. There is no reason to assume that answers to the treaty/contract issue must 
be the same across all provisions of an investment treaty. Neither the treaties nor 
customary international law require any single generalizable approach. True, as 
Crawford notes, the customary conflicts rule applies in investor-state arbitration—
whereby international law prevails over domestic law in case of conflict.193 But a 
conflict would only arise if we assume the treaty creates mandatory rules. As 
Craswell explains, a contract does not conflict with a contrary default rule in any 
meaningful way, since the key function of default rules is to give way to the choices 
of the parties.194 And the relationship between international law and national law 
poses no particular problem in this regard, as clearly evident in the realm of 
transnational sale of goods. The multilateral CISG is, after all, almost completely 
comprised of default rules, which private actors can freely contract around.195 The 
real problem, investment law, is just that the treaties expressly apply to contracts-
as-investment, yet completely fail to address how treaty and contract thus 
interrelate. In the absence of any other general rules of international law on point, 
the issue of how contract relates to treaty must be asked anew vis-à-vis each 
particular treaty, and each particular treaty provision, bearing in mind the 
overarching object and purpose to protect and promote foreign direct investment. 
                                                
191 See Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482. 
192. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note , at 22, 29-30; Anne van Aaken & Tobias Lehmann, 
Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND POLICY 317, 329-332 (Roberto Echandi and Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013) Anthea Roberts, 
Triangular Treaties, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 380; Yackee, supra note , at 398. For a more nuanced 
take, see José Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL., 17, 41-42 (2009) (rejecting a 
“mono-causal” explanation of why States sign BITs, and advancing a number of important geo-
political considerations in play).  
193. Crawford, supra note , at 353. 
194. Craswell, supra note , at 1. 
195 CISG, supra note , art. 6. 
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The outstanding question is whether there might yet be some guiding principle, and, 
if so, where to find it.  
 What is clear is that, to the extent treaties apply to contracts, the point is in 
part to protect the parties’ contractual arrangements. Certainly investment treaties 
are meant to provide an added level of security to the parties' relations. But the point 
is just as surely to do so in a way that encourages contractual relations between 
states and foreign investors—to better enable the parties to plan together, and 
allocate risk in their joint affairs—not to make planning more difficult. From this 
point of view, it would be quite problematic if treaties were to stand in the way of 
the parties’ ability to allocate risk as they see fit—at least as a general matter. 
Bearing in mind that treaties apply to investment contracts in order to protect the 
bargain, and to promote such bargaining in the future, it stands to reason that treaty 
protections should not generally denature contractual arrangements freely 
negotiated by states and foreign investors. If the goals of the treaty are understood 
as calling for respect for investment contracts, then it stands to reason that the 
guiding principle to resolving the treaty/contract question should be drawn from 
within the private law logic of contract.196  
A. The Value of Choice in the Logic of Contract 
It is useful to consider more closely the core conceptual difference in the logics of 
contract and property, in light of the goals of investment treaties to protect and 
promote foreign direct investment. With property, protection and promotion 
demand a certain kind of application of the treaty rules. To act as inducements, the 
treaty rules will have to impose a regular set of protections for foreign-owned 
property. The regularity of these protections, along with the levels of protection and 
the availability of an international forum are the incentives to invest. With contracts 
the situation is different. Here foreigners and sovereigns negotiate the risks 
themselves in the first cut. They structure and govern their own relationships. In 
this context, it is no longer clear that superimposing treaty protections on the asset 
in question—a carefully negotiated allocation of rights, duties, and risks—will have 
a positive effect on promoting investment. For the most part, ex ante, states and 
investors alike will want their own choices to control. Anything they cannot control 
will have to be priced into the contract. Too much rigidity can seriously undercut 
the parties ability to reach efficient outcomes, and too much stickiness can make 
the transaction costs of drafting intolerably high. 
 Put another way, in most instances, the closer that treaties come to imposing 
property-style rules on contracts, the more pressure they will put on the desirability 
of contracting in the first place. And herein lies the problem with the current 
tendency among investment tribunals, who do just that when they assume that treaty 
rules simply trump contract provisions negotiated by the parties.197 Property and 
                                                
196. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note ; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239, 254–56 (1983). 
197. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 37-42 (Feb. 12, 
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contract have quite distinct organizational logics—and only the logic of contract 
serves to adequately guide the disposition of investment treaty provisions in cases 
of investment contracts. In light of the objects and purposes of investment treaties, 
there is good reason to distinguish between property and contract here, and to treat 
contract claims with quite a bit more nuance than we have seen.  
 The basic organizing principle in the logic of contract is choice. There are, 
of course, great debates about the ultimate value (or values) of contract—whether 
it is the autonomy of the parties,198 or a more utilitarian vision of efficiency.199 This 
is not the place to wade deep into that discourse. Suffice it to say that across all 
these visions of contract choice is ultimately fundamental. The centrality of choice 
is obvious for those that emphasize autonomy and promise as the moral and legal 
core of contract.200 But choice plays just as big a role in utilitarian theories of 
contract. In the law and economics approach of scholars like Schwartz & Scott, 
efficiency is the central value—not autonomy—but, critically, efficiency is left up 
to the market.201 Party choice is still given as much respect as possible because, on 
this view, the parties are usually themselves better positioned to allocate risk 
efficiently than courts or legislatures—particularly in the case of sophisticated 
parties engaged in commercial contracts.202 Cutting a middle path between these 
classic theories, one recent and compelling account makes choice the centerpiece. 
Dagan and Heller’s liberal “choice theory of contract” gives autonomy pride of 
place, but builds efficiency into the theory as one of the primary goods contracting 
parties seek to achieve (along with community).203 This approach usefully 
distinguishes between types of contracts as an important aspect of choice. In at least 
some kinds of contracts, particularly commercial contracts between sophisticated 
parties, efficiency is all the parties seek to achieve—and we can assume that their 
choices are oriented toward such outcomes. In other kinds of contracts, values like 
community might be emphasized—as with marriage contracts or non-profit 
charters.204 Thinking about contracts in terms of types may affect our assumptions 
                                                
2010; Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 372-373 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 202-209 (May 27, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award, ¶¶ 115-123 (May 12, 2005). 
198. See, e.g., DAGAN & HELLER, supra note , at chs. 4-7; FRIED, supra note , at 71-73; Kraus, supra 
note , at 1611-19; Seana Valentine Schiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and 
Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 520 (2008). 
199. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note , at 552. 
200 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note , at 71-73; Kraus, supra note , at 1611-19; Schiffrin, supra note , at 
520. 
201. Schwartz & Scott, supra note , at 618. 
202. Id. 
203. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note . 
204. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note , at ch.6.  
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about just what the parties have chosen in particular instances, and may give reason 
to nudge parties one way or another through sticky defaults and mandatory rules. 
But ultimately, on this theory, the point of contract law is to prioritize choice—to 
make choice meaningful. The bottom line is, whether we emphasize efficiency or 
autonomy, and whatever values particular parties emphasize in particular contracts, 
it should be clear that choice lies at contract’s heart. 
 The logic of contract law is thus inextricably oriented around respect for 
party choice: choices about what kinds of contract to adopt, and choices about the 
terms within any particular contract.205 To the extent that investment treaties apply 
to contracts, they create contract law—and this law should resonate with contract’s 
basic logic. In determining the interaction between investment treaty and state 
contract, the first principle should be respect for the contracting parties’ own 
choices—though this surely means treaties will apply differently to contracts than 
other assets like real property, or, for that matter, sovereign debt or intellectual 
property.206 Treaties, in other words, should not normally be used to rewrite 
contractual arrangements.207 Whatever their content, the basic presumption should 
be that investment treaty norms apply to contracts as no more than defaults, which 
the parties are free to contract around. 
B. The Value of Choice in International Investment Law and Policy 
 Beyond bringing the burgeoning investment treaty law on contracts into 
greater coherence with contract theory, the choice-oriented approach advocated 
here offers real policy payoffs for international investment law. Most debates in the 
field treat the interests of states and investors as essentially zero-sum. The battle 
lines tend to be drawn over how much investment treaties impinge on the state’s 
policy space,208 or how much they undercut its sovereign authority.209 Too often 
                                                
205. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note . 
206 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, ¶ 481(Recalling that trademarks are not 
normally insulated from regulatory interference, the Tribunal explained that “if investors want 
stabilization they have to contract for it.”). 
207. Crawford, supra note , at 373-74. 
208. Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment 
Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2014). 
209. Critics have tried to reconceive international investment law in public law terms, in hopes of 
rebalancing the regime toward states. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private 
Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 283, 304-08 (2010) (invoking the “margin of appreciation”); Mattias Kumm, An Empire 
of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, 
EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, May 25, 2015, at 1, 4 n.2, 7 (invoking “proportionality” and 
“subsidiarity”); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 
LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 76 (2010) (invoking “proportionality”); see also Stephan W. Schill, 
Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 579-80 (2012). I am sympathetic to public law scholars’ concern about the 
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this debate is portrayed as a conflict between commercial lawyers who tend to be 
“investor-friendly,” and “state-friendly” public lawyers—as if private law is 
intrinsically insensitive to public regulatory values.210 The approach advocated here 
belies this false distinction, to the benefit of states and investors alike. The 
treaty/contract issue is not zero-sum. The question of whether a treaty or contract 
norm gets priority does not easily divide into “investor-friendly” and “state-
friendly” approaches. At least from the ex ante perspective, neither rigidity nor 
flexibility clearly favors one party or the other. Indeed, rigidity generally 
undermines both sides’ interests ex ante, while flexibility is generally the optimal 
approach.211 
 The basic problem is that too much rigidity prevents states from adequately 
managing the significant risks entailed in high-value contracts with private 
parties—not least to their long-term regulatory autonomy. Take, for example, a 
typical damages rule. It is usually understood that the proper measure of damages 
for a violation of FET is fair-market value (FMV), which amounts to expectation 
damages in contract cases.212 What if, however, the contract was negotiated under 
a national legal order that provides only reliance damages by default for contracts 
with the state? Or what if the parties explicitly selected a liquidated damages 
provision? 
 From the state’s perspective, the stickier the FMV rule is, the more difficult 
it becomes for states to manage risks to their capacity to regulate in the future. High-
value contracts with foreign investors will have an unavoidable chilling effect on 
subsequent regulation, which may in turn chill the prospect of contracting. This is 
all the more problematic when it comes to contracts in sensitive areas like the 
extractive industries or water services, which are perennially likely to generate risks 
to health and environment. And the chilling effects will be felt all the more acutely 
                                                
threat the regime poses to public values. But I am skeptical of the too-easy invocation of national or 
transnational public law doctrines as a panacea for global investment law—for both principled and 
contingent reasons, given current institutional arrangements. See Julian Arato, The Margin of 
Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 548-52 (2014); see also Philip 
Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Gary Born, 
¶¶ 190-191 (rejecting the majority’s transposition of the margin of appreciation into international 
investment law). 
210. This is assuredly not true. As this Article has sought to demonstrate in one particular area, a 
nuanced approach to private law can be highly sensitive to public values. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra 
note . Particularly in the transnational context, the power of contract can be highly liberating for 
states concerned to protect their public values. 
211 Notably, even ex post, it is not clear that any particular resolution to the treaty/contract issue will 
always hew toward one party or the other. Take, for example, a rule that treaty dispute resolution 
clauses are mere defaults. This cut against the Claimants in SGS v. Philippines, where the exclusive 
forum selection clause in the underlying contract prevented bootstrapping the contract claims to the 
level of the treaty via the umbrella clause. But the same rule cut against the Respondent in Oxus, 
where the Respondent was equally barred from bringing counterclaims against the Claimant under 
a contract that exclusively selected domestic courts for dispute resolution.  
212. Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note , at 737. 
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by emerging economies. A rational state will have to price such risks into their 
contracts.  
 And herein lies the problem for investors—who may well want to shoulder 
more risk in the hopes of greater reward. In the context of foreign direct investment, 
some degree of risk in the hopes of greater rewards is , after all, the point. While it 
may seem, at the point of litigation, that any investor would want an investment 
treaty to offer as much protection to the private party as possible, the matter has to 
be assessed ex ante. If the treaty protections imposed on a contract are too great, 
the State may be pushed into offering investors less attractive investment 
opportunities in order to insure itself, or may even be dissuaded from contracting 
under the shadow of the treaty altogether. Such chilling effects are precisely the 
opposite of what these treaties seek to achieve—the protection and promotion of 
foreign direct investment. 
 By contrast, much of the sting of even highly investor-friendly rules would 
be removed if they merely provided default baselines—if, for example, the parties 
can contract around the presumption of FMV, that is, expectation damages, 
inhering in the treaty. True, the state might find itself on the back foot in contract 
negotiations—as compared to negotiating a similar contract with its own national, 
in which the law of the contract might entail a lesser measure (such as reliance 
damages) by default.213 But, much more importantly, the power would still lie with 
the contracting parties to allocate the risks among themselves. 
 Contract represents the crucial tool for states to structure projects with 
investors in ways that allocate risk at tolerable levels. To the extent that states are 
concerned about the possible effects of high-value investment contracts on their 
capacity to regulate in the future, they ought to be able to insure against such risks 
in the structure of the deal. But these strategies only mitigate risk if such contractual 
choices are ultimately given effect. If highly protective treaty provisions are treated 
as mandatory rules, as is apparently implied by the rigid interpretations of 
investment treaties espoused by cases like CMS Gas and SGS v. Paraguay, it 
becomes much more difficult for states to manage their risks ex ante. The 
consequence of such a rule is not just regulatory chill, but contractual chill. If treaty 
provisions like a robust version of legitimate expectations or expectation damages 
are effectively mandatory, states will have to price these background norms into 
their deals with foreign investors in order to insure themselves—and in some 
instances the risks might dissuade them from contracting at all. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, the basic rule that contractual choices ought to be given priority 
over treaty norms enhances the autonomy of the state. 
 The approach here benefits investors as well. It might seem that foreign 
investors would want investment treaties to afford as much protection as possible. 
This would certainly appear to be the case from a glance at any investor’s brief at 
the point of litigation, when investors are often engaged in bet the company cases. 
And it may be that as far as assets like real property go, the more treaty protection 
offered the better the inducement to invest. But this is not the case in contract. 
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Particular investors may simply not value certain provisions—when, for example, 
they trust the state’s national courts. To the extent that the state party values 
avoiding international arbitration, such investors should be able to offer opting out. 
In other cases, investors may want to take on some risk—no business venture is 
risk free, and in at least some cases an the appeal of foreign investment is the 
possibility of taking on elevated risks in the hopes of high rewards. And as 
importantly, sometimes such risks can be more efficiently managed in other ways, 
through, for example, political risk insurance.214 Investors surely want some 
measure of security in engaging with foreign sovereigns, but not necessarily at the 
expense of all rewards. Certainly, at the least, they want states to be able to 
negotiate over risk. If, however, treaties create rigid rules that mandate certain 
allocations of risk, investors may not be able to secure the risk profile they want. 
If, for example, states are forced to anticipate paying expectation damages where 
changes in regulation vitiate the value of a contract, they may not be willing to 
negotiate with foreign investors at all—and even if so, a rational state will have to 
price in such risks. If the investor wants to shoulder some of the risk, say by 
agreeing to a liquidated damages provision, she should be able to make a 
meaningful offer to do so.  
 Finally, generally speaking neither party would want too many treaty 
provisions to be sticky, at risk of balooning the transaction costs of drafting. There 
may be some special exceptions where good policy reasons require making certain 
provisions more difficult to contract around—which I consider further below. But, 
in general, all parties should prefer to have confidence that their choices will be 
enforced without having to engage in too many drafting acrobatics. 
 The point is that, at least ex ante, investors and states alike should prefer an 
arrangement in which the treaty enables them to allocate risk as they see fit. The 
investor still gets a sizeable benefit from the treaty, which generally put in place 
highly protective provisions on breach, defenses, damages, and forum selection by 
default. Thus the state begins negotiation somewhat on the back foot. But at the 
same time the State will still be able to manage its risk so long as the parties’ 
contractual choices ultimately take precedence over the background treaty norms. 
C. Justifying Constraints on Choice 
Insofar as investment treaties apply to contracts, their provisions should be 
presumptively understood as doing so only by way of defaults. The general rule 
should be that the contracting parties’ choices prevail over background treaty 
                                                
214 Public and private insurers offer investors insurance against political risks. DOLZER & SCHREUER, 
supra note ___, at 228-229. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) is a good 
example. The MIGA is an international institution, connected to the World Bank. It offers 
prospective investors an array of schemes to ensure themselves against political and regulatory risks. 
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and states before disputes arise and in their early stages – often obviating the need for dispute 
resolution. See www.miga.org/who-we-are. 
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protections. Yet there may still be instances in which constraints on party choice 
might be justifiable. 
 Though they differ widely in extent, most national legal orders do 
incorporate some limits on contracting parties’ capacity to choose how to structure 
their arrangements—partially (via sticky defaults) or completely (via mandatory 
rules).215 Such constraints on party choice are usually justified in one of two broad 
ways: on grounds intrinsic to the logic of contract, or on the basis of external values. 
The first type of justification considers sticky defaults and mandatory rules 
appropriate where they serve to enhance party autonomy, for example by putting 
the parties on equal footing or by correcting for certain market failures.216 These 
kinds of constraints serve to ensure the rules of the game, protect basic fairness 
among contracting parties, and the like. A second type of justification for 
constraining choice relies on extrinsic values—including, classically, mandatory 
rules invalidating contracts of enslavement or contracts to commit a crime.217 
 The same logic might apply to the treaty/contract issue in international 
investment law. Although in general there are strong reasons to allow parties to 
contract around treaty norms, there may be specific instances in which it makes 
sense to treat a particular treaty provision—or aspects of it—as sticky or mandatory. 
And as in national law, such reasons might be either intrinsic to the logic of 
contract, or extrinsic in the service of some other value.   
 Again, it must be borne in mind that the treaties do not clearly resolve the 
matter one way or the other, in general or vis-à-vis any of their norms. So 
interpreters are left to explore the issue on the basis of principles. Given the 
importance of the basic principle supporting party choice in investment 
contracts,218 significant caution should be exercised here. A first corollary is that 
any such departure from the general rule favoring contractual choice must be 
justifiable and justified—not simply assumed, as several of the cases have been 
wont to do.219 Ideally, we would also expect that, in determining that a default is 
sticky, a tribunal would afford some explanation of how the parties could have 
contracted out—for the benefit of future contracting parties.220 A second corollary 
is that there are strong reasons to limit the pool of such exceptions. The greater the 
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number of sticky treaty defaults, the more complicated drafting becomes—which 
has an exponential effect on transaction costs.221 There may be reasons to deviate 
from the general rule in some cases, but such sticky defaults should be based on 
especially compelling reasons and not be stricter than necessary. 
 Keeping these principles in mind, it is easier to start with the possibility of 
intrinsic justifications for constraints on contractual choice in investment treaties. 
The example of forum selection clauses provides a plausible example where 
stickiness might be justified—though I raise it only by hypothesis here, in full 
recognition that there may be countervailing reasons to limit investor-state dispute 
resolution to a default. The SGS cases reveal two distinct visions of interaction 
between contract and treaty on the issue of forum selection.222 SGS v. Philippines 
privileges the contracting parties’ choice to exclusively select national courts for the 
resolution of all disputes arising out of the contract—thereby displacing the treaty 
forum.223 On this view, the treaty does not rewrite the contract.224 SGS v. Paraguay, 
by contrast, privileges treaty over contract.225 There, even an express clause 
exclusively selecting national courts does not waive the investor’s right to 
international arbitration under the treaty.226 On this view, from the ex ante 
perspective the treaty provisions must be understood as effectively mandatory. As 
argued above, the SGS v. Paraguay interpretation rests on a faulty premise that 
treaty and contract are radically separate, which should be discarded.227 There is no 
good reason why fully informed and sophisticated investors and sovereign states 
should not be able to structure their investments around treaty jurisdiction. Indeed, 
investors may well want to disclaim such rights if it can fetch them a better price—
especially if they are sufficiently confident in the national courts. But that does not 
mean such a provision should be easy to contract around. 
 Though treaty provisions on international dispute resolution should 
certainly be understood as defaults, there may be reason to treat them as relatively 
sticky. Recall that investment treaties are international agreements between states 
to protect their nationals, and most states are subject to numerous such 
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instruments.228 Investment treaties are meant to afford protection to all covered 
nationals, whether they know it or not. And there is real concern  about whether 
investors are fully aware of their treaty rights in making the decision to invest 
abroad—indeed, the empirical evidence shows that, with the exception of repeat 
players in certain fields, like oil and gas, investors are often not aware that they 
might be empowered to sue host states before an international tribunal.229 Arguably, 
then, there may be cause to push states to convey information to putative investors 
about their default rights to treaty fora, where they may not otherwise be aware of 
what they are giving up. 
 If such concerns about information asymmetries were sufficiently 
compelling, treaty provisions on dispute resolution might justifiably be act as a 
particular kind of sticky default—meant to force states to convey information about 
treaty rights to foreign investors—as apparently envisioned by the Tribunal in 
Crystallex.230 Fully informed contracting parties could still get around such a 
clause, but only by including language evidencing that all sides were sufficiently 
informed. On this view, even the following clause might not suffice: “all disputes 
shall be resolved exclusively before the courts of [x country].” Though expressly 
exclusive, such a clause would not guarantee against the relevant information 
asymmetries. On this view, to contract around the treaty, states would have to 
ensure that the contractual clause put the investor on sufficient notice, for example 
by stating “notwithstanding the [BIT]...” or “notwithstanding the existence of any 
international fora ...”.231 Such clauses would ensure that the investor had been 
aware of her rights, and was thus satisfied with the contract’s reallocation of risks.  
 Notice that this account is also similar to the Claimants’ argument in 
Kardassopoulos, on the question of liquidated damages.232 In my view, however, 
stickiness makes less sense in that context. To insist that all treaty provisions should 
be similarly sticky goes much too far—forcing the parties to disclaim the treaty by 
name any time they expect a contractual provision to deviate from its terms. Even 
aside from the transaction costs such drafting would involve, there is generally not 
sufficient reason to question the substantive deal between the parties. Any 
justification for treating forum selection as a special case would have to derive from 
                                                
228. See Yackee, supra note , at 398. 
229. See Yackee, supra note , at 400. 
230 Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482. 
231. Id. In another instance, Colombia contemplated this sort of reasoning in a 2014 draft concession 
contract, which sought to waive “investment arbitration contemplated in any [BIT] or other 
international treaty.” República de Columbia, Ministerio de Transporte, Agencia Nacional de 
Infraestructura, “Contrato de Concessión Bajo el Esquema de APP No. [*] de [*]” [Model 
Agreement], translated in Strong, supra note , at 692. As an aside, it would be wiser for the state to 
opt for a more general waiver clause, rather than mentioning any particular BIT by name, because 
arbitral jurisprudence generally allows corporate investors to change their nationality to access 
myriad treaties with relative ease—even after executing the contract. Arato, supra note , at 275–76. 
232. Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, Award, ¶ 481 (Mar. 3, 2010). 
164
J. Arato / Logic of Contract 
Forthcoming: Wm & Mary L. Rev. (2016) 48 
the structural importance of that particular provision.  
 There may indeed be compelling reasons for viewing treaty provisions on 
forum selection as sticky defaults. International dispute resolution by non-national 
arbitrators is, after all, the central structural innovation of the investment treaty 
regime—on which all confidence in the application of other treaty standards is 
based and on which the key enforcement mechanisms rely.233 Given its structural 
and institutional weight, there are arguably special reasons to ensure that parties are 
sufficiently aware of what they are giving up—which may justify stickiness in this 
limited context. But this rationale should not be taken too far vis-à-vis other treaty 
standards. In the context of damages, for example, there is much less reason to 
worry about whether parties would not be aware of the precise meaning of a 
damages cap—whether or not they knew of the existence of the treaty.  
 And what of extrinsic values? It is possible that some treaty rules might be 
justifiably considered sticky, or made sticky, for reasons wholly external to the 
logic of contract—for example, in the service of protecting the state’s capacity to 
engage in environmental or public health regulation. regulate in the areas of 
environment, or public health. A rationale for stickiness, in such contexts, would 
involve a classic concern about agency costs. The point is best expressed through 
hypothetical. The state’s capacity to regulate in the public interest is an omni-
present controversy in international investment law. Investment treaties tend not to 
include general exceptions provisions granting states carve-outs for bonafide 
regulation in the public interest.234 But occasionally such clauses appear, typically 
modelled on the WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).235 For 
example, the 2012 Canada—China BIT provides a long list of carve-outs on the 
model of GATT Art. XX, covering inter alia regulation in the interest of protecting 
public health, the environment, public morals, and more.236  
 Imagine a hypothetical investment treaty on this model, which includes a 
typical FET protection, along with a clause modeled on GATT Article XX, 
exempting the state from liability for any measures necessary to secure public 
health, environmental protection, and public morals. An investor negotiates and 
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executes a contract to explore dolomite in the state with a relatively low level 
official in the ministry of finance (or even a representative of a state-owned entity). 
Assume the contract includes a sweeping stabilization clause, guaranteeing the 
investor full compensation for any subsequent regulation that undermines the value 
of the contract. A year later the legislature passes sweeping environmental reforms 
that reduce the investor’s future profitability by 60%, and the investor brings suit 
under the Treaty. Can the State take advantage of the exceptions clause, or does the 
contract’s stabilization clause trump the State’s treaty protection? In other words, 
is the exceptions clause a mere default, a sticky default, or is it mandatory?  
 Since the issue is speculative, we can momentarily skip the question of 
proper interpretation and start with the normative question: what would be the 
rationale for making such an exceptions clause difficult to contract around? In my 
view, there is a compelling argument about agency costs here. The reality of foreign 
direct investment is that major investment projects are often executed by relatively 
low ranking state actors—and often employees of state owned enterprises. Many 
states lack the resources (or expertise) to rigorously vet these contracts across all 
government agencies for whom they might be relevant. If a hypothetical treaty 
exeptions clause were a mere default, a contractual stabilization clause like the 
above would seem to have the effect of abrogating the exception completely.  States 
might thus be justifiably worried about the possibility of lower level officials 
without all relevant expertise waiving the state’s regulatory exemptions under the 
treaty. Making the treaty exceptions sticky or mandatory would go a long way 
toward addressing these agency costs. A mandatory rule would eliminate such costs 
completely, though at the expense of some of the State’s bargaining power should 
it affirmatively want to offer such a stabilization clause in full knowledge of the 
consequences. A sticky default rule, dependent on a “notwithstanding international 
law” clause, would at least help ensure that the state officials were contracting on 
behalf of the state with adequate information.  
 Agency costs might provide a good justification for making a general 
exceptions provision resistant to contractual opt-out. If states were to contemplate 
enacting such a clause, they might take pains to make it sticky or even mandatory. 
Of course, if they were so inclined, it would be best to do so explicitly in the treaty 
text—in the mode of the CISG, or in national contract law-by indicating whether 
the clause could be waived at all, and if so, by what magic words. We need not 
speculate about how an interpreter should address this question absent any 
affirmative treaty language. Suffice it to say that extreme caution would be 
appropriate.  
 Framed in formal international legal terms, treating a limited set of treaty 
norms as sticky defaults could—in principle—resonate with the object and purpose 
of investment treaties. But such instances would have to be strictly justified. The 
treaties’ twin goals are, again, to protect and promote foreign direct investment.237 
In the context of contractual investments, this means respecting the parties’ 
bargains. In most cases this will mean privileging the parties choices. However, 
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partially constraining choice may be occasionally necessary to ensure that the law 
is protecting real bargains—ensuring that they are arms-length deals between 
sufficiently sophisticated parties. And treaty parties may well seek to constrain 
party choice in the service of values wholly extrinsic to the logic of contract. This 
may mean that some treaty norms are properly understood as stickier than others. 
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A BETTER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT 
CONTRACTS 
Investment treaties are creating a new international law of contracts, governing 
arrangements between states and foreign investors. But they are largely silent about 
what kind of law they create, and in particular how their norms relate to the express 
choices made by states and foreign investors in their covered contracts.238 I have 
argued that the jurisprudence lies in disarray, creating unbearable uncertainty.239 
The case law’s unjustified divergences make investing through contract insecure 
and highly inefficient, and pose a real threat to the state’s regulatory autonomy. I 
have proposed, here, a principled way of grappling with the problem, grounded—
perhaps counterintuitively—in private law.240 
 Drawing from the logic of contract, the basic organizing principle should 
be the choice of the parties. Privileging contractual choice in investment law is, 
unsurprisingly, the best way to enable investors to secure efficient contracts with 
foreign sovereigns. But it is equally the best way to empower states, without giving 
up on all security for investors. Contractual freedom here enables states to manage 
risk to their regulatory capacities. Privileging choice recognizes that the contracting 
parties are best positioned to regulate their interactions themselves, and empowers 
them to do so. This means understanding treaty norms as mere defaults, which can 
be overturned by any explicit contract language (if not choice of law). To the extent 
that they apply to contracts, treaties should serve the logic of contract—as systems 
of private law oriented toward self-regulation by private parties. 
 As a corollary to that principle, however, a degree of constraint on party 
liberty can be autonomy enhancing in some instances.241 Privileging the treaty over 
terms in the contract may make sense under certain limited circumstances—as, for 
example, a sticky default in cases when informational asymmetries seem likely to 
create a market failure, or otherwise undermine the goals of the investment treaty. 
Given their centrality in the treaty system, forum selection provisions might be a 
plausible candidate.242 Constraints on choice might also be justified on the basis of 
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values completely extrinsic to contract—though here in particular such constraints 
would be far more legitimate where formally enacted in the treaty text. But in any 
case, adjudicators ought to view such situations as exceptional, and carefully justify 
deviation from the norm by appeal to the logic of contract itself—rather than by 
simply insisting on the formal difference between treaty and contract claims, or by 
appealing to the general conflicts rule governing international law and national law. 
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